BLACK SEA,
ROMANIA AND
GREECE
REVIEW OF MILITARY HISTORY
Unu
ROMANIAN - HELLENIC SPECIAL ISSUE, 2008
CONTENTS
•	Preface - Lieutenant General NICHOLAS MASTRANDONIS, President of the Hellenic Commi-
ssion on Military History...................................................................... 2
•	Preface - Major General (Ret) Dr. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Director of the Institute for Political Studies of
Defense and Military History................................................................... 3
•	The Black Sea and the Beginnings of Hellenic Geopolitics - Dr. FANAGIOTIS FOURAKIS, Historian
and Collaborator of the Hellenic Commission on Military History................................ 5
•	Greek Cities in the North-Western Pontus - Dr. SERGIU I0S1FESCU, Senior Researcher of the Institute
for Political Studies of Defense and Military History.......................................... 8
•	The Greeks of the Euxine (Black Sea) in the Ancient and the Middle Ages - Dr. NICHOLAOS
SOL. DEPASTAS, Historian-Archaeologist, Sc. Collaborator and Ex Member of the HCMH/HNDGS,
Director of the 3rd Ollice AHL/HAGS........................................................... lg
•	The Byzantine Expansion in the Black Sea Area - Dr. ALEXANDRU MADGEARU, Senior Researcher
of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History........................ 22
•	Romanians and Greeks in the XVIIth Century - Dr. MIRCEA SOREANU, Senior Researcher of the
Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History............................... 32
•	The French-German Antagonism in the Balkans before World War I. Finance and Armaments.
The Case of Romania and Greece - Professor Dr. IOANNIS ANTONOPOULOS, Associate Member
of the Hellenic Commission on Military History......................... 37
•	Treaty of Bucharest The Role of Romania in the End of Balkan War II - Dr. EFPRAX1A S. PASCHAL1D0U,
Historian, Hellenic Commission on Military History........................................ 44
•	The 534 Hellenic Air Squadron in Southern Russia (1919) - RAISAROUPANIAZOPOULOU TR1ANIAFILIA A
Historian of the Hellenic Air Force History Museum, Member of the Hellenic Commission on Military
History................................................................................... 54
•	Romania, Greece and the Issues in the Black Sea (1919-1939) - Dr. PETRE OTU, President of the
Romanian Commission of Military History................................................... 55
•	Historical Development of the Legal Regime of the Straits and Access to the Black Sea (Euxeinos Pontos)
-	Rear Admirai Dr. STYL1ANOS POLITIS, Vice President of the Hellenic Commission on Military History.... 63
•	The Participation of Romania and Greece at BSEC. Cooperation Theory and Practice in the Balkans
-	ȘERBAN FILIP CIOCULESCU, Researcher of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense
and Military History...................................................................... 73
FRONT COVER: The training ship ‘Mircea', a Symbol of Romanian Military Navy, was often a bridge
between the romanian and greek sea shores
BACK COVER: The transfers and the bases of operation of the 534 Hellenic Squadron in the Allied South
Russia Campaign (1919), the Asia Minor Campaign (JUL 1919-AUG 1922) and the river Evros Front The
Red Arrow indicates the route of the Spad XIII in the 534 Squadron’s first mission of transporting the
French plane from Odessa to Brăila. The inset shows the flight's intended course to the Brăila airfield
and the plane's forced landing at Sulina (see the article by Kaisarou-Pantazopoulou Triantafillia)
■ Review of Military History ■
PREFACE
Ueutenant General NICHOLAS MASTRANDONIS
Presldent of the Hellenic Commission on Military History
It is a great pleasure and a privilege for myself to preface this second joint Hellenic-Romanian
publication under the general topic: “The Black Sea, a Link between Greece andRomania ”,
In the framework of the “Military Cooperation Programs” between Greece and Romania, that have
been in etfect since the year2000, the Hellenic Commission on MilitaryHistory (HCMH) and the respective
Romanian Commission, as well as the Romanian Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military
History set out to collaborate on the study of military history issues. The tirst successful attempt of
cooperation was a special Romanian-Hellenic issue on the “Reviewof MilitaryHistory”, in the year 2001.
Lastyear, continuingon ourfruitful cooperation, wereached the decision fora newjointpublication.
The Black Sea, an important area for both Romania and Greece, was selected as the general topic
around which the articles were going to develop.
The Black Sea, or Euxinus Pontus is an area of vital importance for SE Europe and the surrounding
countries. It is connected to the Mediterranean Sea by the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara, the Dardanelles
straits and the Aegean Sea. For the Greeks, the Black Sea is a well-known region since antiquity. It
constituted the centre of gravity for the ancient Greek mythology and the centerpiece of the Greek
colonization and the maritime commerce. Constantine the Greatin the year 330AD chose Nova Roma,
or Constantinople as the new capital for his Empire, ata point dominating the entrance to the Euxinus
Pontus.The wars of Russia against the Ottoman Empire, in the frameworkof the Eastern Question, had
alwaysas their maingoal the Russian aimfora wayoutto the Mediterranean Sea through, or around the
Black Sea.
The Dardanelles straits thatdominate and control the entrance to the Sea of Marmara constituted and
continue to be a cause of contlicts and constantlyaltered agreements amongst the Great Powers, Russia,
Turkeyand the rest of the Black Sea Coastal countries. In the beginning of theXXF Century, the pipelines
through and around the Black Sea lend a newdimension to the economical dispute in the whole area.
The scientiiic historical articles by the distinguished Romanian and Greek researchers, who
cooperated and worked on this joint edition, make a multilateral analysis of the role that the Black Sea
played on the relations of our countries. I believe that this form of cooperation contributes to a better
understanding and ameliorates ourrelationship. For this reason, Iwould like to express my appreciation
to all of them.
Last but not least, I would like to express my gratitude to the Director of the Romanian Institute for
Political Studies of Defence and MilitaryHistory, as well as to the President of the Romanian Commission
on Military History for their interest and concern, so that today we are able to have our second joint
edition.
■ Review of Military History ■
PREFACE
Major General (Ret) Dr. MIHAIL E. IONESCU
Director of the Institute for Political Studies
of Defense and Military History
The Hellenic and the Romanian Commissions of Military History, together with the Institute for
Political Studies of Defense and Military History, after seven years, are dedicating a newissue of the
“Review of Military History” to the history ofpolitical-military relations between our countries, with a
Pontic connotation this time.
Apeople ofnavigators andmerchants, the old Greeks „discovered” the Black Sea bythe expedition
of Argonauts in search of the Golden Fleece (XHIth Century B.C.), annexed it to the written history,
iirstly through Homer and Hesiodus, than in much circumstantiate manner, together with the entire
basin of the Danube, thanks tothe work of Herodotus. But, bythe Hellenic influence tothe development
of the autochthonous civilization, the historical relations between old Greeks and the Carpathian-
Danubian-Pontic regions and their inhabitants, the Geto-Dacians, date back from more than three
millennia.
Although the Black Sea is a part of the Eastern Mediterranean basin, being considered as its
prolongation, the possession of the Straits is the keyfor the geopolitical understanding of the history of
Pontus, of the political relations between the inhabitants of its shores and Greece.
The possession of the Straits is essentialnot only for the developement in the Aegean, but also for
the Black Sea. The Greekpossession of Dardanelles andBosphorus in the ancient world explained the
Greek colonization on the Pontic shores, afterward being challenged by the Persians.
On the eve of the Christian era the Roman expansion in the Pontic basin, the development of the
Roman Empire and the transformation of the BlackSea into a “Roman lake” werepossible by the strong
control over the Straits. Their excepțional geopolitical signiiicance is proved by the translation to
Constantinople of the capital of the Roman Empire and its survival, the Byzantine Empire. By the
function of the Black Sea as a “Byzantine lake” and of an “Imperial Danube” until the IVb Crusade
(1204), were possible the spreading of the mediaeval Greek civilization and the implementation of
political forms, essential for the incipient organization of Romanian statehood.
During the „Turkokrateia”and the lockingof the „Ottoman lake” - even if the BlackSea navigation
and trade relations between the Greeks and the Romanian Principalities have remained vigorous, the
Greek sailors and merchants being the main instrument of the naval Communications -, the Ottoman
control over the Straits mediated orprohibitedallpoliticalconnections. But even in these conditions, in
theXVP -XV!!!111 centuries, the influences and the flourish of the Greek culture were important for the
building of the modern civilization in the Romanian Principalities.
The Peace ofAdrianople (1829) started a new era for the Romanian - Greekrelations, by opening the
Blake Sea and the Danube to the great world trade and also by the emergence of a Greek state. The
important commercial partnership between Romania and Greece, the presence of colonies of Greeks
merchants in the Danubian and Pontic harbors influenced the development of the modern Romanian
urbanism.
Greece andRomania were involvedin the Balkan crisis of 1912 -1913 ended with the Peace Treaty
of Bucharest of 1913. The two countries were tinallyon the same side during the WWIand Greek units
participated atthe second French mission of General Berthelot in Romania (1919), in the North-Eastern
Black Sea.
If, after 1923, the Greek political interest was focused on the East Mediterranean, we assist to a
strong Balkan dimension of the Romanian-Greek relations, by purpose to conserve here, with the
Yugoslavian alliance, the Versailles system, and, with Turkey, the status of Black Sea. Predominantly
■ Review of Military History ■

Greekgeographicalattention has been monopolized by Eastern and Central Mediterranean Sea, according
to the geopolitical law that who owned the Straits has a possibility to connect the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean Sea.
After WWII, the Montreux convention (1936) and the Soviet Union naval predominance in the Black
Sea were the pillars for the codilication of its connection with the Mediterranean Sea.
After the fall of Soviet Union and of its domination over the Black Sea and East Europe, our countries
are involved in a newframe of cooperation, BSEC being a suggesting example. Of course, in the actual
geopoliticalsituation of the BlackSea basin we can emphasize an East-Westaxe, a strategic communication
of Europe with Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, but for Romania and Greece their new
pattern of evolution as members of European Union and allied countries in NATO, there are
complementarities ofcommon interests in Black Sea and in East Mediterranean basin.
Ihe present number of the “ReviewofMilitaryHistory” was worked out through the jointRomanian-
Hellenic efforts. Dr. Panagiotis Fourakis placed the beginning of the Greekgeopolitics in relation with
the Argonautes expedition in the Black Sea in search of Golden Fleece (XHIth Century B.C.). The
archaeological and historical sources concerning the Greek colonisation in the BlackSea and especially
in its North-West basin are presented by dr. Nicholaos Sol. Depastas and dr. Sergiu losipescu. The phases
of later Roman and Byzantine Empire expansion in Black Sea (IV11 ■Xll'h centuries) are reconstituted by
dr. Alexandru Madgearu.
Ihe contributions ofdr. Mircea Soreanu, dr. loannis Antonopoulos, and dr. Efpraxia S. Paschalidou as
well are consecrated to Modern Age, concerning the influences of the Greek culture in the Romanian
Principalities, in the XVlIth Century, the tinancial and weapons exports aspects of the competition for
Balkans between France and Germany, the Peace Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, with important
documentary contributions from the Greek archives. Events of this longer South-Eastern European
conilagration, from 1912 to 1920, are also analyzed by Triantafyllia Kaisarou-Pantazopoulou. RearAdmirai
dr. Stylianos Politis presents the question of the Straits since the Peace of Adrianople (1829) until today.
Finally, to the contemporaneous epoch are dedicated the ample studies of colleagues dr. Petre Otu
(Romania, Greeceand the Issues in theBlackSea. 1919-1939) andȘerban Filip Cioculescu, thelastone
treating the presentrole of Greece and Romania in BSEC.
The interest of the topics and the accuracy of the analysis give us high hopes for the future of our
collaboration. In an United Europe, in which both our countries have rediscovered each other, these
Romanian and Hellenic studies represent a contribution in the research of a common military past of
our continent, dreamed byjacques LeGolf, as a foundation for buildingits future.
4
■ Review of Military History ■-------
THE BLACK SEA
AND THE BEGINNINGS
OF HELLENIC GEOPOUTICS
Dr. PANAGIOTIS FOURAKIS
Historian and Collaborator of the Hellenic Commission
on Military History
The roots of Hellenic Geopolitics are found in
antiquity, both History and Mythology, and demon-
strate the significance of the sea in the continuous
endeavors of the Greeks to rule the known, by that
time, world.
At the beginning of the second millennium B.C.
in the wider space of Aegean Sea, two geocultural
Systems were established: the civilization of Cycla-
dic islands and the civilization of the Northeastern
Aegean Sea. Concerning the first, it must be
pointed that it developed the maritime trade as an
important factor for its further prosperity. The
island of Milos has been a pioneer to such kind of
development and really opened way for all kinds of
trading exchanges between the Cycladic islands
and the Southern coasts of continental Greece.
However, this activity contributed the most to the
development of the civilization of the Northeastern
Aegean Sea where many significant commercial
and maritime centers flourished such as the
Heraion of Samos, the Emporion of Chios, Thermi
fo Lesbos, Poliochni of Lemnos and Troy in the
Asia Minor northwestern coast. Especially
Poliochni exploited its significant strategic location
at the island of Lemnos, just outside the Straits of
Hellespont and therefore, managed to examine
high surveillance in the navigation of the maritime
space of northeastern Aegean Sea. The above
mentioned islands developed their maritime trade
to such a point that the social, political and financial
differences between them and the Coastal areas
were enormous.1 The sense of power that those
islands established, very soon led them to the
understanding that the full political and economic
control of the wider northern Aegean Sea and the
Straits was of high priority for the continuation of
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their prosperity. The most obvious example is the
case between Poliochni and Troy that according to
archaeological excavations shared a deep cultural
relation.2 However, the inequality that the two cities
appeared at all levels leads to the conclusion that
Troy was controlling the navigation of the Straits
but only in order to serve best the interests of
Poliochni.
The time that the Greeks demonstrated their
interest for the Black Sea was the Expedition of
the Argonauts (XIIIlh century B.C.). The age of the
Argonauts is one phase of Hellenism that the
management of the Aegean space and of the wider
Eastern Mediterranean Sea commenced granting
itself new dimensions due to the fact that the
Mycenaeans extended their dominance from Crete
to the Black Sea. However, it was the Argonauts
that led the Mycenaean world to the northern
coasts of the Aegean Sea, which is the Black Sea.
The Argonauts have been the first social group of
Hellenism which, according to tradition, struggled
for the fulfillment of certain geopolitical goals of
high significance in the beginning of Hellenic
History.
Thucydides did not mention anything in his
History (especially the first book known as
“Archeology”) concerning the Expedition of the
Argonauts because he considered it to be a part of
Hellenic mythology3 that he could not verify with
facts and eye-witnesses. However, contemporary
Science concludes that the Expedition of the
Argonauts has historically been the outcome of
brave ventures of Greek seamen in their effort to
create colonies in the Black Sea.
According to Herodotus, the Expedition of the
Argonauts has been only a part of the conflicts
-----------------------------------EU—
between Greeks and Asians that culminated with
the Greek-Persian wars of the Vlh century B.C. It
followed the kidnapping of Europe from the Cretans
and preceded the Trojan War.4
For the Mycenaeans, their expansion to the
Black Sea was imposed by both geostrategic and
geoeconomic reasons. Their prime at the second
half of the second millennium B.C. was basically
the outcome of the Aegean prime and the Black
Sea was considered to be a geostrategic part of it.
Behind the legendary venture of the Argonauts
hides the historic reality of the geopolitical
development of the Mycenaeans in the wider Black
Sea space until the Caucasian coasts. The Golden
Fleece symbolizes the will for adventurism and
danger which are elements that almost always are
found at the beginnings of every powerful naval
dominion, such as the Mycenaean. The very same
description of the Golden Fleece is nothing more
than the granary of the Black Sea coasts which
was considered quite vital for the survival of the
Mycenaeans5 and later the Athenians. But the
whole structure of the Argonaut legend symbolizes
the geopolitical (both strategic and economic)
unification of the wider Aegean space and the Black
Sea. This unification is the cultural consequence
of the transformation of the Aegean Sea into a
“close” Mycenaean sea which is based on two
factors: the first is the maritime power which is
established through the development of trade that
transfers agricultural products such as olive oii and
wine and ceramics. The second factor is clearly
geopolitical: it aimed at the complete control
(economic, political, military) of the Aegean Sea.6
The colonization of the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean Sea, which was systemized from
the IXlh century B.C. and onwards, contributed to
the intensiveness of trade due to the fact that from
the VII111 century and onwards all the Coastal areas
of the known ancient world were inhabited by Greek
cities that kept very close relations with their
metropolis.7 This trade intensiveness transformed
the very deep nature of the way the trading was
held: from the exchange of goods to the monetary
trade. This cultural development led to the creation
of a new social class, the middle class which started
questioning the tradițional rights of aristocrats to
govern the cities. That resulted to the outbreak of
civil wars inside the city-states of the archaic world
(VIII,h - VIth century B.C.) and the appearance of
tyranny. It is true that tyranny supported the middle
classes and opened way for democracy that
culminated in the Vlh century B.C.8 Thucydides,
though he considered tyranny to be an authori-
tarian political system, connected it with the
building of the first triremes,9 the ancient war ships
that secured Athenian domination and sea power.10
The most prestigious of the Athenian tyrants
was Peisistratos who was aiming to transform his
city into the center of all Aegean developments
and for that reason he built a sacred temple to the
island of Delos in the honor of god “Apollo Patroos”
(“fatherhood”). At the same time, he sought the
economic and military development of Athens by
the creation of colonies that were controlled by
the metropolis. One of those main strategic steps
was the (re)colonization of Sigeio, that was located
at the Straits of Hellespont. Thus, Athens secured
the supplying of wood for the construction of the
triremes and silver,11 and at the same time con-
trolled the Black Sea navigation.
The social and political reforms of Peisistratos
were followed by Kleisthenis who basically laid the
foundations of Democracy.12 The Greek-Persian
Wars of the early decades of the Vlh century (490
and 480-479 B.C.) demonstrated the Athenian naval
superiority and established the Athenian / Delian
League which aimed at the prosperity of the people
of Athens and the assumption of leadership of
Hellenism. Themistocles’ naval program has been
the crucial factor for that purpose.13 The military
structure of the League, which was divided into
administrative peripheries (“phoroi”), was very
strict and each city-member had certain economic
or other obligations. Such an administrative
periphery was the one of Hellespont which
controlled the Black Sea navigation. Thus, the
Athenians managed not only to transform the
Aegean Sea into a “mare nostrum” but also to
prevent any ill will against their wider geopolitical
interests in the Black Sea that was now considered
to be part of the Aegean Sea.
Pericles, the leader of Athens who culminated
the glory of his city in the middle of the Vlh century
6
■ Review of Military History ■
B.C., promoted a dynamic plan that basically aimed:
a) to unify the two seas into Athenian geopolitical
fields of comprehensive defense against any
possible future Persian expansion to the west and
b) to establish them as the base for the develo-
pment of their economic program towards the
wider Mediterranean Sea. The Black Sea granary
was of high importance for the Athenians and
therefore, the control of the Straits was crucial
for them. Thus, the transformation of the Aegean
Sea into an “Athenian lake” without the simul-
taneous control of the Hellespont navigation was
pointless. Despite their efforts, the Athenians did
not manage to control the Southern seas, such as
Cyprus and Egypt, since the Persians with their
Phoenician allies dominated Eastern Medi-
terranean Sea. Thus, the control of the Aegean
and the Black Seas was vital. It is worth noticing
that Athens supplied corn from the Black Sea
granary to all her allies and thus secured their
obedience and loyalty to the League, even though
it is true that she never hesitated to use military
force in order to preserve order.
The importance of the Hellespont Straits
according to the Periclean geostrategy, was proved
in the third phase (413-403 B.C.) of the Pelo-
ponnesian War (431-403 B.C.) when the Spartans,
being assisted by the Persians, transported the
conflict to the Aegean Sea and the Straits. The
definite naval battle of the Aigos Potamoi of the
Hellespont Straits in 405 B.C. surprised the
Athenians and led to their defeat.
Concluding, the Black Sea has always been of
high significance for the Greeks in antiquity. It is
important to conclude that Hellenic geopolitics
commenced and realized at the Aegean Sea and
the Black Sea has always been considered to be its
northern coast. For the Greeks the sea was an
endless path of wealth and expansion that had to
be discovered and dominated at all costs. If the
Aegean Sea was their home, the Black Sea was
their courtyard and therefore, it had to be
preserved carefully.
11	. Loucas, Aegean Sea, History and Geopoli-
tics of Hellenism from Pre-History to the Alexander
era, (‘Aigaio Pelagos, Istoria kai Geopolitiki toii
Ellinismoyapo tin proistoria os tous Alexandrinous
chronous’), Athens, Papazisis,1993, p. 32-57.
2	L. Bernardo-Brea, Poliochni. Citta preistorica
nell’ isola di Lemnos, Roma, L’ Erma, 1964-1976
(Monographie della scuola Archeologica di Atene
e delle Missioni Italiane in Oriente).
3	Concerning the legend of the Argonauts see
Roussos E., entry “Argonautiki Ekstrateia” in
Pagkosmia Mythologia, Ekdotiki Athinon, Athens,
p. 56 and onwards.
4	See Herodotus, 1,1 and onwards.
51	. Loucas, Aegean Sea, ed. cit., p. 65 and on-
wards.
6I	. Loucas, GeopoliticalTrilogyofHellenism,
Part One: the Brotherhood of Argonauts and the
Clash of Civilizations (“Geopolitiki Trilogia tou
Ellinismou, Logos Protos: I aderfotita ton Argo-
nauton kai I sygkrousi ton politismon”), Athens,
Esoptron 2003, p. 118.
7	See H. Bengson , History of Ancient Greece
(“Istoria tis Archaias Elladas”), Athens, Melissa
1979, p. 80 and onwards. Also, Wilcken U., Ancient
Greek History (‘Archaia Elliniki Istoria Athens,
Papazisis 1976, p. 118 and onwards.
81	. Loucas, Geopolitical Trilogy of Hellenism,
ibid, p. 144.
9Ibid,p. 153-4.
10	Thucydides, 1,13.
11	U. Wilcken, Ancient Greek History, ed. cit.,
p. 153 and onwards.
12	See H. Bengson, History of Ancient Greece,
ed. cit., p. 126 and onwards. Also, U. Wilcken, An-
cient Greek History, ed. cit., p. 154 and onwards.
13	For Themistocles’ naval program, see G.S.
Maridakis, The Law of Themistocles on naval ar-
mament (“O nomos tou Themistokleous peri
thalassiou exoplismou’), Athens, 1963.
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GREEK CmES
IN THE NORTH-WESTERN PONTUS1
Dr. SERGIU IOSIPESCU
Senior Researcher of the Institute for Political Studies
of Defense and Military History
When the first „Citizen of the world” - after
Proclos - son of river God Meles, and of nymph
Cretheis, the great Homer was telling the story of
the Trojan War and of Odysseos’s wanderings,
Greek navigators had already reached the Pontus.
The Foetknew about the Euxinos lands, the Istros
and the people in the neighborhood, or even be-
cause of the prejudices “he shifted (...) toward the
Ocean the happenings from Pontus, thinking that
people (...) would accept them easier”.2 However,
near the mouths of Istros is located the rocky is-
land Leuce (White), surnamed of the Achilles’,3
where, later on, the sailors from Milet will build a
temple dedicated to pontarch Achille, under who’s
auspices were placed the navigation and commerce
in Pontus.4
Through an extraordinary chance, the most
valuable geographic work of the classical antiquity
is due to a scholar from the shores of the Black
Sea, Strabon (69 B.C.-19 A.D.) of Pontic Amaseia.
Thus, the information of the illustrious geographer
about the region of the Lower Danube and Pontus
are of prime rank, his conception combining the
data of cartography with those of anthropogeo-
graphy.
Strabon focused his description of the North-
western Pontus on Istros, which had seven mouths
at that time. Sailing along the “left” (western) shore
of the Sea, the first mouth was the Sacred one,
where entering one could reach, after a floating of
120 stadia, the island Peuce. From the seventh
mouth of Istros to Tyras there were 300 stadia, on
this shore being located two lakes, one of which
being opened as a harbor, further on the river Tyras
being navigable. Between the Istros and Tyras was
the “Getic desert”, less inhabited because around
the last river were living the Tyragets.5
According to Eratosthenes, the left bank of
Istros, around the river mouths appeared as a swam,
which gave the name of Salmydessos and those
sand banks formed in the Sea by the waste brought
by waters and named by sailors “chests”.6 From
the Sacred mouth, Strabon enumerate the settle-
ments of: Istros, Milesian colony, Torni, the town
Callatis, colony of Heracleia, then Bizone “a part
of which sunk due to earthquakes”, Crunoi, Odessos,
Milesian colony, Naulochus founded by Mesem-
brians and beyond the Haemus mountains,
Mesembria, Megarian colony, and Apollonia,
Milesian creation.7
To Strabon’s enumeration must be added, on
the Peuce branch upstream of Histria, the city
Orgame/Argamum, the first to be mentioned in a
narrative source - Europe by Hecateos of Milet
(Centuries VI-V B.C.).8 There should be also added,
in the Christian era, the Stratonis pyrgos (Straton’s
tower) between Tomis and Callatis, Amlaidina,
Parthenopolis, and beyond Callatis, Gerania.9
If Strabon limits his description to the Pontic
shores, another great geographer of classical an-
tiquity is preoccupied with the course of the Danube.
Famous in its time, the Geographicalguide by
the great Alexandrian Claudius Ptolemeus from
the II”d Century A.D., based on the not less valu-
able longitude and latitude calculations made by
Marinos of Tyr, comprises the succinct descrip-
tion of the North-Western Pontic shore and of the
last part of the Danube. Along this river, Ptolemeus
recorded Durostorum, Transmarisca, Sucidava,
Axiopolis - downstream of which the great river
was named Istros - Carsium, Troesmis, Dinogetia,
Noviodunum, Sitioenta/Aigypsoenta, in fact
Aegyssus. From the city of Noviodunum, Istros
separated its waters, flowing into Euxinos Pontos
through numerous mouths named from North to
South: Thiagola or Psilon, Boreion, Naracion,
Pseudostomos, Kalon, Peuce or Sacred. After this
mouth it was following a promontory, Pteron, tiran
the cities Istros, Torni, Callatis, Dionysopolis, prom-
ontory Tiristis, Odessos and beyond the mouths of
the river Panysos, Mesembria. North of the
Danube’s delta, the Geographical Guide enumer-
ates the city of Harpis/Carpis, the village of
Hermonact, Tyras city at the mouths of the hom-
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■ Aerlal view of the
ancient city of
Dolojman Cape
(Orgame/Argamum on
the Danube's branch
Peuce)
onym river, Ophiussa and Niconium,10 the last,
probably a colony of Istros after the multitude of
Histrian coins and the type of ceramics remains.
But, beyond navigation and commerce, foun-
dation of Hellenic settlements in the Mediterra-
nean basin looks to be due to internai causes, a
congenital crisis of Greek cities, “stenahoria” -
word entered into the Romanian language in the
XVIIIth Century - the increasing population in the
first urban centers which became crowded. Fa-
vored by a mild climate, taming the winters espe-
cially in the Pontic zone, imposed by the inner
crisis (stasis), between “interests groups”, coloni-
zation followed naturally the paths of navigation
and commerce, and the establishment took into
consideration with preponderance the maritime
accessibility, possibilities of defense and the atti-
tude of inhabitants, water resources and the qual-
ity of soil, eventually.
Recent researches tend to consider the archeo-
logical material discovered in the fortification from
Dolojman cape the oldest Greek settlement in the
North-Western Pontic basin and to identify it with
Orgame. Despite it was the first city to be men-
tioned by Greek sources at the edge of the VI/V
Centuries B.C.,11 it appears only in the epigraphic
monuments of the Roman epoch. However, as the
official cadastre of Histria, in the year 100 A.D.,
indicates the neighboring territory of the
Argamenses, the result of archeological excava-
tions seems to find such support, since probably
only the existence of boundaries prior the estab-
lishment of the Milesian city could impose. In the
silence of the written sources, archeological dis-
----■ Review of Military History ■------------------
coveries, starting with those by Paul Nicorescu12
(1926-1932), and especially those after 1965 by Maria
Coja and collaborators revealed the life of the city
in the VIIth Century B.C., until the beginning of the
second Christian millennium. As, otherwise, the
first researcher of the site, Paul Nicorescu, did, the
evolution of the Greek polis must be connected with
the fortification from Bisericuța, on the littoral is-
land in front of Dolojman cape. Even if in the ab-
sence of some stratigraphic circumstantially deter-
minations a correlation between the two sites can
not be made, suggestion by the former professor of
the University of Iași is important because it draws
the attention upon the old hydrographic configura-
tion favoring the location of the first Greek colony
on Istros at Dolojman cape. The position was domi-
nating the lake Halmyris and, of course, the temp-
tation of having a fortified correspondent on the
opposite shore at Bisericuța must have appeared
early.
If the last mention of the city is found in the
work of Procopius of Caesarea, On buildings, where
„Argamo” appears among the strongholds “along
Pontus Euxinos and river Istros”, erected by Jus-
tinian (527-565), archeological researches of the
last years revealed both the Hallstattian inhab-
itance (X-VIII Centuries B.C.), that preceded Greek
implantation, and the sporadic medieval presence
until the XIlh Century and thereafter; the discov-
ery of an engolpion cross in a tomb at Bisericuța13
demonstrates the Byzantine presence in these ru-
ins. But, urban life in Argamum, as in other Greek
polis of Scythia Minor ceased in the first half of the
VII111 Century, under still unclear circumstances.
An excepțional importance for the reconstitu-
tion of Greek life in North-Western Pontus had the
excavations started in 1914, at Histria, by Vasile
Pârvan (1882-1927), the founder of Romanian sci-
entific archeology.
Istros or Istropolis - the city on the river Istros
by excellence - Histria or Histros for Romans, was
according to tradition a colony of Miletos, estab-
lished after Eusebios-Hieronymos, in the year 657
B.C. With less precision Pseudo-Scymnos dated the
moment in the second part of the VII111 Century
B.C., thus allowing the archeological support of
ceramic pieces of Ionic imported poteries14 as well.
For the impact of the Milesian implantation in
these lands the burial ceremony is very signifi-
cant, since the VI"' Century B.C. in tomb necropolis
around Histria of some Getic leaders.15 This is a
proof of the normal relation with Getic population,
of leaders’ aspirations towards the Hellenic civili-
zation, visible also under other Pontic horizons.
However, the growing prosperity of the Milesian
colony in the next two centuries after establish-
ment is explained by the active commerce with
natives and by the possibility of relatively peaceful
exploitation of the rural domain (chora), which
gradually the city succeeded to take over. Oii,
wines, handicrafts imported or manufactured by
Istros colony penetrated further the great river,
being profitably traded for cereals, honey, furs,
skins, slaves, and especially fish, articles extremely
necessary to Greece and lonia.
This first stage of evolution was marked by the
great Persian expedition of King Darius, against the
Scythians (513 B.C.), to which were associated the
devastation traces in the archeological sectors of the
Sacred and X zones from Histria. This supposition is
sustained by some funerals in Histrian necropolis and
also by the narration of the Iranian expedition, the
construction of the transdanubian ship bridge taking
place, according to Herodotus, at the months of the
Danube, and the army of Darius marching Peuce
island toward the North Pontic steppes.
Reconstruction will not delay, toward the year
480 B.C. the city released its first coins, obvious
sign of a prosperous economic life. It was not ex-
empt of internai shakings provoked by the accu-
mulation of notable wealth in hands of a few fami-
lies of merchants, ship-owners, bankers, and land
owners, an oligarchy that understood to take over
the political leadership as well. Instauration of de-
mocracy took place under these conditions with
violence and sustained probably by Athens, orga-
nizer during the Peloponnesian war of the known
maritime periplus of Pericles in Pontus (436 B.C.).
The IVlh Century had to be perturbed, after its
first half, both by the penetration into Dobroudja
A part of the
Northern precinct
of Callatis
■ Review of Military History ■
of some Scythic tribes, under the rule of Ataias,
and by the reaction of Macedonian kings, eager in
the same measure to stop the invasion and to im-
pose their authority upon Greek cities of the Left
Pontus, as well.
In this context, The History of Philippos in-
cludes the episode of the resistance opposed to
Scyths by “Histrians”, led by a “Histrianorum
rex”.16 The absence of such dignity in Histria ex-
cludes the possibility of a “King” of Histrians, but
enhances the conviction of Getic presence on the
right shore of Istros and of contacts with the Hel-
lenic civilization of the Pontic colonies.
The expedition of King Philippos the II”d of
Macedonia against the Scyths of Ataias in 339 B.C.
succeeded not only to cast them out of Dobroudja,
but also to take under protection the realms to-
ward the Danube mouths, the final conquest stage
of the eastern part of Balkan Peninsula, after the
annexation, two years earlier, of the Thracic King-
dom of Odrys.
Under Lysimachos, the successor (diadoch) of
Alexander the Great, ruler and next King of
Thracia (323-281 B.C.), the protectorate was trans-
formed into an oppressive domination, against
which the Greek colonies will rise in arms in 313.
The war ended with a victory of the diadoch, Histria
being among the first of his conquests.
Despite the Macedonian king was defeated by
the Getic leader Dromichaites (approx. 292 B.C.),
his attempt to influence somehow the status of the
Greek colonies on the North-Western-Pontic lit-
toral failed, and the effective mastery of Lysi-
machos continued until his death.
On an indeterminate date, in the first part of
the IHrd Century B.C., the college of Synedroi in
Histria proposed the hiring of an architect, thus a
messenger of the city sent to Byzantium brought
Epicrates. The architect, son of Nikoboulos of
Byzantium, not only took appropriate measures for
work leasing, but also, during the war with “Olats”
- unknown people otherwise - zealously prepared
the defense of the city, than led the construction
of the town walls for two years, remaining for more
years in Histria and proving spotless behavior and
exquisite diligence. His remarkable merits were
rewarded by his coronation in the theatre with the
golden wreath at the time of Thargelia feast, by
allotting a bonus and the rightful wage, awarding
the quality of proxen, citizenship, cooptation
amongst the devotees of Apollo sanctuary, as well
as the right to enter and exit the harbor during
peace or war time, access to Council and People
----■ Review of Military History ■------------
■ An ancient ship from an inscription
of Istros/Histria
right after the holy problems are discussed. The
stone with the architect’s inscription, put in the
sanctuary of Apollo, reached in unknown condi-
tions at Monastery Dragomirna, its date and prove-
nience being cleared by Professor Dionisie M.
Pippidi.17
Epicrates’s activity in Histria was connected
with the reconstruction of a portion of the Helle-
nistic wall - archeologically ascertained18 - fol-
lowing the first riot of Pontic cities against
Lysimachos.
By the year 260 B.C. Histria joined Callatis in
the attempt to dispute with Byzantium the port of
Tomis. Callatians seemed to want to ensure their
exclusive control upon the Tomisian Emporium,
while the Byzantines sustained its opening. Al-
though, both parts called for the support of Pontic
Heracleia, Callatis metropolis did not intervene
with other than reconciliatory advices, and finally
the victory of Byzantium was decisive.19 Histria
did not suffer like her allied which, according to
Memnon - could not restore after this defeat.20
■ Callatis - Northern
part of the Roman-
Byzantine city
In fact, the respite for reconstruction was short
because since the end of the IIIrd Century B.C. the
Eastern-Carpathian and Istro-Pontic territories were
invaded by Bastarns - Germanic people, ulterior
settled on the Peuce island, in the immediate neigh-
borhood of Histria. The situation will get compli-
cated with the Celts’ invasion in the Balkans, the
establishment of Tylis Kingdom in the East of the
Peninsula - the coins of these kings, imitations of
Alexander the Grate’s tetradrahms, being discov-
ered on Danube’s fords at Giurgiu and Oltenița.
Under these circumstances, the Istropolitan lead-
ership had to focus its efforts to obtain protection
from the Getic King Zalmodegikos. The inscription
that notices the memorable moment of a messen-
ger’s mission was discovered exactly near the altar
of Zeus Polieus’ temple, among few inscriptions,
fallen off and found not far to the place where had
been put. The inscription acknowledges the excep-
țional merits of the messengers Diodoros of
Thraysicles, Procritos of Pherecles and Clearchos
of Aristomachos, who had obtained from King
Zalmodegikos both the return of hostages (more
than sixty), and his approval that the city revenue
be restituted. Must be emphasized that in order to
arrive at the Getic leader the messenger traveled
“through enemy country”, and that both the hos-
tages’ capturing and restoration of Histria’s revenue
sources by King Zalmodegikos, did not mean any-
thing else, but the preexistence of an agreement
between Histrians and Getae that had to bring back
to Hellenic city the means for its prosperity. Of
course, all these ensured an efficient protection to
allow exploitation of the rural territory and continu-
ation of navigation and commerce on Istros.21
Situation will continue further on, as clarified
by a Histrian inscription, the decree of council and
people in honor of Agathocles of Antiphilos; on the
edge of centuries III/II B.C., Agathocles, descen-
dant of a family of benefactors of the city, had
proven his skillfulness first by leading the archers
and other paid soldiers, in turbulent times, when
along with internai discord, Thracians were attack-
ing the city and the territory (“chora”), exactly at
harvesting time. With his troops Agathocles
guarded the territory “giving time to everyone to
harvest their crops without harming”. Than, dur-
ing the siege of city Bizone by the Thracians, he
had negotiated with them and with their King,
Zoltes, twice to redeem the city and crops facing
their invasion in Scythia Minor against “Greek
towns under King’s Rhemaxos protection”. Finally,
when Thracians broke agreements, attacking
again, Agathocles formed a group of volunteers
“among the citizens and barbarians settled in the
city”, guarding the field, crops and herds until King
Rhemaxos passed across Istros. In his messages to
the King and to his son “Phradmon”, Agathocles
obtained first support of 100 cavalry men, and than,
after their run away, 600 horsemen with whose
help the forces of Zoltes were finally defeated.22
The inscription presents the difficult circum-
stances of Greek cities in Scythia Minor, which
the far away transdanubian protection by King
Rhemaxos could not secure in front of the
Thracians’ invasions, despite the tribute paid. As
Scarlat Lambrino, the discoverer and first editor
of the marble inscription for Agathocles sustained,
and as demonstrated by D.M. Pippidi, Rhemaxos
must have been one of the Getic kings, whose
-----------■ Review of Military History ■--------
mastership extended, based on coins discoveries,
in regions Buzău and Putna.23Demonstration was
also sustained by the contemporary testimony by
Trogus Pompeius/Iustinus of another Getic King -
Oroles24 - whose domination was on the path of
Bastarns. In a large view of Centuries III-I, the
professor did not restrain to affirm the existence
of a “Pontic policy” of the Getic kings.25
Whether, as the inscription shows, in the great
policy, Histropolitanians were looking for the sup-
port of Getic kings from across Istros, valorization
of rural territory was based on cohabitation with
“Barbarians”, local Getae, sheltered in the city in
hard times and ready to enroll volunteers for com-
mon defense.26 This reference enabled Professor
D.M. Pippidi to reject the opinion, of Marxist-
leninist origin, of the rural territory of Greek cit-
ies exploitation with numerous agrarian slaves.27
The virulent Thracian threat at the edge of cen-
turies III/II was not followed by a calm period, Scythia
Minor being probably the path that connected some
Bastarnic tribes with the Kingdom of Macedonia so
that these put themselves in service of kings
Philippos V, Demetrios II and Perseus.
The same Bastarnic pressure at Istros would
have pushed toward South Scythic tribes, whose
leaders are known as “kings” according to their
coins: Ailios, Kanites, Sariakes, Tanusa, Akrosas,
Charaspes. Probably, more important of them was
Kanites, mentioned also by a decree in Odessos, in
the II”d Century, regarding the Greek commerce
in the lands controlled by him.28 It is not to be
excluded that to these times of domination by these
Scythic leaders be attributed some archaeological
discoveries of the important settlement in Albești,
in the Callatian chora.
The interdependency between Pontic Greek
cities, resulted from the economic unity of the
Black Sea, more and more accentuated in the
Hellenistic age, appears also during the serious
conflict that broke out in the first half of the IInd
Century B.C. between Apollonia and Mesembria
upon the port Anchialos. Thanks to the alliance,
concluded one century prior, between Apollonia
and Histria, the Milesian colony was called for
help when Mesembrians, without any war decla-
ration, occupied the territory and the city
Anchialos. Builtby Apollonians, the stronghold and
the borough were meant to ensure their control
upon Burgas Gulf, natural outlet of some commer-
cial roads in the Balkans. Intervention by
Istropolitans did not delay. Long ships under the
command of admirai Hegesagoras of Monimos
----■ Review of Military History ■------------
cooperated with Apollonians in defending the ter-
ritory, the city and the ports. Ulterior, through
common efforts by other unnamed allies, the en-
emy fleet that was defending Anchialos was de-
feated - a naval fight where Histrian admirai evi-
denced by capturing one ship with its entire crew.
Following this victory, the allies landed under the
city assaulting and completely destroying it,
Hegesagoras was excelling through his courage
and skillfulness in leading the fighters on this oc-
casion. His merits were rewarded not only by coro-
nation with the golden wreath on the feast of
Dionysos, but also through construction of his
bronze statue, presenting him armed at the ship’s
bow, placed in the temple of Apollo Medicus (the
Healer), the decree that sanctions the facts being
fixed on the base. Apollonians’ acknowledgement
was also recorded in Histria through an inscrip-
tion on a marble stone, discovered during the ar-
cheological excavations in 1958.29
Fruitful affinity between Greek cities in North-
western Pontus, martially illustrated by the above
named decree, is also registered in other epigraphic
testimonies from Histria. Here appeared inscriptions
in honor of some Tomitans, Callatians, Apollonians,
and of one inhabitant of Byzantium and Cyzic.30 A
decree from Tomis was rewarding the merits of one
inhabitant of Tyras for sustaining the interests of
Tomitans in his city.31 Moreover, Tomitan merchants
were welcomed in Odessos.
Despite Memnon’s testimonies, picking prob-
ably an information contemporary to events, the
confrontation between the Callatian-Histrian alli-
ances with Bizantium, in the first half of the IIIrd
Century B.C., did not provoke the definitive col-
lapse of city Callatis. On the contrary, in the H"d
Century its economic role is dominant, clearly
outrunning Histria. Benefiting by an impressive
perimeter and by a not less secure port, the busi-
nesses of merchants from Callatis flourish, differ-
ent testimonies attesting this at Tyras Olbia, Tauric
Chersones, Dyonisopolis, Apollonia, Byzantium,
Parion in Troada, Mytilene, Delos, Delfi, and Alex-
andria. In the same measure are edificatory, for
the knowledge of commercial relations of the Greek
cities, the archeological discoveries of some
handcrafted products, whose provenience can be
dated based on seals or inscriptions. Among the
most precious of these testimonies there are the
sealed amphorae attesting imports from the great
centers of production - Sinope, Thassos, Rhodos,
Cnidos, Cos, of these useful pots, especially for oils,
wines and other products transported by ships.
---------------------------------------m--------
At Histria, Tomis and Callatis, where numer-
ous inscriptions reveal the most varied aspects of
the Pontic civilization, are not missing the news
about cultural life, connections with great
“universitary” centre of the Greek world from
Cyzic, theater performances and even the quality
of the language spoken and written by inhabit-
ants, carved into stone by lapicids.
The decisive event at the end of the IInd Cen-
tury, with unexpected consequences, was, of course,
occupation of Cimmerian Bosporus by the king of
Pontus, Mithridates VI Eupator (132-63 B.C.). Based
on older ties, the king of Pontus, a persistent adver-
sary of Roman Republic, extended his domination
upon Greek North-Western-Pontic cities Olbia, Tyras,
Histria, Tomis, Callatis, and Apollonia. Establish-
ment of garrisons by the Pontus King, attested on
an inscription from the last city, must have been
generalized for the others, since the neighboring
kings, Scyths and Thracians, were comprised in
the system of alliances of Mithridates VI.
The circum-Pontic domination by great king
would crush under Roman blow, the Rome’s eagles
appearing in the years 72-71 B.C., in the Left Pont.
The Roman governor of Macedonia, M. Terentius
Varro Lucullus, succeeded, through campaigns de-
ployed in the Left Pontus, to subjugate all Greek
cities previously under dominance of King Mithri-
dates, from Apollonia to the mouths of Istros:
Messembria, Odessos, Dyonisopolis, Bizone,
Callatis, Parthenopolis,32 Tomis, and Histria. It is
significant that later, a historian, L. Annaeus Florus
(I-II Centuries A.D.), associates these campaigns to
the overflow of Thracian people and their arrival at
river Tanais (Don) and Meotic lake (Azov Sea).33
According to a Callatian decree, between Rome
and the Greek cities in North-Western Pontus,
seems that treaties of alliance (foedera) have been
established, which taking them out of the circum-
Pontic system of King Mithridates, associated them
to the Republic.34
Situation did not maintain both due to the ex-
cessive Roman exploitation and very probably due
to the beginning of a new factor of power.
From the first point of view, in the years 62-61
B.C., the Governor of Macedonia, C. Antonius
Hybrida, known for his immorality, succeeded to
provoke a riot that ended with the defeat of Ro-
man forces by the walls of Histria, under the strike
of a Greek-Getic alliance and the run away of the
commander to Dyonisopolis.
Under the second angle of examining the
sources of events of those years, is prefigured the
—uu---------------------------------------------
authoritarian intervention “by the greatest king
ever dominated Thrace”, Burebista (approx. 70-44
B.C.), in the Left Getic Pontus, that begun through
the attack and occupation of Olbia (55 B.C.). Resis-
tance opposed by this and by Histria and Messem-
bria as well, was harshly sanctioned, the conse-
quences being archaeologically attested at Histria
through a level of fire at the middle of the Ist Cen-
tury B.C. Moreover, a decree for Aristagoras shows
that, practically, fortifications were not able any-
more to defend the remaining inhabitants, others
being captive or hostages and “Barbarians occu-
pying the Histrian territory”. Occupation, which
according the letter of the decree, lasted for more
than three years and its conclusion seems to be
due to an agreement negotiated by the same bene-
factor Aristagoras.
According to another inscription dating from
the edge between the pagan and the Christian era,
through an enormous effort and with the support
of a large number of citizens, the city could revive,
talking about “the second establishment/construc-
tion of the city”, after the death danger which it
had surpassed.35
Reconstruction of Histria and other cities
which were affected following the domination of
King Burebista could be achieved especially with
the return of Romans in the Left Pontus.
Concerning the moment of the entrance of
Greek colonies of Scythia Minor in the Roman
Empire, through computerized methods36 were de-
termined the years 29-28 B.C., during the campaigns
of Licinius Crassus against the Getae of King Dapyx.
But, careful examination of Dobroudjan inscription
formulation reveal the possibility of an interval
rather between 27 and 8 B.C. Significance of the
first date is the triumph “ex Thraciae et Geteis” for
Crassus (after 4 July 27), and of the last, the begin-
ning of Ovidius’ exile at Tomis. The former inde-
pendent Greek colonies of Scythia Minor were
United in a e î e î î i under the power of Rome .37
If at the time of Ovidiu’s exile at Tomis the
situation in Scythia Minor was still precarious -
under the reign restored of “the alliance” once
concluded by Lucullus - formation of the province
Moesia under Emperor Tiberius (14-37 A.D.), would
be accompanied by the set up of a praefectus orae
maritimae or praeses laevi Ponti with administra-
tive attributions upon the Greek cities. Further on,
they will share the fate of the Roman Empire with
a flourishing period until the IIP Century, followed
by a lent decadence, in the end of which, a renais-
sance, - in the VI111 Century under the reign of
-----------■ Review of Military History ■-------
Justinian - had nothing else remained than to an-
nounce the total collapse, less than one hundred
years later.
*
In a brilliant communication at the Romanian
Academy dedicated to the Hellenic penetration
into Carpathian basin and included later in Dacia.
In outline of the Early Civilizations of the Carpatho-
Danubian Countries, Vasile Pârvan recomposed,
based on researches and discoveries at the time
the remarkable influence of the Greek presence
in the Left Pontus upon development of the Geto-
Dacian society. The establishment of the huge
“arhe” (“empire”) of Burebista, and after of Dacia
of King Decebal, can be considered, on the back-
ground and with autochthonous interpretation, the
last reflexes of the Hellenic civilization and mili-
tary art. Doubtless, along with the massive coloni-
zation of Roman Dacia with elements from Ma-
gna Graecia, the Greek cities in North-Western
Pontus played a role of prime rank in the forma-
tion of early Romanian civilization. The persis-
tence of Greek element in the Left Pontus, in the
VHlh-XVth Centuries, remained a catalyst of Roma-
nian evolution, the provincial Byzantium from
Dobroudja and from the Lower Danube being the
factor that directly contributed to ecclesiastic-
cultural and military state organization of the
Romanian Principalities.
1	Essential bibliography in John Boardman, The
Greeks Overseas. Their Early Colonies and Trade,
Thames and Hudson, London, 1980, a Romanian
edition by Maria Alexandrescu Vianu and Petre
Alexandrescu, Meridiane Publishing House,
Bucharest 1988, with a Black Sea dossier by Petre
Alexandrescu, pp. 409-428. For the Greek colonies
on the Romanian seashore, cf. D.M. Pippidi,
Contribuții la istoria veche a României, second edition,
Bucharest, 1967; idem, I Greci nel Basso Danubio
dall’eta archaica alia conquista romana, Milan, 1971;
idem, Scythica Minora. Recherches sur les colonies
grecques du litoral roumain de la mer Noire,
Amsterdam-Bucharest, 1984 and idem, Studii de
istorie și epigralie, Bucharest, 1988.
2	Strabon in Fontes ad Historiam Dacoromaniae
Pertinentes (infra FHDR), voi. I, Bucharest, 1964,
pp. 217-218.
3	Pseudo-Scymnos in FHDR, voi. I, p. 173.
4	Philostratos, Heroicos, in FHDR, I, pp. 658-661.
5	Ibidem, pp. 241-243
6	Ibidem, pp. 218-219.
7	Ibidem, pp. 248-251.
8	Ibidem, p. 9.
9	Ibidem, pp. 724-725, 398-399.
----■ Review of Military History ■--------------
10	Ibidem, pp. 548-555.
11	“Orgame city on the Istros” (Hecataios, in
FHDR, pp. 8-9).
12	Paul Nicorescu, in In memoria lui Vasile Pârvan,
Bucharest, 1934, p. 222; idem in “Buletin de la Section
Historique de l’Academie Roumaine”, 25, 1944, pp.
95-101.
13	Paul Nicorescu, in In memoria lui Vasile Pârvan,
pp. 223-226.
14	Marcelle Lambrino, Les vases archaiques de
Histria, Bucharest, 1938, pp. 12, 352; Petre
Alexandrescu, in Histria., voi. IV, La ceramique
d’epoque archad'que et classique, Bucharest, 1978,
pp. 19 and following.
15	Petre Alexandrescu, in “Klio", XII, 1963, p. 257.
16	FHDR, voi. I, pp. 352-353.
17	D. M. Pippidi, Inscripțiile din Scythia Minor
grecești și latine, voi. I, Histria și împrejurimile,
Bucharest, 1983, pp. 180-185.
18	Idem, Contribuții la istoria veche a României,
pp. 107-111; C. Preda, O. Doicescu, in Histria. Mono-
grafie arheologică, voi. II, Bucharest, 1966, pp. 295-
334.
19	D. M. Pippidi, Contribuții la istoria veche a
României, pp. 33-34.
20	FHDR, I, pp. 510-511.
21	D. M. Pippidi, Contribuții la istoria veche a
României, pp. 167-185.
22	Idem, Inscripțiile din Scythia Minor grecești și
latine, pp. 82-93.
23	C. Preda, Gh. Constantinescu, in “Studii și
Cercetări Numismatice”, IV, 1968, pp. 39-45.
24	FHDR, I, pp. 358-359.
25	Din istoria Dobrogei, I, Bucharest, 1965, p. 231.
26	D. M. Pippidi, Contribuții la istoria veche a
României, pp. 120-166; idem, Scythica Minora, pp.
65-80.
27	Idem, Inscripțiile din Scythia Minor grecești și
latine, I, p. 92.
28	G. Mihailov, Inscriptiones Grecae in Bulgaria
repertae, voi. I2, Serdicae, p. 42.
29	D. M. Pippidi, Inscripțiile din Scythia Minor
grecești și latine, I, pp. 172-175.
30	Idem, in Din istoria Dobrogei, vol.I, p. 237.
31	Gr. Tocilescu, in “Archăologisch-epigraphische
Mittheilungen aus Osterreich-Ungarn”, XI, 1884, p. 41.
32	FHDR, I, p. 367.
33	Ibidem, pp. 522-523.
34	D. M. Pippidi, in Din istoria Dobrogei, I,
pp. 277-280.
35	D. M. Pippidi, Inscripțiile din Scythia Minor
grecești și latine, I, pp. 325-331.
36	Alexandra Ștefan, Application des methodes
mathematiques ă l’epigraphie, in “Studii Clasice”,
XIII, 1971, pp. 29-45.
37	D. M. Pippidi, Studii de istorie și epigralie, pp.
174- 178.
------------------------------------------nu—
THE GREEKS OF THE EUXINE
(BLACK SEA)
IN THE ANCIENT AND
THE MIDDLE AGES
Dr. NICHOLAOS SOL. DEPASTAS
Historian - Archaeologist,
Sc. Collaborator and Ex Member of the HCMH / HNDGS,
Director of the 3^ Office AHD/HAGS
The name “Euxinul Pontus”1 refers to the far
stretching internai sea that extends between Eu-
rope and Asia and borders with the Maeotis (Azof)
Lake to the north and with Propontis, by means of
the Bosporus, to the south. The above sea and its
shores have been bound to the Greeks by an age-old
bond that is traced as far back as the Argo Expedi-
tion. While being surrounded in myth, the Argo Ex-
pedition has an historical core. It constituted a sea
operation that was carried ont by 60 noble and se-
lected young Greeks headed by Jason, the nephew
of King Pelias. The campaign set off from the city of
Eolkos in Magnesia and ended up in Colchis (place
of Colchs), where the Golden Fleece was kept. Ja-
son literally seized the Fleece from the temple of
Ares (Marș). Evidently, the myth underlies the real
aim of Jason’s expedition that was the exploration
of the Euxine. Until then, a generation before the
Trojan War (1194-1184 BC), the Euxine still remained
unknown territory (to the Greeks). The outcome,
of that expedition was the establishment of Greek
colonies along the Euxine coast.2
According to Strabo,3 the Euxine was famed
for the severe cold weather in the winter and the
ice covering the inlet into the Maeotis Lake. The
Euxine was also known by the names Black Sea, or
Black Bay. The first of these became internation-
ally accepted (îâynț EUeâooâ, mer Noire,
—QU---------------------------------------------
In memory of my beloved wife
Katherine Gheorghiou - Depastas (1952-2007),
Professor of Hellenic Literature - History
«Post tumulum vita est»
Schwarzes Meer, Black Sea).4 These names and
the Argonauts action lead to the conclusion that
the Euxine has been a Greek sea since the an-
cient times by means of the regular contact of our
sea farer ancestors with the Euxine coast the in-
habitants of which, according to Homer, were cov-
ered by the fog and the clouds and the sun rays
never reached them.5
The Ancient Greeks had a limited and insuffi-
cient knowledge of the geography of the Euxine.
Thus it was conceived that because of its vastness,
the Euxine was an interminable Ocean that was
connected to the Adriatic by means of the river
IstRus (Danube).6 The Euxine inland was better
known thanks to the land routes. In contrast, the
coast was far less known, since in reality the Euxine
was a hard sea to sail.6a For that reason, it was
originally named Aîâeiîd, or Axenus (meaning
inhospitable or hostile). The original name owes
not only to the harsh weather conditions in the
winter but to the ferocity and the fierceness of the
barbarie - mainly scythic - races that were inhab-
iting the Euxine coast and that had no reservation
to slay every foreigner, eat his flesh up and use
his skull as a drinking glass.7
Despite the early conceptions, gradually in
time, the originally <)îă(e)iid Dilidid meaning
-----------■ Review of Military History ■----
Inhospitable Pontus was renamed into Âyîăeiîi,
orEuxinus (Hospitable) ‘by way cf euphemism
Another view holds that the well known half God
Hercules managed to eliminate everything inhos-
pitable in the area «eâe âed Âyîâeili îăâăâ eâdUoăe
â ii ftâ iii», that is “turning the Inhospitable into
a hospitable sea”. However, the most likely inter-
pretation is that the renaming was due to the
lonians that were very active in establishing sev-
eral city - colonies along the coast of the Euxine.8
The Milesians were the most prominent among
the Greeks in establishing colonies along the
Euxine coast.9 They were dedicated to this task
and they carried it out with great zeal turning the
inhospitable shores of the past into noteworthy
urban centers, in which the Hellenic Diaspora pro-
gressed and prospered.10
Truly, the Milesians can be considered as the
pioneers of the colonialism in the Euxine coast.
Since 750 BC and thereafter, the Milesians were
the leaders in establishing financially and socially
prosperous colonies. Thus Miletos founded Sinope
and Trapezous in the south coast of the Euxine,
Odessos (or, Odessople), Tomis and Pantikapaion
in the northwest coast and Phasis in Kolchis, or
the east coast of the Euxine.11 During the VTh cent.
BC, the Milesians founded even more settlements12
in the Euxine. These colonies served to supply
them with large quantities of wheat, fisheries,
cattle, various metals and slaves.12a The most re-
cent of the Milesian settlements were Istria, or
Istros, Apollonia and Krounoi in the west coast of
the Euxine (around the end of the VHth century
BC and through the VIlh century). Along the coast-
line north of the river Istros (Danube) and up to
the Crimean Peninsula, the Milesians founded the
prosperous settlements of Tyra and Borysthene
(in the outfalls of their namesake rivers) as well as
Olbia (at the end of the VII111 or the beginning of
the VIlh century BC). Following the establishment
of Panticapaion, Theodosia, Karkini and Hermo-
nassa (between 550 and 500 BC), Miletos founded
the colony of Phanagor(e)ia (around 540 BC) on
the Crimean peninsula as well.
Finally around 558 BC, the Megareans founded
Herakleia in the south coast of the Euxine. Subse-
quently, that colony became the metropolis of yet
other settlements. The oldest of them was Kallatis
founded around 500 BC in the west coast between
----■ Review of Military History ■---------------
the Milesian settlements of Tomis and Krounoi.
Another Megarean colony was also Mesembria,
south of Odessos. It should be noted that although
the sources place the establishment of the oldest
colonies in the middle of the VIIIth century BC,
archaeological findings that came into light
through excavations date the colonies approxi-
mately 100 -150 years later. Most likely that is due
to the fact that the specific colonies suffered ex-
tensive damages and destruction by the Cimme-
rian’s raids. Those were barbarie warriors that were
living as nomads in Ukraine and that looted and
destroyed the colonies since 650 and thereafter.
Thus, the above findings (mainly pots) belong to
the time and phases of reconstruction of the colo-
nies that occur in a later time than the raids.13
The establishment, the longevity and the pros-
perity of the Greek colonies of the Euxine serve to
demonstrate the determination, the daring, the
insistence, the vitality and the multidimensional
activity of our ancestors in those distant shores.
For several centuries, those tireless seafarers fol-
lowing on Jason’s and the Argonauts vision, they
founded new colonies transferring and expanding
the Greek civilization along with the commercial
cunning.13a
Long afterwards, since the VIlh cent. AD, the
Euxine played an important part in relationship to
the Middle Ages Hellenistic State that is the Byz-
antine Empire. In the year 549 and in the reign
of Justinian I the Great (527-565) a war broke out
between Byzantium and Persia in the area of
Lazica, in the East coast of the Euxine. The war
lasted until the year 557. Lazica had great political
and financial implications for the relationships of
the Byzantines and the Persians alike with the
Caucasus people. Thus the region was strongly
contested by the both the Persians and the
Byzantines (thatwas an “apple of discord” between
them). After several bloody operations by the
Justinian’s generals, Lazica was reconquested by
the Byzantines. A truce was agreed in 557 and
around the end of 561 representatives from the
two sides signed a peace treaty lasting for 50
years.14 The treaty was signed in the fortified city
of Daras, NW of Nisibis (Nusaibin today) in the
Upper Mesopotamia (the broader region of today’s
Iraq).15
In 582 the Avarians, a barbarie race coming
from Mongolia and Manchouria that had settled
in the plains of Pannonia three years earlier, occu-
pied Sirmion that was lying in the European bor-
der of the Byzantine Empire since 437.16 Since that
time, the Avarians along with their Slav allies liter-
ally ravaged the Byzantine territory lying between
the junction of the rivers Istros and Savus and up
to the west coast of the Euxine. Those barbarie
races carried out several operations in the west
coast. From the winter of 599 until April 600 laid
siege to the city of Tomis (the ancient colony of
Torni) thus posing a threat even to Constantinople.
At the end, a peace treaty was signed thus recon-
stituting the north borders of Byzantium.17
A little later and in the first years of Heraclius’
Reign (610-641), a mass settlement by Slavic races
took place in various regions of the Balkan penin-
sula and the prosperous old colony of Istria, in the
West coast of the Euxine.18 The Slavs, due to the
primitive civil and military structure and the divi-
sion in small groups did not constitute a serious threat
to the Byzantine Empire. Things deteriorated when
the Bulgarians, a barbarian Asian race that came
from the mixing of Huns and Ogours and they were
inhabiting the North of the Euxine, started to press
on the Slavs as they settled hither to the Danube.19
The many disturbances and the frequent raids
of Bulgarians in Byzantine territory constituted a
severe threat to Byzantium. The Emperor
Constantine V (741-775) confronted the Bulgarian
threat in repeated campaigns, with foremost the
battle in the plain of Anchialos, a prosperous
Greek city on the West coast of the Euxine (June
30, 763). In that battle, the Bulgarians were de-
feated and their remnants were forced to disor-
derly retreat.20
The cities of Anchialos, Debeltos and several
other cities in Thrace, near the Euxine coast suf-
fered new raids by the Bulgarians in the spring of
812, a year after Emperor Nicephorous I (802-811)
was heavily defeated by the numerous forces of
Kroumos. Following that victory, Kroumos spread
the fear and terror in the inhabitants of those cities,
killing several of them and forcing others in exile.21
During the VIIIth and the IXth centuries, the
Empire’s administrative institutions were re-
—UE]-------------------------------------------
formed and the Theme System was developed in
an attempt to further reinforce the self-govern-
ment of the provinces. The Themes were military
districts that were originally formed in Asia Minor
and subsequently in the European territory of the
Byzantine Empire during the middle period of the
Empire.22 The oldest Theme was the Armeniacum
Theme, founded in 667. Subsequently, the Anatolic
Theme (of the Eastern provinces) was founded
two years later and the Opsikian Theme in 680.
The first Themes in Europe were the Thracian
Theme (between 680 and 685) and the Theme of
Hellas (695).23
During the first half of the IX111 century, the
need to defend the Greek cities along the Euxine
coast more effectively called on the one hand, for
the reinforcement of the defence in those areas24
and on the other for the reorganization of the
Theme system.
Thus and in order to achieve the more effec-
tive defence of the south coast of the Euxine, the
Coastal section of the Boukelarion Theme, lying
south of the river Alys, was sectioned to form the
Paphlagonian Theme, with Gangra as its capital.
Also, from the sectioning of the North-western
section of the Armeniacum Theme, the Chaldion
Theme was formed having Trapezus, the previ-
ously mentioned old Milesian colony25 as its capi-
tal. The generals of these new Themes took part
in the victorious battle by the river Lalakaon (Sep-
tember 3, 863) that was fought in the context of
the Empire’s war against the Arabs.26
The establishment of the above Themes is most
likely attributed to the Emperor Theophilus (829-
842)27, that he took care for the military recon-
struction and the further fortification of the
Empire’s territories in the north coast of the Euxine
and more concretely in the ancient Taurica penin-
sula, where he founded the Cherson Theme in 833,
or 834. The construction of the Sarkel fort in the
lower route of river Tanais (today Don) is connected
to and it was carried out in the context of the estab-
lishment of the above Theme. The fortification was
constructed by Byzantine engineers after the order
of the Emperor Theophilus and it contributed the
most to the defence of the Kingdom of the Khazars,
old allies of the Byzantium against a possible inva-
sion by the Patzinaks, or the 'Rus.28
-----------■ Review of Military History ■------
In the autumn of 927, approximately five
months after the death of Bulgarian sovereign
Symeon (on May 27*) who by means of constant
wars had literally devastated the Aimos peninsula
and he had “cropped” by sword the inhabitants of
the Greek cities in the peninsula29, a peace treaty
was signed between Byzantium and the Bulgar-
ians. By means of that treaty, the cities in the west
coast of the Euxine and among them Anchialos
and Mesembria came under the Byzantine rule.30
In the meantime, the Byzantine lands in the
previously mentioned Cherson Theme prospered
politically, economically and culturally during the
Xlh century. The ’Rus after being defeated in the
three unsuccessful sea campaigns against Byzan-
tium through the Euxine and the Bosporus (860,
907 and 941) signed commercial agreements with
Byzantium. The above-mentioned territories of the
Byzantium developed an intensive action in con-
verting the ’Rus. Empress Olga that along with sev-
eral others had in the meantime become Christian
off icially visited Constantinople in 957. The Emperor
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus offers a very vivid
account of the “Welcome of Olga of Russia”.31
The Hungarians went through a similar course.
After three unsuccessful campaigns against
Constantinople (934, 959 and 961) came into a
treaty with the Empire and as they settled in the
northern coast of the Euxine, they were subjected
to the deep cultural influence from Byzantium.32
During the Xlh century, the seashore centres of
the Euxine reached a prosperity that is reminiscent
of the prosperous colonies of the VII* and VIth cen-
tury BC. Thus, Cherson having been strengthened
by the founding of the namesake Theme developed
financial and cultural relationships with the people
of South Russia and the Caucasus region, while
Sougdaia, another city of the Chersonesus Taurica
grew into an important trade center. In the south
coast of the Euxine, Trapezus developed into a pros-
perous customs port that was contributing signifi-
cant income to the Empire from the collection of
duties. The cities of Kerasus, Amisos, Sinope and
Amastris were very wealthy centers as that is de-
duced from recovered seals demonstrating the great
economic activity in those cities.33
In the early XIII* century, in 1202, two years
before the Crusader’s raid of Constantinople, the
----■ Review of Military History ■------------
Empire of the Great Comnenoi Dynasty was
founded in the Trapezus region (in the old Chaldion
Theme). Since the “inauspicious day” of 13* April
1204, Latinocracy started lasting for 57 years, the
above mentioned Komnenoi stabilized their rule,
so as to later lay claim the Emperor’s Throne in
Constantinople. When in 1261, Michael VIII
Palaiologos (1259-1282), the founder of the
Palaiologoi Dynasty managed to restore the Byz-
antine Empire relying on the reconstructive ac-
tion of the Nicaea Emperors (Laskaris and Vatatzis),
Komnenoi were forced to abandon their claims on
the Throne of the one time powerful Byzantine
Empire. Since that time and particularly from 1325
and thereafter when West Asia Minor was taken
over by the Turks, the Trapezus Emperor was car-
rying the title “Loyal King and Emperor of the
Entire East (Orient), the Iberians and Perateias”.34
In time the Komnenoi Dynasty extended its
rule up to Sinope to the West and up to Lazica and
the river Phasis to the NE. At the same time,
thanks to its strategic position, the Trebizond Em-
pire developed extensive trade covering almost the
entire Euxine coast, while its merchants were trans-
porting products from the Indies. Its competitors
were not only the Selchuk Turks but the Genovese
as well. Komnenoi confronted the one with mili-
tary operations and the other with commercial
agreements with Venice.
Trapezus thanks to its notable state structure,
the competent training and sufficient (ample,
supple) armament of its army, the strong faith in
the Christian Orthodox Church, the hard work of
its citizens and its persistence in following the ex-
ample of the old and glorious Byzantine Empire
succeeded to endure until 1461 when it was taken
over by Mehmet II. Although the prosperous Hel-
lenism in the far end of Asia Minor, in the south
coast of the Euxine was subjugated, it never let go
from memory the național and cultural identity
and the brightest periods of his glorious history.35
The Greeks of Trapezus, preserving and con-
tinuing the action of their ancestors - the settlers
of the VHlh and VI6lh centuries BC - came to know
times of glory and fall, went through hardship and
exhilaration, times of hopefulness and despair and
thus kept the values and traditions of the Hellenic
Race up to our times.
1	The term Pontus means the open and far stretch-
ing sea: Hom.il. VI 29, Hom. Od. III 158. Pontus
(meaning Euxinus): Herod. VII 147, Aesch. Pers. 878,
Aristoph. Vesp. 700. Euxinus Pontus: Herod. 16, Thuc.
II 96, Eur. Iph. Taur. 123.
2	For a detailed account of the Argo Expedition
see: Pind. Pyth. 4,117-187, Schol. Apoll. Rhod, Arg. 1,
20 sqq. Apollod. 1,111-113. Also see: K. Meuli, Od.
und Aigonautika, Berlin 1921, I.R. Bacon, The Voy-
age of the Argonauts, Methuen 1925, R. Roux, Le
probleme des Argonautes, Paris 1949, H.V. Geisau,
Argonautai (Ânâi'iâyoăe), LA 1 (1979) 537-539. Dnâe:
M. -M. Simpsas, The Navy in Greek History, I (in
Greek), published by the Hellenic Navy General Staff,
Athens 1982, 45-47.
3	Strab, Geogr. 7 3,18.
4	S. E. Lykoudes, The Euxine (Âyîăeiîd Duiâid),
MEE 11 (1929) 756.
5	Hom. Od. XE 15 - 16. As Strabo (7 3,8) States,
Apollodorous accuses Homer of presenting false evi-
dence as true due to ignoring the actual elements of
the geography of the Euxine.
6	Strab. 7 1,1 The maximum length of the Euxine
is 980 klm and its maximum width between Herakleia
and the mouths of the river Hypanis is 530 klm. See:
Chr. Danoff, PontosEuxeinos, LA 4 (1979) 1051. More
about Euxine see idem, Pontos Euxeinos, RE Suppl.
IX 866-1175.
6	a B.W. Labaree, How the Greeks sailed into the
Black Sea, AJA 61 (1957) 29 sqq.
7	Apollod. De navium, II (= Strabo 7 3,7). E.H.
Minns, Scythians and the Greeks, Cambridge, 1913.
8	Dion. Perieg. 1. 146, Scymn. Ch. Peripl. 1. 734,
Eust. Parecb. in Dion. Per. 1. 146.
9	Scymn. Ch. Per. 1. 733.
10	J. Berard, La colonisation grecque, Paris 19572.
Also R. Drews, The Erliest Greek Settlements on the
Black Sea, JHS 96 (1976) 18-31.
11	Chrys. P. Kardara, Introduction into Ancient
History. The creation and development of Greek Cit-
ies (1200 - 500 BC) (in Greek, ÂedăăîiăP ăed âqi
An^dfiăi Eocmfiăi. Âqletonâfiă eâe âiUâooîeo oui
ăeeqieepi dileâui 1200-500 â. *.), Athens 1981, 104.
For a very detailed account of the relevant elements
see El. K. Petropoulos, Ancient greek Colonies in the
Black Sea, I - II, BAR, Oxford 2007.
12	Markedly, Constantine Paparrigopoulos in his clas-
sic work “History of the Greek Nation” «Edoirflă oio
Âeeqieeiy ,eiioo», I, Athens 19255, 521 classifies the
Euxine colonies as ‘Milesian Institutions (Colonies)’.
12	a T. S. Noonan, The grain Trade of the Northern
Black Sea in Antiquity, AJPh 94 (1973) 231-242.
13	Michael Sakellariou, The prosperity of Ancient
Greeks (in Greek, Q ăeiP oio An^ăuely Âeeqieohy),
—W------------------------------------------------
IEE, II, Athens 1971, 244-245 and 275. About
Cimmerians see: Ann Kammenhuber, Kimmerier, LA
3 (1979) 210-211.
13	a El. K. Petropoulos, Aspects of the Early His-
tory of the Euxine (in Greek, lăneetd dod - Yd oqd
dnpeîqd edo'tnfiăd oio Âdîâfiiid Diiidio), Journal
«Ân^âeleîiJSă» 76 (2000) 61-64.
14	D. A. Zakythinos, History of the Byzantium (324
- 1071) (in Greek, Â&eăioeiP Eooiifiă (324 - 1071)),
Athens 1972, 73.
15	K. Karapli, Daras, a city-fort in Upper Meso-
potamia (6,h -11“’ century) (in Greek, ÂUnăo, led Oueq
- onlynei boți <tiu lădtdioăifiâ (ff6 - IV6 ăe.),
Kletorion, in memory of N. Oikonomides, Athens -
Thessalonica 2006, 147-8.
16	J. - R. Palanque, La prefecture du pretoire de T
lllyricum au 1V‘ siecle, Byz. 21 (1951) 5 sqq.
17	Ibid, Zakythinos, 96.
18	Concerning the Slavic activity in connection to
Istria based on the archaeological evidence see: E.
Condurachi, Histria ă T epoque du Bas - Empire d’
apres les dernieres fouilles archelogiques, Dacia (N.S.)
1 (1957) 245 spp. Also see: Ion Nestor, L’ etabli-
ssement des Slaves en Roumanie â la lumiere de
quelques decouvertes archeologiques recentes, Dacia
5 (1961) 429 sqq.
19	Concerning the origin of the Bulgarians and their
relationships with Byzantium and the Slavs see: Gy.
Moravcsik, Byzantinoturcica, I, Berlin 19582,108 sqq.
20	G. Ostrogorsky, Histoire de T etat Byzantin,
Paris 1956, 198. Also see: Kath. Christophilopoulou,
Byzantine History (în Greek, ÂâeăioeiPEooifftă), II 1
(610 - 867), Athens 19842, 126 - 127.
21	Christophilopoulou, op.cit., 166-177 and 180.
22	Ostrogorsky, op.cit., 134.
23	A. Pertusi, La formation des themes byzantins,
Berichte zum XI. Internationalen Byzantinisten - con-
gress Miinchen 1958, 26 sqq.
24	The Byzantines, already from the time of
Heraclius to reinforce the defence of the north shores
of the Euxine formed an alliance with the nomadic
race of the Khazars, that in time manage to establish
a kingdom in the North of the Caucasus. Thanks to
that alliance, the Empire managed to obstruct in the
Arab’s expansionist aims and tendencies to the north
coast of the Euxine through the Caucasus. Around
the end of the VII81 and the start of the VIIIth century,
the relations between Byzantium and the Khazars
worsened because of their intentions to limit the
Empire’s control over the Climates in Crimea. Since
711 and thereafter the relations of the Byzantines
with the Khazars improved again. See: Th. Nooman,
Byzantium and Khazars: a special relationship? In the
collection J. Shepard - S. Franklin (ed). Byzantine
Diplomacy, Variorum Reprints 1992, 220-241.
------------■ Review of Military History ■----------
25	Christophilopoulou, op.cit., II 1, 293.
26	Theoph. Conțin, p. 181. Most likely, the battle
took place to the west of river Alys, in the border of
the Armenian Theme and Paphlagonia. See: H.
Gregoire, Etudes sur neuvieme siecle, Byz. 8 (1933)
534-536.
27	See Zakythinos, op.cit., 213-4.
28	Theoph. Cont. p. 122. Also see: Christophil-
opoulou, op.cit., II 1, 234-5.
29	Io. Sakkelion, King Romano’s of Lakapinos Let-
ters (în Greek, Niiiâily AăoeeYiid old Eăeââțiiy
ââedolecfi, AEÂÂ1 (1883) 659 sqq.
30	See: Zakythinos, op.cit., 278-9.
31	Constantine Porph. Exposition of the Kingdom’s
Order I (in Greek, ,eeâoeo 690 BâoeeâBio CUîâuo Â')
Bonn Publication (Edition), 594 sqq.
32	G. Moravcsik, Hungary and Byzantium in the
Middle Ages, CMH, IVI, Cambridge 1966, 568.
33	See: Zakythinos, op.cit., 304. Also see: M. G.
Nystazopoulou, The city of Sougdaia in Chersonesus
Taurica from the XIII to the XVcenturies (in Greek, (7 ăi
ChoneeP xânoliPou âiieeâ Oidăacfiă âdî oii EA' lY-iie
oiiEÂ' ăe.), Athens 1965, 14 and on. Hei. Antoniadou -
Bibikou, Recherches sur les douanes ă Byzance. L’
“Octava”, le “kommerkion” et les commerciaires, Paris
1963, 201,101, 225 and on. Con. Io. Amantos, History of
the Byzantine State (m Greek, Edovfiă oio Âoceaioeily
EnUotâc), II, Athens 19772, 231.
34	Hei. Ahrweiler - Glykatzi. The Trapezus
(Trebizond) Empire (in Greek, (7 Adoienăoii.fiă oqd
Omd&Eiyioid, EÂÂ, E', Athens 1979, 326-7. In the
author’s view the term «DUoăÂiâoIeb» (“Entire Ori-
ent”) means the Asia Minor Heritage of Trapezus. The
mention of Iberians, that is the Georgian Kingdom
underlies the long standing friendly relationships of
Trapezus with the Iberians (= Georgians) and Perateia
means the occupations of Trapezus in the opposite
coast of the Euxine and more concretely in the
Crimean peninsula.
35	Complete picture of the Trapezus Empire by
view of the historical and cultural perspective is of-
fered in A.E. Vasiliev, The Empire of Trebizond in
History and Literature, Byz. 15 (1940-1) 316-377.
ABBREVIATIONS
AJA: American Journal of Archaeology.
AJPh : American Journal of Philology.
BAR: British Archaeological Reports, Interna-
tional Series 1675.
Byz.: Byzantion. Revue Internationale d’
Etudes Byzantines.
CMH : Cambridge Medieval History.
AEÂ4: Bulletin of Histor. and National. Society
(in Greek, ĂâeoBîi oco Eooîneel’o eâe ÂeneiăeePd
âoăenâBăo).
IEE: History of the Greek Nation (in Greek,
EoomBă 610 Âeeșleeîy ,elîod), Yeă.«Âeăî6eeI>
Âeșijti».
JHS : Journal of Hellenic Studies.
LA : Der kleine Pauly. Lexikon der Antike in
5 Bănden.
MEE : Great Hellenic Encyclopaedia (in Greek,
îâăUeș Âcccicch ÂăeoeeiâăeaâBă), Yea. «Donotio».
RE : Real - Encyclopădie der Classichen Altertu-
mswissenschaft.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank: - The President of the Hellenic Commission on Military History Lieutenant
General Nicholas Mastrandonis for the honour to include me in the authors of the present issue. - My
Director in the AHD/HAGS Lieutenant General Panaghiotis Konstantopoulos who approved the design
of the diagram of the Euxinus Pontus based on an own sketch of the Euxine. - My colleague Dr. Pighi
Kalogherakou for her assistance in compiling the bibliography. - The designer of the AHD Mrs Alexandra
Stamatopoulou for the preparation of the diagram. - The translator Loucas Michaelis for his contribu-
tion in the English translation of the work.
N.S.D.
■ Review of Military History ■
21
THE BYZANTINE EXPANSION
IN THE BLACK SEA AREA
Dr. ALEXANDRU MADGEARU
Senior Researcher of the Institute for Political Studies
of Defense and Military History
The Byzantine Empire never mastered all the
Pontic seashores, but it fought from the age of
Constantine the Great to the 4lh Crusade to preserve
the hegemony, either by direct domination, either
by alliances with the powers who controlled other
seashores. At the beginning of the 4lh century, the
frontiers of the Black Sea provinces were set on the
Lower Danube in the northwest, and on Acampsis
(Choroki / Coroh) in the southeast. The empire
continued to keep the enclave from Crimea,
Cherson (Sevastopol). A Roman garrison is attested
there after 375 and at least until 488.1 This means
that the empire embraced around a half of the Black
Sea shores.
The first step of the Byzantine expansion in the
Black Sea, which meant in fact the recovery of the
positions previously held by the Early Roman Empire
and lost in the 3rd century, was represented by the
conquest of Lazica (the present regions of Abkhazia,
Mingrelia and Adjaria), a small kingdom disputed
between Byzantium and Persia for its high strategic
value (it was a barrier in front of the invasions of the
northern nomads). Byzantium and Persia fought
several times for domination in the Caucasian
region, by conquests or by the establishment of buffer
States like the Armenian principalities, Iberia and
Lazica, used against the rival empire or against the
northern nomads. The eastern shores of the Black
Sea were thus involved in the long conflict between
these empires. The Byzantine domination in Lazica
was restored by war in 378, but Persia preserved
Iberia (the eastern part of present Georgia).2 Roman
forts were built at Sebastopolis (Suhumi) and Pityus
(Pitsunda), butaș enclaves in the kingdoni of Lazica.3
Lazica entered again in the Persian sphere of
influence between 470 and 522, but when the kings
Tzathes I of Lazica and Gourgenes of Iberia became
subjects of Justin I (518-527), the Byzantine Empire
acquired a new opportunity to strengthen the
domination over the eastern shore of the Black Sea.4
Since the very beginning of his reign, Justinian
I (527-565) followed a policy of restoration of the lost
----[22]----------------------------------------------
western provinces combined with the containment
of the rival Persian power in the East. The struggle
with the Persians entered in a new phase in 527,
when the emperor Kavadh I attacked Mesopotamia
and Armenia. His heir Khusro I agreed to close peace
in 532 and to return the forts that were occupied in
Lazica and Armenia. Iberia remained under Persian
rule, but the shore of Lazica was firmly defended by
the Byzantine army. The ancient fort of Petra
(Tsikhisdziri, northeast of Batumi) was occupied in
532.5 In the same year, the three vassal Armenian
principalities were included in the Byzantine Empire.
The conflict was resumed by Khusro I in 540 by the
invasion of Lazica, at the request of king Gobazes II.
The Black Sea became thus, as said Procopius of
Caesarea, a target for Persia in the war of 540-545.6
Petra was conquered by the Persians and the fights
continued in Lazica until 557. The Byzantine-Persian
treaty of 562 specified that Lazica will be included in
the Byzantine Empire.7 The expansion continued
under the emperor Maurikios (582-602). In the
Persian war ended in 591, the western parts of Iberia
and Armenia were annexed at the Byzantine
Empire,8 but the campaigns of 607-612 led by Khusro
II established again the Persian domination in the
Caucasian region, opening the way to the Black Sea,
as Khusro I wished before.9
Another region of the Black Sea area recovered
by Justinian I was Crimea. This peninsula had similar
strategic value as Lazica, because from this place
were watched the steppe peoples movements. The
city of Cherson was continously preserved by the
empire, but the inland Bosporan kingdom fell under
the Gothic and next Hunnic dominations, between
234 and the middle of the 5lh century. In 528, this
kingdom was occupied by the Byzantine Empire,
after a combined naval and field campaign.10 In this
way, the Byzantine domination was extended over
the entire Crimea, directly or through the surviving
small Gothic subjected principalities.
Major changes occurred in the first half of the
7th century. The most part of the European
------------■ Review of Military History ■----------
provinces of the Byzantine Empire (a Greek
speaking state from then on) were conquered by
the Avars and Slavs, while the East was again
assaulted by the Persians. But the most grave and
enduring threat was represented by the rise of
Islam, which replaced the Persian Empire in the
dispute for Caucasus. In 627 was restored the
eastern frontier of 591 after the wars of Hera-
klios,11 but after few years, in 642-651, the Arabs
conquered Armenia and Iberia. The Pontic eastern
seashore remained outside their expansion. The
frontier between Byzantium and Islam became
stabilized on a strip that began around 50 km east
of Trebizond.12 In the eastern part of the Black
Sea, the Byzantine Empire was challenged not only
by the Arabs, but also by a new emerging small
power, Abasgia (Abkhazia). This region was
detached from Lazica by the end of the 6111 century.
In Abasgia, the Byzantine domination was installed
in 686, but lost in 697, when this kingdom accepted
the Arabian domination. Justinian II tried to
recover the region in 711 with the aid of the Alans
living to the north and east of it, but Abasgia
remained free. The rest of Lazica and next Iberia
entered in this kingdom, that was finally recognized
by Byzantium around 880.13 So, a century after
the climax of the Byzantine expansion in the Black
Sea area (the peace with Persia in 591), the empire
lost the last possession on the eastern shore.
In the period of the decline of their power
following the rise of Islam, the Byzantines made
significant efforts to regain the control over the
Black Sea, not only for military reasons, but also
because this space became vital for the wheat
supply of Constantinople after the Arabian
conquest of Egypt (641). The Pontic policy of the
Byzantine Empire after Heraklios, applied by
military and diplomatic means, was designed to
defend Constantinople and to support the trade
from north-west and north with the aid of a larger
security space that included all the regions from
which the city could be attacked by sea or by field.
With this purpose the emperors tried to keep or to
recover the Danube’s mouths, Lazica and Crimea,
by the control exerted over some the strategic
points, or by alliances based on the principie of
divide etimpera, whose target was the diminishing
of the power of the nomadic peoples.
On the western seashore, the settlement of
Protobulgarians led by Asparuh in Moesia in 680
added a new danger, but the harbors of Anchialos
----■ Review of Military History ■-----------
and Mesembria were preserved in the 7lh and 8lh
centuries, as naval bases in the wars against
Bulgaria led by Constantine V (741-775).14 For
Callatis15 and Tomis,16 the archaeological re-
searches suggest a settlement continuity for some
decades in the 7111 century, but there are no proofs
for a survival until the 10* century, when the urban
life revived. On the Danubian sector close to the
sea, it is possible that Noviodunum remained a
harbor for the Byzantine ships along the 7lh
century.17 Against this new danger (the Bulgarians)
was established in 687 the first European theme of
the Byzantine Empire, Thrace. The command was
exerted from Arkadiopolis (Lule Burgas, Turkey).
In the 8111 century, the theme extended to inland,
and in 789 its western part was transformed in the
theme of Macedonia, with the residence at
Adrianople.18
Some historians sustained that the state created
by Asparuh has included Dobrudja since the very
beginning,19 but there is no proof for that. This
happened only during the reign of Krum (803-814),
when took place the first large expansion of
Bulgaria. The seal of a dignitary called Kyriakos
found at Nufăru and dated in 696-697 shows that
the fortification was stih under Byzantine control
after the Protobulgarian settlement.20 Bulgaria
acquired the region between the Balkan Mountains
and Burgas (Zagora) in 705 as a reward for the
help given by Tervel to Justinian II to regain the
power. The treaty of 717 specified that the frontier
was between Mileone (Jabalkovo, reg. Haskovo)
and Emona; the cities Anchialos (Pomorie),
Mesembria (Nesebăr) and Develtos (Burgas)
remained in the Byzantine Empire. The lost
positions were recovered during the wars of
Constantine V. After the victory of Markellai
(Krumovo, 7 km west of Karnobat) of 756, the
empire advanced to the Balkan range. The
following wars until 775 strengthened the new
frontier, extended in 784 up to Anchialos and
Mesembria, but the Bulgarian victories of 792 and
796 established the old frontier of 717, and led to
the conquest of Varna.21 During the wars of 760,
763 and 765, Durostorum was occupied again for a
while. Only in this way can be explained the
discovery of some lead seals issued by Byzantine
officers dated in the 8th century. One of them,
belonging to a strategos called Phokas, shows that
at Durostorum was an officer who was receiving
orders from a theme commander.22
-------------------------------------[23~|----
The second stage of the Bulgarian expansion
to south took place in 812-815. By the peace treaty
of 816, the Byzantine Empire has lost Anchialos
and Mesembria, but received Sozopolis, Ranuli
(Ropotamo) and Agathopolis (Ahtopol). Develtos
was divided between the two States.23 The western
coast was now entirely lost for Byzantum, except
the theme of Thrace.
In the North-Pontic space, a significant change
in the balance of powers was caused by the rise of
the Khazars in the region between Dnieper and
Volga, after the second third of the 7* century.
The Khazars became the main power north of the
Black Sea, and Cherson entered under their control
in 711. Theoretically, this city remained in the
Byzantine Empire, but the real authority was
exerted by Khazarian governors,24 as well as in
Bosporos (Kerch) and Phanagoria (Tamatarkha),
the cities located on the both sides of the Kerch
Strait.25 In this way, the Byzantine monopoly in
the Black Sea turned into a power sharing with the
Khazars. The rise of the Khazars affected the
Byzantine positions in Crimea, influencing the
strategy applied in the northern space of security
of Constantinople. As long as the Khazars were
stih powerful, the Byzantines avoided any conflict
with them, especially during the wars against the
Arabs, their common enemies. The Byzantine-
Khazarian power sharing enabled the return of a
real imperial administration in Crimea, in the form
of the new theme of Cherson, created in 841 by
emperor Theophilus.26 Kerch was not a priority
for the Byzantines as long as the Khazars were
stih powerful.27 A recent interpretation suggests
that this harbor was recovered by the Byzantines
before 873,28 but the Khazarian rule came back in
unknown circumstances, since it is sure that Kerch
was a Khazarian possession in 965, when it was
conquered by the Russians.29
In 860, Constantinople suffered a surprise
attack caused by a fleet of 200 ships with 8000
warriors arrived by the Black Sea from the far
north. The invaders, called Rhos in the Byzantine
sources, ravaged the suburbs, taking a rich booty.30
The Rus’ (Vikings mixed with Slavs) were a
potențial danger not only for Cherson, but also for
other Byzantine regions, including the capital, and
also for the Khazars. The defence against them
required the strengthening of the Byzantine
positions in Crimea and the prevention of future
attacks by new and effective alliances. At
----E24---------------------------------------
Constantinople, a new military district secured the
defence of Bosphorus.31 The new danger which
emerged north of the Black Sea was counter-
balanced by the alliance with the Hungarians
established in 863. Their location between Don
and Bug was suitable for the prevention of the
Russian attacks. They were also in good position to
strike the Khazars, and to attack Bulgaria and the
Frankish Empire. For more than three decades,
the Hungarians, took the place of the Khazars as
the warrants of the North-Pontic space security,
with the difference that they did not intend to
control the Crimean harbors as did the Khazars.32
A good defence against the Russian maritime
attacks required also the control over some
strategic points on the western and northern
shores of the Black Sea. The recovery of the
western harbors was necessary because they were
on the way of the Russian raids. In the war against
Bulgaria launched in 863, the emperor Michael III
(842-867) reconquered Develtos, Anchialos and
Mesembria.33 At Mesembria was created after 864
a kleisura (small frontier district). The seals of its
commanders are dated through the archaeological
context between 864-917. Another kleisura was
established around 840 at Sozopolis.34 It followed
the reestablishment of some positions on the
Danube. The existence of a Danubian theme called
Lykostomion was inferred from the dedication of
Patriarch Photios’ Lexikon, made for a certain
Thomas, protospatharios and archon of Lykos-
tomion. Helene Ahrweiler has supposed that this
9lh century Lykostomion is the same with that
recorded in the Danube Delta in the 13lh-15lh
centuries.35 The hypothesis was endorsed by
several historians36, but denied by Vasilka Tăpkova-
Zaimova, who supposed that this Lykostomion was
in Thessaly.37 However, the location on an island
at the mouth of the Chilia channel, at Periprava,
could be taken into consideration, since the
existence of a Byzantine headquarter on the
Danube in the 9lh century is now supported by the
seals of two Byzantine dignitaries found at
Isaccea.38 The base of Lykostomion was a stop in
the coast navigation to Chersones.
The new defensive system created after 863,
based on the harbors of Anchialos and Mesembria
and on the port of caii of Lykostomion, ensured
the security of the capital against the Rus’ and
Bulgaria, while the alliance with the Hungarians
secured the stability in the north. It was a well
-----------■ Review of Military History ■-----
The Byzantine Empire in 1025
(after Warren Treadgold, Byzantium an its Army, 284-1081, Stanford, 1995, p. 38, fig. 5)
■ Review of Military History ■
£25}
developed system, composed from two themes
(Cherson and Lykostomion), and an allied people
(Hungarians), inserted between Bulgaria and the
latent dangerous steppe region. It is very likely
that the last operation in which the fleet of
Lykostomion was involved was the transshipment
of the Hungarians in Bulgaria during the war of
894-896. The failure of the campaign led also to
the end of the ephemeral Danubian theme.
Mesembria was also lost.39 After the war of 917,
Anchialos entered again under Bulgarian domina-
tion, together with the harbors of Mesembria,
Develtos, Sozopolis and Agathopolis. The Byzan-
tine domination in the western Pontic space was
seriously damaged. The peace treaty of 927 has
reconfirmed for Bulgaria the possession of
Develtos, Sozopolis, Agathopolis, Anchialos and
Mesembria (it seems that the latter remained free
for the Byzantine navy).40
In the first half of the 10th century, the Byzan-
tine Empire broke the alliance with the Khazars,
no more useful, because their power declined.
When the Pechenegs evolved toward a potențial
supremacy in the North-Pontic steppes, it was
necessary to stop this trend by supporting their
rivals, the Rus’. It is true that they were potențial
enemies of the Byzantine Empire, but they were
not able to launch offensives toward the Black Sea
if they were hold back by the Pechenegs who
controlled the Dnieper cataracts. By this reason,
it was imperative to keep the hostility between
Russians and Pechenegs.
A persecution of the Christians launched by
the Khazars was the alleged reason for a Byzantine
maneuver, which was intended to oppose two
potențial enemies, the Khazars and the Rus’, in
Kerch Strait area. At the request of Romanos I
Lekapenos (920-944), knyaz Oleg started a war
against Tmutorokan, around 940. The city was
captured, but the commander of Kerch, a certain
Pesah, was able to start his own campaign against
Cherson. After the conquest of this city, he
continued the war against the Rus’, defeating them
and requesting them to attack Constantinople. The
invasion took place in June lllh, 941, under the
common command of Oleg and Igor. A fleet
composed of 1000 small boats sieged the capital
and destroyed the suburbs like in 860, but it was
finally defeated with the intensive use of the
“Greek Fire”.41 The Byzantine intrigue failed this
time, but the idea of using the Rus’ as an instrument
----[26~|--------------------------------------
in the north Pontic policy was resumed after few
years. The Rus’ launched in 943 another attack
against the Khazarian fortresses Sudak and
Tmutorokan. This fact gave to the Russians the
opportunity to settle their control over one side of
the Kerch Strait. Next, the Russians planned a
new inroad in the Byzantine Empire, in alliance
with the Pechenegs, but the invasion did not take
place, because the Byzantines payed knyaz Igor to
stop the war. Igor was thus convinced to close a
treaty with the Byzantine Empire, in 944 or 945.
He obliged himself to defend the isthmus of Crimea
against the “Black Bulgarians” settled north of the
Azov Sea and against the Pechenegs, and to do not
occupy the Dnieper mouth. In the same time, the
treaty allowed to the “Black Bulgarians” to attack
the Khazarian territories in Crimea, because this
matched the Byzantine interests.42
The Russian attack of 941 made necessary the
improvement of the fighting capability of the navy.
The emperor Romanos I Lekapenos, its former
commander, acted in this direction.43 It was
supposed that in these circumstances was restored
the port of caii from Tomis, recorded in the sources
with the new name Constantia (De Administrando
Imperio, c. 9). The Byzantine ports of calls had in
the same time commercial and military functions.44
It was already emphasized the increase of the
amount of Byzantine coins at Constanța in this
period, that could reflect the revival of the port of
caii (another one was perhaps at Mangalia).45
Taking into account the peaceful Bulgarian-
Byzantine relations reestablished after 927, the
settlement of some Byzantine ports of caii in
Dobrudja would be not excluded, but we think that
the few archaeological and numismatic remains
can not surely support this hypothesis. From De
Administrando Imperio, c. 9 results that, around
953, Bulgaria mastered Dobrudja up to the Danube’s
mouths, and that Constantia belonged to Bulgaria.
The Russians who navigated along the coast
reached Selinas (the Sulina channel) and from that
point they entered in Bulgaria, a land that included
the next branch of the Danube (Sfântu Gheorghe)
and Constantia.
For the time being, the Rus’ remained an useful
ally for the Byzantines, if they were able to contain
the Pechenegs and to fight against Bulgaria. The
Russian hegemony in Crimea was perceived by
the Byzantine Empire as a way to surround
Bulgaria, which became again an enemy when tzar
------------■ Review of Military History ■--------
Peter refused to impede the Hungarian inroads that
crossed his state. The anti-Bulgarian common war
proposed by Nikephor Phokas to Svyatoslav in 966
was intended to give to the Rus’ a field for action
that was also convenient for the Byzantine
interests, but the treachery of Kalokyres, strategos
of Cherson, transformed this campaign into a war
against the Byzantine Empire (he suggested to
Svyatoslav to support him as pretender against
Nikephor Phokas). With his forces of 40.000 men,
Svyatoslav crossed the Danube in the summer of
968, conquering a part of Bulgaria, including
Preslav. Svyatoslav decided to keep Bulgaria for
himself, in order to profit from the intensive trading
with Central Europe fulfilled on the Danube. Only
the strong offensive led by the next emperor John
Tzimiskes has succeeded to defeat Svyatoslav at
Durostorum, in 971. By the peace agreement,
Svyatoslav engaged himself to do not attack
Cherson in the future.46
In 971 were created three provinces, Preslav
(renamed loannoupolis), ruled by a strategos,
Dristra (renamed Theodoroupolis), ruled by a
katepano, and the Western Mesopotamia (in the
northern Dobrudja).47 At Anchialos was organized
a strategy after 97148, and at Mesembria was
restored the kleisura lost in 917. The seals of its
commanders Alexios and Pankratios are dated by
the end of the lOth century.49 The danger from
north has disappeared for a while along the
Danube, but it was replaced after few years by
another one, from south. The Bulgarians rebelled
against the Byzantine occupation in 976.50 In 986,
the most part of the Danubian region was again in
the hands of the Bulgarians, but the Byzantine
Empire continued to preserve the region of
Dobrudja north of the line Cernavoda-Constanța.
The lost territory was recovered in 1001.51 In the
new organization decided by Basil II, the Preslav
and the Western Mesopotamia provinces were
attached at Dristra, renamed Paradunavon after
1059.52 A part of this theme rebelled in 1072-1091
under the rule of the Pechenegs, but the victory of
Alexios I against these warriors restored the
control over the entire province in 1091.53
The victory against the Rus’ was a stimulus for
a new Byzantine expansion in Crimea, beyond the
narrow area around the city of Cherson. In the
first years after 971 was created the function of
strategos of Bosphoros (Kerch). This means that
Kerch was took from the Rus’ in the aftermath of
----■ Review of Military History ■-------------
the victory over Svyatoslav. The extension of the
Byzantine domination over the Kerch Strait
indicates the involvement of this naval power in
the trade fulfilled by the Azov Sea, hence the
beginning of a new stage in the commercial policy
of Byzantium. The area of the Cherson theme was
too extended over the Gothic settlements, among
whom Doros was the most important.54 The need
for a better maritime defence against future
Russian attacks could explain the appearance of a
new function, most probable just after 971: the
strategos of Pontus Euxinus.55 However, the fate of
Cherson remained uncertain as long as the Rus’
were able to threaten it. When Basil II (976-1025)
asked the new Rus’ ruler Vladimir (980-1015) to
help him in the civil war against Bardas Phokas,
the city of Cherson was destroyed by the Rus’,
because it was on the side of the rebels. It is true
that Vladimir offered the city to Basil II after he
married with Anna, the sister of the emperor,56 but
the Russian devastations from 990 had harsh
consequences for Cherson. The city will remain
the residence of a theme, but deprived of the
previous prosperity.57 The Byzantine Empire
annexed all the eastern Crimea, leaving to the
Russians the port placed in front of Kerch. After
few years, in 1021, the region east of Tmutorokan
rich in oii (naphta), the raw material for the “Greek
Fire”, Zichia, was too included in the empire. In
this way it was established a kind of Byzantine-
Russian condominium over the Kerch Strait (the
city of Kerch was Byzantine, while Tmutorokan
was Russian). In another campaign (from 1021),
the Byzantine Empire occupied Iberia (Georgia).58
After 1030 was conquered another strategic point
on the Iberian seashore, Anacopia (Novyi Afon).59
This was the climax of the Byzantine domina-
tion in the Black Sea, and the end of a long struggle
to achieve the security of the Black Sea space, by
two kind of strategies. The first one was to ensure
the stability of Crimea. The Byzantine Empire
preferred to leave the interior of the peninsula in
the hands of the barbarian peoples (Khazars,
Hungarians, Pechenegs, Russians), in order to
protect what was really important, the harbors of
Chersonesus and Kerch. For the Byzantines,
Crimea was a fulcrum for the control over the Black
Sea and a region of trade transit. The Byzantine
hegemony on the sea remained undisputed despite
the Russians maritime attacks. All the North-Pontic
powers were orientated toward the mainland, not
----------------------------------------[27~|----
to the sea. The second strategic direction of the
Pontic policy was the containment of the Bulgarian
expansion, whose ultimate act was the annihilation
of this state. The target was accomplished in most
cases by a combination of field and naval
operations, sometimes with the cooperation of the
northern allies. It is nevertheless true that these
alliances with the barbarians were not efficient.
They were defeated (the Hungarians in 894-896),
they abandoned the fight (the Pechenegs in 917),
or they betrayed (the Russians in 967). The
Byzantine Empire had strong reasons to resort to
such unsure alliances, because the conflicts in the
Pontic space often took place at once with the wars
against the Arabs, that remained for a long time
the main concern for the grand Byzantine strategy.
The Christianization of the Bulgarians and
Russians brought their States in the Byzantine
Commonwealth. It also enabled the restoration of
the Byzantine supremacy in the Pontic space, when
the new Christian rulers were not tempted by
imperial ambitions, like Symeon and Samuel, who
fought against Byzantium because they wished to
transform Bulgaria in a rival empire shaped after
the Byzantine pattern. Unlike them, the Russian
Christian rulers did not manifest such aspirations
before 1453. By this reason, with some not significant
exceptions (such as the naval attack of 1043), Russia
was in the lllh-12lh centuries a faithful partner of
the Byzantine Empire in the North-Pontic area,
oriented toward the mainland and not toward the
sea, in the same way like the Khazars. Jonathan
Shepard remarked that Vladimir “succeeded in
making his realm the “Number One Ally” of the
Byzantine Empire north of the Black Sea, replacing
the Pechenegs in that capacity”.60
The last movement of expansion of the
Byzantine Empire in the Black Sea, before the
collapse of 1204, took place during the reign of
Alexios I Comnenos. A speech of Manuel Straboro-
manos remembers that this emperor took again “the
lands located near the Cimmerian Bosphoros”.61
This could concern the region recovered by a group
of English knights who were in the service of the
Byzantine army, sent in 1082 in Zichia, in order to
protect this area against the neighboring barbarians
(the Cumans, perhaps). The location of the territory
conquered by these knights proposed by J. Shepard
in 1974 was denied by some scholars, but the
existence of some place-names of obvious English
origin in the area is a decisive proof for it.62
----W---------------------------------------------
Nicolae Bănescu supposed that the seal of a
certain Michael, archon of Matracha (Tmutoro-
kan), Zichia and Khazaria, belonged to a Byzantine
dignitary whose mission was the defence of the
entire area of the Azov Sea and the region west of
Bosphoros, and that the Russian prince Oleg
Svyatoslavich abandoned Tmutorokan in 1094 to
the Byzantines.63 In fact, the seal belonged to this
prince, also called Michael. Another seal, also
known to Bănescu, with the inscription Theophano
Mouzalonissa archontissa Rhosias, belonged to his
wife. In this case, we should admit that the Byzan-
tine Empire took Tmutorokan in a later moment,
perhaps after the death of Oleg Svyatoslavich, in
1115.64 Even so, this extension was auspicious for
the development of the Byzantine trade with the
north. It is very significant that the privilege
granted in 1169 by Manuel I Comnenus to the
Genoese merchants specified that they can trade
freely all over the Byzantine Empire, but with an
exception: not also in ‘Russia’ and Tmutorokan
(praeter Russiam et Matracham).65 This Russia
could be identified with a city from the eastern
part of Crimea.66 The exception clause did not
mean that the access beyond Kerch was forbidden,
as it was considered before, but only that the
Byzantine Empire preserved the right to take
customs taxes for the merchandise arrived from
the Azov Sea.67 A Genoese document from the
same time remembered that the Genoese and
Venetians are making trade at Tmutorokan,68
while the existence of a Byzantine customs service
is attested in the same point around 1180.69
This concern for the Byzantine monopoly in
the Azov Sea denotes that the Byzantine state was
aware of the importance of the Kerch Strait for
the connection with the northern trade routes. In
a similar way acted the Genoese in 1269, when
they forbad to the Venetians the access at Tana by
the Azov Sea (quod non ireturad Tanam), in order
to preserve only for themselves the profit took
from the trade with oriental products arrived on
the Silk Road.70 Like in the 8th-9th centuries, the
Byzantine Empire preferred to keep the control
over the most important points in Crimea, leaving
to the barbarians the inner part of the peninsula.
During the 12th century, most of Crimea entered
under the domination of the Cumans. The cities
from the peninsula payed tribute to them. The
Cumans established trade relations with Byzan-
tium, by Sudak.71 However, the relations with them
------------■ Review of Military History ■-------
were not always peaceful. The analysis of a speech
in honor of Manuel I Comnenus has demonstrated
that the Byzantine army launched a campaign
against the Cumans settled near the Azov Sea,
around 1152-1153.72 The reason of this war was
probable the defence of the positions acquired by
the Byzantine Empire near the Kerch Strait.
Another change of the extent of the Byzantine
domination in the Black Sea area was a conse-
quence of the military reform applied by Alexios I
after the beginning of the 12th century. The
function of katepano of Paradunavon disappeared,
and the defence, in order to be more effective, was
moved on the line of the Balkan range. On the
Danube were left only some outposts at Isaccea,
Hârșova, Axiopolis and Dristra, used to block the
most important fords and to support the navy.73
The new military structure that provided the forces
for defence was the theme of Anchialos, detached
from the theme of Thrace. The harbors Mesem-
bria, Sozopolis and Develtos belonged to it.74
On the eve of the fragmentation of the Byzan-
tine Empire caused by the 4"’ Crusade, the Black
Sea area continued to be in its most part dominated
by this state. After 1204, one of the successor States,
the Empire of Trebizond, became the mașter of
the Pontic area.
1	M. Nystazopoulou-Pelekidou, L’administration
locale de Cherson ă l’epoque byzantine (IVe-XlIe s.),
in Eupsychia. Melanges olferts ă Helene Ahrweiler,
voi. II, Paris, 1998, p. 568-571.
2	R. C. Blockley, East Roman Foreign Policy. For-
mation and Conduct from Diocletian to Anastasius,
Leeds, 1992, p. 34-38; D. Braund, Georgia in Antiq-
uity: A History of Colchis and Transcaucasian Iberia,
550 BC-AD 562, Oxford, 1994, p. 260-261.
3	C. Zuckerman, The Early Byzantine Strongholds
in Eastern Pontus, “Travaux et Memoires, Centre de
Recherche d’Histoire et Civilisation Byzantines”,
Paris, 11, 1991, p. 531-535; W. Seibt, Westgeorgien
(Egrisi, Lazica) in friihchristlicher Zeit, in Die
Schwarzmeerkiiste in der Spătantike und im friihes
Mittelalter, ed. R. Pillinger, A. Piilz, H. Vetters, Wien,
1992, p. 139; D. Braund, Georgia..., p. 265-266.
4	Procopius, Wars, 1.12, 6-19; W. Seibt, Westgeor-
gien..., p. 139-140; D. Braund, Georgia..., p. 271-273,
276-277, 283-284, 290; R. C. Blockley, East Roman...,
p. 70, 73-74, 84-85; A. Carile, 11 Caucaso e l’Impero
bizantino (secoli VI-X1), in 11 Caucaso: cerniera fra cui-
ture dai Mediterraneo alia Persia (secoli IV-XI)
(Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull’Alto
Medioevo, 43, 1995), Spoleto, 1996, p. 9, 14.
----■ Review of Military History ■---------------
5	W. Seibt, Westgeorgien..., p. 140,143; D. Braund,
Georgia..., p. 287, 291, 294.
6	Procopius, Wars, II. 15, 17, 28; VIII. 7.
7	D. Braund, Georgia..., p. 297-302, 305-311; J. A.
S. Evans, The Age ofjustinian: The Circumstances of
Imperial Power, London, 1996, p. 158, 166-168.
8	R. Grousset, Histoire de fArmenie des origines
ă 1071, Paris, 1947, p. 251-253; A. Carile, II Caucaso...,
p. 47; R. W. Thomson, Armenia in the Fifth and Sixth
Centuries, in The Cambridge Ancient History, voi.
XIV. Late Antiquity: empire and successors, AD 425-
600, Cambridge, 2000, p. 673-674.
9	R. Grousset, Histoire..., p. 270-272; W. E. Kaegi
Jr., Heraclius, Emperorof Byzantium, Cambridge, 2003,
p. 67-69, 111.
10	V. F. Gajdukevic, Das Bosporanische Reich, Ber-
lin, 1971, p. 500-514; Y. G. Vinogradov, The Late Clas-
sical Bosporus and Early Byzantium (in the Light of
Dated Bosporan Inscripționa of the Fifth Century),
“Ancient Civilizations from Scythia to Siberia”, 5,1998,
3, p. 245-269.
11	R. Grousset, Histoire..., p. 273-276; W. E. Kaegi
Jr., Heraclius..., p. 112-118, 122-132, 141-144.
12	B. Martin-Hisard, La domination byzantine sur le
littoral oriental du Pont Euxin (milieu du VIIe-VHIe
siecles), “Byzantinobulgarica”, 7, 1981, p. 143, 146; G.
Dedeyan, Les Arabes au Caucase: les relations des rois
bagratides d Armenie avec le caliphat abbaside de Bagdad
(de 884 ă 1055), in 11 Caucaso..., I, p. 169-170, 175.
13	R. Grousset, Histoire..., p. 307, 514-516, 537-
538; C. Toumanoff, Caucasia and Byzantium, “Tradi-
tio. Studies in Ancient and Medieval History, Thought,
and Religion”, 27,1971, p. 119,127; B. Martin-Hisard,
La domination..., p. 147-148, 155-156; A. Carile, II
Caucaso..., p. 41.
14	V. Gjuzelev, Die mittelalterliche Stadt Mesem-
bria (Nesebăr) im 6.-15. Jh., “Bulgarian Historical Re-
view”, 6, 1978, 1, p. 51-52; Idem, Anchialos zwischen
der Spătantike und dem friihen Mittelalter, în Schwar-
zmeerkiiste..., p. 24-25.
15	Gh. Mănucu-Adameșteanu, Aspecte privind
circulația monetară la Mangalia în secolele XXI (969-
1081), “Pontica”, 28-29, 1995-1996, p. 287.
16	Idem, Tomis-Constantia-Constanța, “Pontica”,
24, 1991, 299.
17	There are many 7th century seals (I. Barnea,
Noviodunum în lumina sigiliilor bizantine, SCIVA, 48,
1997, 4, 354).
18	R. J. Lilie, “Thrakien” und “Thrakesion”. Zur
byzantinischen Provinzorganisation am Ende des 7.
Jahrhunderts, “Jahrbuch der Osterreichischen Byzan-
tinistik”, 26, 1977, p. 20-21, 34-35, 41-45.
19	P. Koledarov, Administrative Structure and Frontier
set up of the First Bulgarian Tsardom, “Etudes
Balkaniques”, 14, 1978, 3, p. 133; D. Angelov, Die
Entstehung des bulgarischen Volkes, Berlin, 1980, p. 84.
201	. Barnea, Sigilii bizantine din nordul Dobrogei,
in Simpozion de numismatică dedicat împlinirii a patru
	[29
secole de la prima unire a românilor sub Mihai Voievod
Viteazul, Chișinău, 28-30 mai 2000, București, 2001,
p. 107-108, nr. 5.
21	V. Gjuzelev, Forschungen zur Geschichte
Thrakiens im Mittelalter. I. Beitrag zur Geschichte
der Stadt Konstanteia, “Byzantinobulgarica”, 3, 1969,
p. 164; K. Gagova, Bulgarian-Byzantine Border in
Thrace from the 7th to the lOth Century (Bulgaria to
the South of the Haemus), “Bulgarian Historical Re-
view”, 14, 1986, 1, p. 67-69; V. Gjuzelev, Anchialos...,
p. 24-25; R. Panova, Messembria: Une viile frontiere a
deux visages, în Les villes frontiere (Moyen Age-
Epoque Moderne), Paris, Montreal, 1996, p. 69; R.
Rasev, Varna, une viile frontiere de trois empires, ibi-
dem, p. 82-83.
221	. Barnea, Șt. Ștefănescu, Din istoria Dobrogei,
voi. III, București, 1971, p. 15; O. Damian, Despre
prezența politică bizantină la Dunărea de Jos în secolele
V1I-X, in Prinos lui Petre Diaconu la 80 de ani, Brăila,
2004, p. 290-291..
23	V. Besevliev, Die protobulgarischen Inschriften,
Berlin, 1963, p. 190-206 (the treaty of 816); K. Gagova,
Bulgarian..., p. 70-72; V. Gjuzelev, Forschungen..., p.
165-167; H. Dimitrov, Bulgaria against the Byzantine
Empire for the Mastery of the Black Sea Coast in the
First Half of the Ninth Century, in Bulgaria Pontica
Medii Aevi, voi. III, Sofia, 1992, p. 43-45..
24	A. A. Vasiliev, The Goths in the Crimea, Cam-
bridge (Mass.), 1936, p. 75-76, 81-87; O. Pritsak, The
Khazar Kingdom’s Conversion to Judaism, “Harvard
Ukrainian Studies”, 2,1978, p. 264-265; Th. S. Noonan,
Byzantium and the Khazars: a special relationship ?,
in Byzantine Diplomacy. Papers from the Twenty-
fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cam-
bridge, March 1990, ed. by J. Shepard, S. Franklin,
Aldershot, 1992, p. 112-113.
25	O. Pritsak, The Khazar..., p. 264.
26	M. Nystazopoulou-Pelekidou, L’administra-
tion..., p. 572-574; N. Oikonomides, Le “systeme”
administratif byzantin en Crimee aux IXe-Xe s., “Ma-
terials in Archaeology, History and Etnography of
Tauria”, Simferopol, 7, 2000, p. 321; C. Zuckerman,
Two notes on the early history of the thema of
Cherson, “Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies”, 21,
1997, p. 210-222.
27	Th. S. Noonan, Byzantium and the Khazars..., p.
130-131.
28	C. Zuckerman, Les Hongrois au pays de Lebedia:
Une nouvelle puissance aux coniins de Byzance et de
la Khazarie ca. 836-889, in Byzantium at War (9th-12th
c.), ed. by K. Tsiknakis, Athens, 1997, p. 68-73. N.
Oikonomides, Le “systeme”..., p. 321 agrees that the
Byzantine administration returned in the eastern
Crimea in the second half of the 9lh century.
29	Th. S. Noonan, The Khazar-Byzantine World of
the Crimea in the Early Middle Ages: The Religious
Dimension, “Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi”, 10,1998-
1999, p. 209-210.
—noi----------------------------------------------
30	S. Franklin, J. Shepard, The Emergence of Rus.
750-1200, London, New York, 1996, p. 51-53.
31	H. Ahrweiler, L’escale dans le monde byzantin,
“Recueils de la Societe Jean Bodin”, 32, 1974 (Idem,
Byzance: les pays et les territoires, Variorum, Lon-
don, 1976, VI), p. 168.
32	S. Nikolov, The Magyar Connection or Constan-
tine and Methodius in the Steppes, “Byzantine and
Modern Greek Studies”, 21, 1997, p. 79-92.
33	N. Oikonomides, Mesembria in the Ninth Cen-
tury: Epigraphical Evidence, “Byzantine Studies”, 8,
11, 12 (1981, 1984, 1985) 1985, p. 269-273; V.
Gjuzelev, Anchialos..., p. 25.
341	. Jordanov, Corpus of the Byzantine Seals from
Bulgaria, voi. 1: Byzantine Seals with Geographical
Names, Sofia, 2003, p. 119-120, 159-160.
35	H. Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer. La marine de
guerre, la politique et les institutions maritimes de
Byzance aux Vlle-XVe siecles, Paris, 1966, p. 89-90.
36	For instance: P. Ș. Năsturel, book review at H.
Ahrweiler, Byzance..., “Revue des Etudes Sud-Est
Europeennes”, 4, 1966, 3-4, p. 649-651; I. Barnea, Șt.
Ștefănescu, Din istoria Dobrogei..., p. 12; P. Diaconu,
Sur la presence des Byzantins au Bas-Danube (IXe-
XlVe siecles), RESEE, 32, 1994, 3-4, p. 368.
37	V. Tăpkova-Zaimova, Quelques observations sur
la domination byzantine aux bouches du Danube - Le
sort de Lykostomion et de quelques autres villes
cotieres, “Studia Balcanica. 1. Recherches de
geographie historique”, Sofia, 1970, 82-86.
381	. Barnea, Noviodunum..., p. 355.
39	J. D. Howard-Johnston, The De Administrando
Imperio: a re-examination of the text and a re-evalua-
tion of its evidence about the Rus, in M. Kazanski, A.
Nercessian, C. Zuckerman (ed.), Les Centres proto-
urbains russes entre Scandinavic, Byzance et Orient,
Paris, 2000, p. 342-354; V. Spinei, The Great Migra-
tions in the East and South East of Europe from the
Ninth to the Thirteenth Century, Cluj-Napoca, 2003,
p. 52.
40	V. Gjuzelev, Die mittelalterliche Stadt Mesem-
bria..., p. 52; I. Bozilov./l propos des rapports bulgaro-
byzantines sous le tzar Symeon (893-912), “Byzantino-
bulgarica”, 6, 1980, p. 73-81; H. Dimitrov, Die
friihmittelalterliche Stadt Develtos zwischen Byzanz
und Bulgarien von Achten bis ins Zehnte Jahrhundert,
in Die Schwarzmeerkiiste..., p. 40-43; K. Gagova, Bul-
garian..., p. 74-76.
41	Th. S. Noonan, Byzantium and the Khazars...,
p. 115-116; S. Franklin,}. Shepard, The Emergence...,
p. 113-117; Th. S. Noonan, The Khazar-Byzantine...,
p. 210-211.
42	A. A. Vasiliev, The Goths..., p. 118-122; F. E.
Wozniak, The Crimean Question, the Black Bulgar-
ians and the Russo-Byzantine Treaty of 944, “Journal
of Medieval History”, 5, 1979, 2, p. 115-126.
------------■ Review of Military History ■-----------
43	H. Ahrweiler, Byzance..., p. 106.
44	Eadem, L’escale..., p. 163-164.
45	Gh. Mănucu-Adameșteanu, Tomis..., p. 304-308;
Idem, Aspecte privind..., p. 289-290.
461	. Barnea, Șt. Ștefănescu, Din istoria Dobrogei...,
p. 72-73; S. Franklin, J. Shepard, The Emergence...,
p. 88-89, 145-150; A. Madgearu, Organizarea militară
bizantină la Dunăre în secolele XXII, Târgoviște, 2007,
p. 22-28.
47	N. Oikonomides, Problems of Chronology and
the Seals of Preslav, “Studies in Byzantine Sigillo-
graphy”, Washington DC, 7, 2002, p. 7; A. Madgearu,
Organizarea..., p. 29-34.
48	J. Nesbitt, N. Oikonomides, Catalogue of Byzan-
tine seals at Dumbarton Oaks and in the Fogg Mu-
seum ofArt, voi. I. Italy, North of the Balkans, North
of the Black Sea, Washington DC, 1991, p. 168-169,
nr. 73.1.
49	N. Oikonomides, Problems... p. 7. The seals are
published by I. Jordanov, Corpus..., p. 119-120, 47.1,
47.4.
50	J. V. A. Fine Jr., The Early Medieval Balkans. A
Criticai Surveyfrom the Sixth to the late Twelfth Cen-
tury, Ann Arbor, 1991, p. 188-189.
511	. Barnea, Șt. Ștefănescu, Din istoria Dobrogei...,
p. 87-88; I. Jordanov, V. Tăpkova-Zaimova, Quelques
nouvelles donndes sur l’administration byzantine au
Bas-Danube (lin du XeXIe s.), in Geographic historique
du monde mediterraneen (sous la direction de H.
Ahrweiler), Paris, 1988, p. 121-122; P. Diaconu, Surla
presence..., p. 369; A. Madgearu, Organizarea...,
p. 37-41.
52	A. Madgearu, Organizarea..., p. 52.
531	. Barnea, Șt. Ștefănescu, Din istoria Dobrogei...,
p. 135-152; P. Stephenson, Byzantium’s Balkan Fron-
tier: A Political Study of the Northern Balkans, 900-
1204, Cambridge, 2000, p. 99-100; A. Madgearu, The
Periphery against the Centre: the Case of Paradu-
navon, “Zbornik Radova Vizantoloskog Instituta”, 40,
2003, p. 49-56.
54	N. Oikonomides, Les listes de preseance
byzantines des IXe et Xe siecles, Paris, 1972, p. 363;
N. N. Alekseenko, Un tourmarque de Gothie sur un
sceau inedit de Cherson, “Revue des Etudes
Byzantines”, 54, 1996, 275.
55	N. Oikonomides, Les listes..., p. 266, 267, 358.
56	D. Obolensky, Byzantium, Kiev and Cherson in
the Tenth Century, “Byzantinoslavica”, 54, 1993, 1,
p. 110-113; S. Franklin, J. Shepard, The Emergence...,
p. 162-163.
57	J. Shepard, The Russian Steppe-Frontier and
the Black Sea Zone, “Archeion Pontou”, 35, 1979,
p. 221-222.
58	N. Bănescu, La domination byzantine ă Matracha
(Tmutorokan), en Zichie, en Khazarie et en ‘Russie’
ă l’dpoque des Comnenes, “Bulletin de la Section
----■ Review of Military History ■-----------------
Historique de l’Academie Roumaine”, 22, 1941, 2,
p. 59, 63, 66, 70-74; G. G. Litavrin, Â propos de
Tmutorokan, “Byzantion”, 35, 1965, 1, p. 230-234; S.
Franklin, J. Shepard, The Emergence..., p. 200; T.
Lounghis, liber die zwei gegensătzlichen Richtungen
der byzantinischen AuBenpolitik im osteuropăischen
Raum im 10. Jahrhundert, in G. Prinzing, M. Salamon
(ed. by), Byzanz und Ostmitteleuropa 950-1453.
Beitrăge zu einer table-ronde des XIX International
Congress of Byzantine Studies, Copenhagen 1996,
Wiesbaden, 1999, p. 38, 40.
59	J. Shepard, Emperors and Expansionism: From
Rome to Middle Byzantium, in D. Abulafia, N. Berend
(ed.), Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices,
Aldershot, 2002, p. 75.
60	Idem, The Russian Steppe-Frontier..., p. 221.
61	G. G. Litavrin, Â propos..., p. 226-230; A. P.
Kazhdan, Some Little-Known or Misenterpreted Evi-
dence about Kievan Rus’ in Twelfth-Century Greek
Sources, “Harvard Ukrainian Studies”, 7,1983, p. 345.
62	J. Shepard, Another NewEngland ? Anglo-Saxon
Settlement on the Black Sea, “Byzantine Studies”, 1,
1974,1, p. 18-39; A. Madgearu, Despre “Noua Anglie”
de la Marea Neagră (secolul al Xl-lea), „Revista
istorică”, SN, 14, 5-6, p. 137-144.
63	N. Bănescu, La domination..., p. 57-77. His opin-
ion was shared by Gh. I. Brătianu, Marea Neagră. De
la origini până la cucerirea otomană, ed. V. Spinei,
Iași, 1999, p. 229 and A. P. Kazhdan, Some Little-
Known..., p. 353.
64	A. V. Soloviev, Domination byzantine ou russe
au nord de la Mer Noire ă l’epoque des Comnenes?,
in Akten des XI Internationalen Byzantinisten
Kongresses (Miinchen, 1958), Miinchen, 1960, p. 576-
580; G. G. Litavrin, Â propos..., p. 226-234.
65	A. A. Vasiliev, The Goths..., p. 144-145; N.
Bănescu, La domination..., p. 64; M. E. Martin, The
First Venetians in the Black Sea, “Archeion Pontou”,
35, 1979, p. 115.
66	A. V. Soloviev, Domination..., p. 573.
67	M. E. Martin, The First..., p. 114-116.
68	Ibidem, 114.
69	A. P. Kazhdan, Some Little-Known..., p. 348-353.
70	Ș. Papacostea, “Quod non iretur ad tanam”. Un
aspect fondamental de la politique genoise dans la
mer Noire au XlVe siecle, “Revue des Etudes Sud-Est
Europeennes", 17, 1979, 2, p. 202-203.
71	D. Obolensky, The Crimea and the North before
1204, “Archeion Pontou”, 35, 1979, p. 132.
72	A. P. Kazhdan, Some Little-Known..., p. 344-347;
V. Spinei, The Great Migrations..., p. 264.
73	P. Stephenson, Byzantium’s..., p. 103-105.
74	H. Ahrweiler, Byzance..., p. 188; J. Nesbitt, N.
Oikonomides, Catalogue..., p. 169; H. J. Kiihn, Die
Byzantinische Armee im 10. und 11. Jahrhundert.
Studien zur Oiganisation der Tagmata, Wien, 1991, p. 168.
-------------------------------------------ezd—
ROMANIANS AND GREEKS
IN THE XVH*h CENTURY
Dr. MIRCEA SOREANU
Senior Researcher of the Institute for Political Studies
of Defense and Military History
After the falling under ottoman domination, in
the XVth Century, of great centers of Byzantine
power Constantinople, Mistra and Trebizond,
Byzantium did not vanish, as political, religious
system, or as civilization - harmoniously combining
the Hellenic intellectual inheritance, Roman law
and the orthodox religion, stih perennial elements
in the Balkan Peninsula and in Romania. In these
findings resides the syntagm of genial inspiration
by Romanian scholar Nicolae lorga Byzance apres
Byzance.1 In the commemoration speech, entitled
Despre Mihai Viteazul (About Michael the Brave),
given at the Romanian Academy on November 21,
1919, Nicolae lorga emphasized that the Byzantine
Imperial idea found refugee and lived sheltered to
the north of Danube, where “princes put a purple
monogram on their charters, wove the golden
eagle on their clothes and appeared imperially
crowned on the walls of the churches”.2
Byzantine continuity is pointed out in Occident,
from Venice to Paris and from Genoa to Germany
through the emigration of scholars, due to ottoman
expansion, such as teachers, editors, text
commentators, grammars, who had an impact
upon Renaissance.
Constantinople was repopulated after the
violence of the final assault by sultan Mehmed IInd
Fatih (the Conqueror) itself, which ensured the
continuity of the strongest spiritual authority of
Eastern Europe, over the centuries, respectively
Ecumenical Patriarchy of the Orthodox Church.
Byzantine aristocracy, refusing to convert to Islam,
succeeded through commerce and land leasing to
revive their power, having representatives more
and more influential in the Ottoman Empire
businesses, like Mihail Cantacuzino,3 surnamed for
his skillfulness Șeytanoglu („son of Satan”).
For the Romanian Lands, despite that in the
XVII111 century they were paying tribute to the
sultan, the Danube kept its significance as border
of the Empire. Princes, aristocracy and clergy were
----DU----------------------------------------
all Christians, building of new churches and
monasteries constituting a title of honor, as
compared to Balkans where army, administration
and judicial system were Muslim, Christian
churches could not be built unless exceptionally,
and those existing could be rebuilt only by using
old materials from the inițial construction. In the
Balkans, non Muslims were not allowed to ride
horses, and Christians were called to religious
service through the sound of beli board, as
compared with the territories north of Danube
where all free people were practically riders and
worshiped God in the sound of bells.
For the Greeks in the Constantinople, especia-
lly in Pera and Galata, but also in those in islands -
Greek archipelago -, the Romanian Lands
constituted a strong attraction for their wealth and
for their large autonomy toward the Porte, but at
the same time, the rays of Greek Renaissance in
the XVIIth century extended their shine north of
Danube, firstly through the agency of theologians,
and also through that of scholars, historians,
rhetoricians and poets. Thus, Greek influence in
Wallachia and Moldavia was political, cultural as
well and economical, of course.
Michael the Brave (1593-1601), the prince of
the first unification of Romanian Lands had around
him at the beginning of his prince, as great
dignitaries, the Greeks Dumitraki the spathar
(sword bearer), Pankratios the treasurer, influential
Cocea, Cantacuzino or Mihalcea Caragea, married
to a relative of the ruler.4
After Ottomans regained their authority upon
Romanian Lands the princes appointed by them,
Radu Mihnea5 (1611-1615; 1620-1623) in Wallachia,
than in Moldavia (1616-1619,1623-1626), Alexandru
Iliaș (1616-1618 and 1627-1629 in Wallachia, 1620-
1621 and 1631-1633 in Moldavia) and Moise Movilă
(1630-1631 and 1633-1634) in Moldavia have brought
numerous Greeks in their suite. A great influence
had lanake Catargi (Catergi), Scarlat saegi (oxen
-----------■ Review of Military History ■-------
■ Vasile Lupu, the prince of Moldavia
(1634-1653)
■ Matei Basarab, the prince of Wallachia
(1632-1654)
merchant), the father-in-law of Alexandru Coconul
- son of Radu Mihnea prince of Wallachia (1623-
1627) and of Moldavia (1629-1630). Between 1621
and 1631 de facto rulers of the Wallachia were
Necula of loanina treasurer and his relatives
Trufanda, Vasile the treasurer, Necula Catargi.
Tutor of Alexandru Coconul was Bartolomeo
Minetti, a brother-in-law of Radu Mihnea. Alexandru
Iliaș was educated in Levant and married Elena,
the daughter of lanaki Catargi, and Moise Movilă
married the sister of Alexandru Coconul.6
The reaction of land noblemen against the new
comers surfaced during the prince of Leon Tomșa
(1629-1632) in Wallachia, surnamed Stridia (Oyster)
after the trade that enriched him. Through the
solemn act of 1631 he was forced to expel those
Greek dignitaries - his co-nationals - who produced
abuses, resorting to sensible increase of tribute
and lending large amounts of money with exor-
bitant usury necessary for claimants of throne to
buy the Porte’s benevolence.7 The Greek monk
Matei of Mirelor, the abbot of Monastery Dealu,
was calling the abusive Greek dignitaries - “do not
înfuriate Romanians through your insatiable
greed”, because “they feed and respect us”, thus
“let’s Iove and honor them as our brothers”,
warning that otherwise they will be punished by
“God with eternal punishment”.8
----■ Review of Military History ■---------------
The prince of Moldavia Vasile Lupu (1634-1653),
a Graecized Albanese, had among his closest
Alexandru Rosetti celebi of Constantinople,
kapukehaia lorga, Trufanda the treasurer, Necula,
lordaki and Toma Cantacuzino, all Greeks. Even
the land princes needed the support of Greeks at
the Porte, and their financial resources. Thus,
Matei Basarab (1632-1654), the prince of Wallachia
had Rumeliot Ghinea Tzukalas (1651-1653) as
treasurer. Constantin, the son of Andronic
Cantacuzino, was his dignitary. Constantin Șerban,
prince of Wallachia (1654-1658), maintained the
great court official Constantin Cantacuzino, and
second treasurer Gheorghe Caridi. The same
politics was followed by the prince of Moldavia
Gheorghe Ștefan (1653-1658,1661).9
After the takeover of great vizierate by the
“dynasty” Kbpriilu,10 on the throne reach Graecized
Albanians like Gheorghe Ghica, prince of Moldavia
(1658-1659) and of Wallachia (1659-1660), than his
son Grigore Ghica, prince of Wallachia (1660-1664,
1672-1673), or Greeks like Dumitrașcu Cantacuzino,
prince of Moldavia (1673,1674-1675,1684-1685),
Gheorghe Duca, prince of Moldavia (1665-1666,
1668-1672,1678-1683), and of Wallachia (1673-1678),
Antonie Ruset, prince of Moldavia (1675-1678), Iliaș
Alexandru, prince of Moldavia (1666-1668), Radu
Leon, prince ofWallachia (1664-1669), supported
--------------------------------------m—
by the exceptionally influential great drogman
Panayotis Nikoussios.
To make an idea about the amounts paid to the
Porte, at thrones auction, with the help of money
lenders, Greeks more often, the price for appoin-
ting of Radu Leon was, after Ricaut, 800 purses or
400 000 scuds, approximately 200 000 golden
coins.11 During this prince the conflict between
boyar fractions burst out again, Băleni’s side which
supported the Levantine princes and their Greek
clientele and Cantacuzino’s side - Greek themse-
Ives - who led the “național party”.12 Reveal of the
plot crafted by Necula Sofialis, and Balasake
Muselim, through which these advisers of Radu
Leon aimed physical liquidation of great land
boyars,13 the population of Bucharest revolted on
December 3,1669. Same as his father Leon Tomșa,
proceeded in 1631 to save his throne, Radu Leon
■ Constantin Brâncoveanu, the prince of
Wallachia (1688-1714)
gave a charter (December 9,1669) against abuses
by Greeks in his entourage and especially against
his two favorites. During the prince of Antonie
Vodă of Popești (1669-1672), Necula Sofialis will be
hanged.14 More paragraphs of the December 9,
1669 charter are similar to that of 1631,15 which
means that we encounter conflictive relations of
the same nature, namely who is actually to posses
the power in the country. After eliminating his
favorites, Radu Leon was constrained to accept that
abbots of monasteries devoted to Grand Lavra of
Levant stop being Greek monks, but Romanians.16
After the treason in the battle between
Ottomans and Imperials of Levice (1664), in nowa-
days Slovakia, when Grigore Ghica has left the
battlefield,17 the prince not only gained Porte’s forgi-
veness, but also was reappointed on the throne of
Wallachia (1672) with the help of great drogman
Panayotis Nikoussios, who proved this way, once
more, his great influence in the Ottoman politics.
Another Greek prince was Gheorghe Duca, in
Wallachia (1673-1678) and in Moldavia (1665-1666,
1668-1672,1678-1683). His son, Constantin Duca
will also be prince in Moldavia (1693-1695, 1700-
1703).
A Cantacuzino, Șerban, was also prince of
Wallachia (1678-1688). His kapukehaia was another
influential Greek, lannaki Porphyrita.
The follower of Nikoussios as great drogman
became a well known doctor and translator,
Alexandros Mavrokordatos, surnamed Exaporitul
(Ex Aporriton).18 His son, Scarlat „Celebi” married
in 1698 Ilinca, the daughter of Constantin
Brâncoveanu, the prince of Wallachia (1688-1714),
who honored his son-in-law with the dignity of great
cupbearer.
The Greek cultural influence was more and
more visible in Moldavia and in Wallachia, flouri-
shing during the princes of Șerban Cantacuzino
and Constantin Brâncoveanu.
At the Romanian princes courts will reach
Greek patriarchs19, such as Cyril of Alexandria,
future patriarch of Constantinople, the Cretan
Cyril Lucaris20 (1572-1638), who in 1614-1615 and
1620 was at the court of Radu Mihnea, in Wallachia.
Another personality who wrote chronics in
prose and in verses and religious booklets was
Matei of Mirelor21 (about 1550-1624), abbot of
Monastery Dealu.
In the second decade of the XVHlh century,
metropolitan bishop of Wallachia was the Cypriot
Luca.22
P34]
■ Review of Military History ■
In 1632, logothet Eustratie translated from
Greek Pravila aleasă, a compilation made from
papers on civil and canonic law, creations of loan
Zonaras, Th. Valsamon, Matei Vlastares and
Constantin Armenopol. He also participated, during
the time of Matei Basarab in writing down the code
îndreptarea legii (1652). For Vasile Lupu he
translated Carte românească de învățătură de la
pravilele împărătești și de la alte giudeațe (1646),
which will be comprised in îndreptarea legii.23
Ignatie Petritzes and Pantelimon Ligaridi (monk
Paisie) of Chios translated from Greek îndreptarea
legii.23
At the school established in 1640 by Vasile Lupu
at the Monastery „Trei Ierarhi” of Iași studies were
in Greek, Romanian and Slavonie.25
Sons of princes were educated by Greek
scholars, such as loan Comnen and Spandoni in
the case of Gheorghe Duca’s son, or sons of prince
Constantin Cantemir (1685-1693), the future
princes Antioh Cantemir (1695-1700,1705-1707)
and Dimitrie Cantemir (1710-1711), who will
become member of the Berlin Academy - students
of Jeremias Cacavelas hegumen of Plăviceni
Monastery in Wallachia, during the prince of
Șerban Cantacuzino, and known as translator of
an anonymous work in Italian regarding the second
siege ofVienna (1683) by ottomans.26
Dosoftei (Dositheu) Notaras, patriarch of
Jerusalem, colleagues of patriarchy, scholars and
Greek pedagogues such as loan Karyophilos were
found at the court in Bucharest during the time of
Șerban Cantacuzino and Constantin Brâncoveanu.
Constantin Cantacuzino opened a Greek school in
Bucharest. Patriarch Dosoftei and his nephew
Hrisant Notaras27 have contributed to the appari-
tion of some books at the Greek typography, led by
monk Antim Ivireanu, who became metropolitan
bishop of Wallachia.
Since the XVI1*1 century, Greek merchants,
especially those from Venice possessions, were
found in Walachia and Moldavia, developing
commerce with Poland. In the next century, they
represented a significant factor in trade of the
Romanian Lands.28 From Ottoman Empire or
Venice they brought luxury merchandise, fabrics,
glass, jewelry, paper, cosmetics, and from
Romanian Countries they exported honey, wax,
----■ Review of Military History ■--------------
butter, caviar, sturgeon, horned cattle leather.29
In conclusion, the political contradictions
between the boyars from Romanian Principalities
and the rulers from Constantinople imposed by
Sublime Porte were not determined by de Greeks
who lived in Romanian Lands, but by the ones
from the suite of the new princes, considered „bad
Greeks”. The last were combated also by the Greek
boyars who lived in principalities, the stake being
to become dignitaries, that meant very rich.
The affluence of Greek theologues and
scholars was for the Romanian Orthodoxy’s and
for the identity of Romanians’ benefit and
contributed to the florishing of the culture in those
times. Through the trade with Greek merchants,
the Ottoman commercial monopoly was often
evaded, which helped the Romanian Principalities
to continue the relationship with Western Europe.
1 N. lorga, Byzance apres Byzance, Bucharest,
1934; reedited in Bucharest, 1971, with an afterword
by V. Cândea, Romanian version ed. Liliana lorga-
Pippidi, Bucharest, 1972 (afterword V. Cândea).
2 Idem, Portrete și comemorări, Publishing House
of Library „Universala” Alcalay&Co., Bucharest, f.a.,
p. 40.
3 Idem, Despre Cantacuzini, Bucharest, 1902.
4 A. Veress, Epistolae et acta generalis Georgi
Basta (1597-1607), 1, Budapest, 1909, p. 39.
5 Cf. I. lonașcu, Date noi relativ la Radu vodă
Mihnea în Țara Românească, in „Studii” Rdl, 1.14, no.
3, 1961, p. 699-720.
6 Cf. N. lorga, Istoria poporului românesc, ed.
Georgeta Penelea, Bucharest, 1985, in special chapter
III, entitled „Influența grecească”, from p. 387 et
passim.
7 Cf. V. Al. Georgescu, Hrisovul din 15 iulie 1631
al lui Leon Vodă Tomșa în Țara Românească și problema
„Cărților de libertăți”, in Rdl, XXIX, no. 7, 1976,
p. 1013-1029; Documenta Romaniae Historica, B,
voi. XXIII, p. 412-414.
8 N. lorga, Istoria poporului românesc, p. 392;
idem, Manuscripte din biblioteci străine relative la
istoria românilor (O nouă cronică în proză a lui Matei
al Mirelor), Bucharest, 1899; idem, Considerații isto-
rice asupra documentelor prezentate de domnul Marcu
Beza, Bucharest, 1935.
9 Cf. S. losipescu, Pe marginea unor documente
de la Gheorghe Ștefan, domnul Moldovei, 1653-1658,
in Rdl, t. 29, no. 1,1976, p. 114-117; I. Corfus, Pe urmele
-------------------------------------------F351------
lui Moise Movilă și ale lui Gheorghe Ștefan, in AIIAI,
XV, 1978, p. 297-305.
“Mircea Soreanu, Marii viziri Koprulii (1656-1710).
Relații politice și militare între Țările Române și
Imperiul otoman, Bucharest, 2002.
11	(Paul) Ricaut, Histoire de l’etat present de
L’Empire ottoman, Amsterdam, 1671, p. 159.
12	N. lorga, Despre Cantacuzini, p. XCIII and follow.
13	Ibidem, p. XC.
14	N. Stoicescu, Dicționar al marilor dregători din
Țara Românească și Moldova, sec. XIV-XV1I, Bucharest,
1971, p. 242; I. lonașcu, Mari dregători în domnia lui
Antonie Vodă din Popești (1669-1672), in RA, IX, no.
2, 1966, p. 41-48.
15	N. lorga, Istoria poporului românesc, ed.
Georgeta Penelea, p. 409, no. 76.
16	Ibidem, p. 395.
17	A. Veress, Pribegia lui Gligorașcu vodă prin
Ungaria și aiurea (1664-1672), in AARMSI, 1924, IIIrd
series, tom II, p. 282, 283.
18	N. Camariano, Alexandre Mavrocordate, le grand
drogman, son activite diplomatique, 1673-1709,
Thessalonik, 1970. A.C. Sturdza, L'Europe orientale
et le role historique des Maurocordato, Paris, 1913.
19	Cf. Gh. I. lonescu-Gion, Patriarhi, mitropoliți și
episcopigreci la București, Bucharest, 1897. See also,
N. lorga, Domnii români Vasile Lupu, Șerban Cantacuzino
și Constantin Brâncoveanu în legătură cu patriarhii
Alexandriei, Bucharest, 1932. M. Braniște, Patriarhi
din Constantinopol prin țările române în a doua jumă-
tate a secolului al XVII-lea, in „Mitropolia Olteniei”,
X, no. 1-2, 1958, p. 45-61.
20	Cf. Gh. Arvanitidis, Chirii Lucaris (1572-1638),
Atena, 1939 (in Greek). N. Popescu, Chirii Lucaris și
ortodoxia română ardeleană, in „Biserica Ortodoxă
Română”, LXIV, no. 7-9, 1946, p. 431 et passim. I.
Pulpea Rămureanu, Legăturile patriarhiei din
Alexandria cu țările române, in „Studii teologice”, IInd
series VIII, no. 1-2, 1956, p. 64 et passim. G.
Hagiantoniu, Protestant Patriarch. The life of Cyril
Lucaris (1572-1638) Patriarch of Constantinople,
London, 1962.
21	N. lorga, Manuscripte din biblioteci străine
relative la istoria românilor, in AARMSI, XX, 1897-
1898. D. Simonescu, Le chroniqueurMathieu de Myre
et une traduction ignoree de son Histoire, in RESEE,
IV, no. 1-2, 1966.
22	Cf. I.C. Filitti, Vlădica Luca ()1629) strămoș al
poetului buzoian Cârlova (1809-1831), Bucharest,
1935. H. Chircă, Un document din 1625 al mitro-
politului Țării Românești Luca, in RA, VII, no. 2,1946-
1947, p. 382-385.
23	N. lorga, Istoria poporului românesc, ed.
Georgeta Penelea, p. 411, n. 97.
24	V. Papacostea, Originile învățământului superior
în Țara Românească, in „Studii” Rdl, t. 14, no. 5,
1961, p. 1139-1167. Idem, Les origines de l’enseigne-
ment supdrieur en Valachie, in RESEE, IV, 1966, no.
1-2, p. 115-146, no. 3-4, p. 413-436. Gh. Cronț, Dreptul
bizantin în țările române. îndreptarea legii din 1652,
in „Studii”, Rdl, t. 13, no. 1, 1960, p. 57-82.
25	Cf. Ariadna Cioran-Camariano, Academiile
domnești din București și Iași, Bucharest, 1971.
26	F.H. Marshall, The Siege ofVienna by the Turks in
1683. Translated into Greek from an Italian work
published anonymously in the year of the siege by
Jeremias Cacavelas, Cambridge, 1925. Ariadna Cioran-
Camariano, Jeremie Cacavela et ses relations avec les
Principautes, in RESEE, t. III, no. 1-2,1965, p. 165-190.
27	Cf. C. Dima Drăgan, Patriarhul Ierusalimului
Hrisant Notaras și cultura română. Contribuții
documentare, in „Mitropolia Moldovei și Sucevei”,
LI, no. 9-12, 1975, p. 699-704.
28	Paul Cernovodeanu, Comerțul Țărilor Române
în secolul al XVII-lea, in Rdl, voi. 33, no. 6, 1980, p.
1071-1098.
29	Cf. Cristian Luca, Țările Române și Veneția în
secolul al XVII-lea. Din relațiile politico-diplomatice,
comerciale și culturale ale Țării Românești și ale
Moldovei cu Serenissima, Bucharest, 2007.
ABBREVIATIONS
AARMSI = „Analele Academiei Române.
Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice”, București
AIIAI = Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și
Arheologie „A.D. Xenopol”, Iași
RA = „Revista Arhivelor”, București
Rdl = „Revista de Istorie”, București
RESEE = „Revue des Etudes Sud-Est
Europeennes”, București
■| 36 |---------------------------------------------------■ Review of Military History ■
THE FRENCH-GERMAN ANTAGONISM
IN THE BALKANS BEFORE WW I
FINANCE AND ARMAMENTS
THE CASE OF ROMANIA AND GREECE
Professor Dr. IOANNIS ANTONOPOULOS
Assoclate Member of the Hellenic Commission
on Military History
In the beginning of the 20th century the
historical circumstances in the Balkan region were
under the influence and the antagonism of the
Great European imperialist Powers, which
competed to advance their political and economic
hegemony at the global level.
The special interest of the European policy for
the Balkans was further emphasized by their
strategic position that unites West and East. Among
the European powers, Germany and France were
particularly interested in the Balkan region.
Both considered the region as the means for
their geopolitical expansion, while the chronically
weak economies of the Balkan States offered
significant prospects for their economic and
commercial expansion.
From the Balkan States of that era, we shall
focus our interest on two countries occupying the
two ends of the peninsula, Romania and Greece.
We shall study particularly their importance at the
internațional relations level mainly in matters
concerning the influence and the antagonism of
France and Germany over these two countries in
the area of the military armaments.
After Bismarck’s downfall in 1890, Germany
remained the centre of gravity of the European
politics. Germany was indisputably the leading
continental European power until 1914. Its
dominant role was recognized by all its neigh-
bouring countries and the rest of the European
world. That predominant role came from Germany’s
demographic importance and the economic
potențial based on a powerful heavy industry and
the innovative commercial methods that made the
German Empire the great competitor of the most
powerful country of that time, that is Great Britain.1
In the same twenty-year period, France
----■ Review of Military History ■--------------
declined from the second to the fourth place among
the European Powers. Having low birth rates and
an industry that suffered from the shortage of raw
materials and coal in particular, France could not
industrially surpass Germany in the early 20lh
century.2
In the early 19111 century France was the most
powerful European state. However, a century later
France was no longer the wealthiest state in the
continent and its economy was the least developed
of the economies of the rest of the Great western
powers.3
However, throughout the 19lh century France
contributed to the economic and cultural develo-
pment of Europe by means of its cultural, social
and administrative influence, the spread of its
technology and certainly - and that is particularly
important - the export of capital.4
On the other hand, in the end of the 19lh century
the socio-economic situation in the Balkan States
remained that of a solidly agricultural and small
factory region despite the important changes that
had taken place throughout the century, especially
in the second half. Except for the limited and belated
development of some fundamental infrastructure,
like the introduction of the rail network and of the
public service in the larger cities, the industrial
production with the exception of the mining of
certain metals was absent from the economies of
the Balkan States during that period.
In what has to do with industrial production
including the products, the know-howas well as the
capital and the investments, those came primarily
from abroad. We should not though miss the fact
that the larger part of the foreign funds that were
placed in the Balkans, predominantly since the last
quarter of the 19lh century and thereafter had to do
with state loans to the respective governments.
Thus, the problem was that the foreign capital did
not serve to promote development but mainly to
pay off for the state debt and the military
expenditure and organization.5
From all the Balkan States, that is Romania,
Bulgaria, Serbia, the European section of the
Ottoman Empire, Greece was entering the 20lh
century nationally shattered after the unfortunate
outcome of the 1897 war against the Ottoman
Empire and financially devastated after the state’s
bankruptcy in 1893 that led to the imposition of
the International Monetary Control by the Great
Powers in 1898.
Until then the German financiers held the
greatest part of the Greek public sector dept
amounting to approximately 250 million francs.
Apartfrom the state dept, the French contribution
of capital started gradually to grow by the
investments in the railway and the banks.
In the beginning of the 20lh century the French
and British funds started to dominate in Greece (the
loan of 1908, the railway loan of 1902-1906) while a
large number of Greek state bonds were passed from
the German to the French money market.6
Thus in the beginning of the century the
competition between France and Germany in the
Greek space will mainly focus on the procu-
rements of arms and railways materials.
Since 1905 and thereafter, an especially fierce
and often back staged competition will break out
between the two powers in connection to the
procurement of army materials for the Greek
army. The French company Schneider-Creusot
and the German Krupp-Essen as the imme-
diately interested parties, the respective gove-
rnments and various credit institutions in from
both the sides of Rhine will be involved in the case.
The French side will demanded for comparative
tests of the material while the German side having
the support of the Greek heir to the throne Prince
Constantine, who was also the chief of the Greek
Army aimed to maintain its dominance. The French
diplomacy intervened and stated to the Greek
government that French funds would not be
available to Greece for as long as the country did
not place its orders with the French Industries.7
—r^n------------------------------------------
The already strong competition further
intensified in 1907. The German government that
was actively supporting Krupp used every means
to confront the French lobbying. Underlying the
industrial-economic competition was an intense
political antagonism at all levels.
The two sides accused one another for paid
articles in the Athenian press that became involved
in the affair and used every means to advance their
case. The German lobbying to the Greek King, the
Princes, the Prime Minister intensified while the
French industrialist Schneider visited Greece
himself. Finally, after several tests the French
material (mountain and field machine gun) was
judged the most appropriate and the order was given
to the French despite the intense German reaction.8
To the point the German newspaper “Tăgliche
Rundschau” wrote that the political interests gave
the victory to the French canons9.
The French success in Greece in the particular
matter of the artillery in 1907 had political and
industrial repercussions. The French government
believed that Greece was turning to the French
side and influence while the whole case tended to
have negative consequences for certain products
of the German military industry.10
Since 1909 and thereafter, the Franco-German
antagonism in Greece was weakened to a degree
although not substantially by the opposition of the
German government to the inflow of German
Banking Funds to Greece through the loans that
the Greek government was seeking to contract in
the European markets. The main reason was the
intention of the Germans not to disaffect the
Turkish side that was against every form of
economic, or military aid to Greece by a Great
Power during that period.11
Thus the issue of the dispatch of a military
committee of higher rank officers to supervise the
re organization of the Hellenic Army as well as the
loan of 150 million gold francs to the Greek
government were both rejected by the German
government leaving the space open for the French
side. Despite the concerns for the political
instability in Greece (Officer’s Revolt in 1909-1910,
The Cretan Question in turmoil), the French
government authorized the French banks and
particularly Comptoir National d 'Escompte de
■ Review of Military History ■
Paris that along with the British bank Hambro
proceeded to finance part of the dept until the year
1911 by the process of “advance payments”.12
Based on these funds the Greek government
made orders of military material of approximately
48 million francs mainly to France .
On the eve of the Balkan wars, Greece enters
the French sphere of political, industrial and
economic influence with all the consequences that
may entail in the political level. Germany having
avoided to adopt a more aggressive stance and
refusing to send officers and to finance the Greek
dept because of her priority to influence the
Ottoman Empire leaves the field open to the
French politics for the control of Greece. Apart
from the financial, the Banking and industrial
interests, political motives as well were decisive in
shaping the decision-making of the Great Powers.
With the end of the Balkan wars (summer of
1913) the issue of the contract of a new loan to
finance the war expenses is initiated by the Greek
government. The German Ambassador in Greece
is in favour of a generous contribution. However
the German financial market is in no place to
respond, due the general financial situation
regarding the applications for the placement of
capital abroad. The German government finds
difficult to exert pressure to the German banks to
respond to the Greek request.13
The inability of the German side to compete in
the financial sector against the French leads to
the establishment of the French in Greece since
the Greeks can only find finance in the French
markets. The Germans are forced once again to
leave Greece to the French economic power with
all that may mean in the political and diplomatic
level.
In early 1914, the first half of the 500 million
francs loan is financed by a group of French and
British Banks. Thus, until the outbreak of the Great
War the influence of the French Funds in Greece
is indisputable. As the German Ambassador in
Athens States the German banks have no means
to break “the iron enclave that the French (funds)
have formed around Greece”.14
In contrast, in the naval armaments, the
German side gains points from among other things
the inability of the French companies to adjust to
the requirements of the Greek side, the greater
cost of the specific products and the inexplicable
----■ Review of Military History ■-------------
delays in deadlines. Thus the German company
Vulkan-Stettin will receive an order to build two
destroyers, six torpedo boats and a Battleship
(which however will only partially be carried out).15
At the end of 1913, a French naval attache is
appointed in the French Embassy in Athens
aiming to promote the French naval material and
as far as possible to weaken the German influence
in that sector.16
In January 1914, Prime Minister Eleftherios
Venizelos visits Paris seeking to strengthen the
country with French finance and promises the
French government the order of one more
Battleship that the Hellenic navy is in need.17
In the end and despite the pressure by the
German government in favour of the shipyard
Vulkan, the Greek government signs a contract
with the French shipyard Penhoet of Bretagne for
the construction of a large Battleship costing
approximately 50 million francs.18
The issue of military and naval armaments
constituted the fundamental element of the
French-German competition in Greece in the eve
of World War I. Thanks to the sympathy of the
court of King Constantine I to Germany from 1913
and onwards a total of 40 million francs of
procurements was given to German companies
even though the Germans had not participated in
financing the Greek debt.19
The French side however, will further stren-
gthen its stance in the matter of financing the
debt forcing the Greek government particularly in
light of the financial requirements from the Balkan
wars not to place any orders with the German
industry. Once again the German side realizes that
her inability to finance with the necessary capital
the Greek debt brings her to disadvantage as
regards the army and other industrial orders by
the Greek government.
On the other hand, Romania and primarily the
country’s pro-European elite were under the
intellectual and cultural domination of France.
Thus, it was natural for the country to turn to
France at the end of the 1850s decade when the
issue of the unification of the country’s two main
provinces, Walachia and Moldavia came up in the
European diplomacy. The government of Napoleon
III and in general the French foreign policy actively
-------------------------------------1~39~|--
supported the Romanian demand for the unifica-
tion of the two provinces. The French government
financed the first two Romanian loans in the Paris
money markets in 1864 and 1866 and also that of
1875 that would serve to support financially the
newborn state.20
Since the Berlin Convention in 1878 and
thereafter, the political orientation of Romania
became principally pro-German because of the
country’s border with the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and the reign of King Charles I in Romania
who was of German descent. In 1883, Romania
joined the Triple Alliance.21 In the economy, the
building of the fundamental infrastructure around
the end the 19th century led to the development of
other sectors of the Romanian economy. The food,
forestry and minerals sectors started to be
developed by large foreign companies, mainly
British and German.22
From the 1870s decade to the outbreak of World
War I in 1914, Romania remained largely controlled
by the German capital and products. The German
Banking group Disconto-Gesellschaft Bleichroder
relying on its close ties with the Romanian Court23
was the one that essentially directed the nego-
tiations with the Romanian government each
time.24 On the other side, the French banks
Paribas, Societe Generale and Comptoir
National d 'Escompte de Paris acting either
separately, or as a group managed to gain some
participation in the placements of capital in
Romania along with the German Banks but always
lagging behind and under the lead of their German
counterparts. Thus the French participation in six
of the twelve loans that Romania contracted from
1880 until 1910 totalling approximately 1.5 billion
francs amounted to 20% of the total capital.25
Naturally, the primacy of the German banks had
commensurate consequences in the German
exports to the country. The German side gained
the lion’s share in the Romanian armaments as
well as the rest of the industrial products. When in
1901, the Romanian Government repeatedly
approached the French Banks to contract a 250
million francs loan in the French money market,
the French Foreign Ministry (Foreign Minister
Delcasse) initially adopted a negative stance. Not
only because of the country’s political ties with the
Triple Alliance but also because Romania looked
for its orders of military material and machine-
guns elsewhere - principally to Germany. Despite
----W-----------------------------------------
everything, the French side had no intention to
abandon Romania in the German hands. The
German Ambassador in Bucharest stressed the
special interests of French financiers and
businessmen who anxiously sought to expand their
corporate interests in Romania.26
Since 1902 the French government adopted
the harder core policy that the French Banks
should negotiate directly with the Romanian
government and not in collaboration with the
German Banks, as members of a French-German
group. Thus, the French side would be in a better
position to impose its terms, principally in
relationship to the condition that industrial and
military orders should necessarily be tied up to the
placements of capital. The competition between
the companies Schneider and Krupp became
intense with the German side though finally
prevailing.27 Respectively, in a correspondence
between the French bank Comptoir National
d 'Escompte de Paris and the German Disconto,
the French side implied that its hands were tied by
the French government in regard to a French -
German collaboration in Romania. The reasons
were mainly political and industrial.28 Certainly,
the German side protested that in contrast to what
was happening in Greece, the German funds in
Romania were used to feed the French industry as
well.29 The French government’s stance identified
mainly with the efforts by French companies to
secure orders from the Romanian army and seize
them from the German Krupp. For that reason
Schneider as well as Saint-Chamond directly
approached Romanian officers for the procu-
rement of a large number of machine-guns. The
French Foreign Ministry even considered the
possibility of a compromise between the particu-
larly competitive Schneider and Krupp so as to win
even a parțial order.30 At the same time, the French
banks participated in the placement of a fraction
of the 1903 loan in the French money market.
However, the order of 450 machine guns would be
given to the German Krupp for an amount of
approximately 25 million francs.31
Similar incidents would more or less be
repeated on the occasion of the contract of the
large Romanian conversion loan of 1905 between
the German and French Banks and particularly in
the case of a parallel loan of 100 million francs,
40% of which was meant for the payment of orders
to Krupp. The minor French contribution and the
-----------■ Review of Military History ■------
credit opening by the French capital market went
through, although not for that part of the loan that
was meant for the payments to the German
industry.32 Thus, the German primacy regarding
the military orders went on in Romania. The
French side was constrained to the lesser orders
of two cargo ships, steam engines for the Romanian
railways and textiles for military uniforms.33
In the next years the contribution of French
funds in the 1908 and in the 1910 loans fell well
belowthe German contribution. Nevertheless, that
contribution was not insignificant amounting for
approximately 1/3 of the collective loans.34 Despite
the constant lobbying to the Romanian government
by the French Foreign Ministry for a more
favourable treatment predominantly of the French
military industry, the German Krupp secured new
war orders. As Comite des Forges (the principal
syndicate of the French metals industry) States,
since 1905 the German industry and primarily the
military German industry received orders for
military materials exceeding the amount of 45
million francs while the respective orders to the
French industry did not exceed 1 million francs
for the same period.35
The Balkan wars with the financial costs that
these brought about in the participating countries
forced them in search of funds from abroad.
Already since January 1913, Romania sought to
contract a loan of 300 million francs in the European
money markets. This time, the Romanian go-
vernment started talks with the already known
German banks that it was traditionally colla-
borating. At the same time though, it turned to the
French side that seemed favourably disposed at
the government’s level for political reasons as well.
The main aim of France was to break the hold on
Romania by the Triple Alliance.36 The loan should
though be financed exclusively by the French
capital market excluding any German con-
tribution.37 However, despite the ReichsBank’s,
that is the German Central Bank’s reservations to
authorize the financing of any large fraction of
the loan, Disconto financed the entire loan in the
form of interest bills. Given the French Foreign
Ministry’s opposition to the formal placement of
Romanian bonds in the French money market by
German Banks, the French banks were forced to
decline any participation in this case. The French
banks “should avoid facilitating the placement in
the French money markets of state bonds or
----■ Review of Military History ■-----------------
interest bills of Balkan countries having close ties
with Banking groups belonging to forces hostile to
the Triple Agreement”.38
Thus, since 1913 and thereafter the Franco-
German Banking cooperation in Romania started
falling apart mainly due to political pressure. In
the future, the French capital market would be
favourably disposed to Romanian loans under the
country’s offering guarantees in foreign policy
matters, particularly in its relations with the
Central Powers.39 After the end of the Balkan wars,
Romania having been worn out by the war as the
other Balkan countries sought to boost its public
finance with a new loan. Again the French diplo-
macy appeared favourably disposed for a placement
of the loan - amounting to 300 million francs - in
the French money market since the country
seemed to have switched her foreign policy in a
direction favourable to the Triple Agreement. At
the same time the Romanian Finance minister had
stated that he intended to proceed with orders of
industrial and military material from France
amounting to at least to 50 million francs.40
The French side though was uncompromising
on the requirement that the loan should be
undertaken by French banks and raised exclusively
in the French capital market. On the other hand,
the Romanian side owed to place significant orders
with the French industry and to re-examine its
duties to French imports in the country.41 While
the Romanian Finance minister (Marghiloman)
was negotiating with the French (Bankers and
politicians) in Paris, at the same time he was
collaborating with representatives of the German
banks with which he finally came to agreement
signing a contract for a loan of 175 million francs.42
Despite the Romanian offer to place the
remaining amount in the French capital market
and the French Banks original acceptance of the
settlement, the French government denied
categorically any settlement in that direction
insisting on the placement of the whole loan in the
French market.43 In the end, despite the difficult
situation of the German capital market, Disconto
managed to finance the entire loan. The Banks
management stressed that used every means to
raise the capital because of the special interest
that it constituted for the German - Romanian
relationships economically and politically.44 Despite
the absence of French funds in Romanian loans in
---------------------------------------------------
this period, the French military industry struggled
to secure some orders. Thus, since the spring of
1913 Schneider-Creusot intensified its efforts to
secure in her favour orders of machine guns from
the Romanian government and against the
German Krupp. It coupled that effort by financing
various campaigns in the Romanian press against
the German products.45
Another French company Saint-Chamond
struggled to secure an order for 4 Romanian
destroyers in her favour and against Krupp.46 On
the eve of World War I the competition between
the French and German military industry goes on
relentlessly in the country. However, the German
primacy in the arms sector is indisputable. The
possibility of selling to the Romanian army 10
artillery units by the French Schneider in June
1914 cannot be considered as success when the
reorganization of that army demanded the buying
of 120 artillery units that would be ordered to
German industry.47
Conclusion
A few years before the World War I, the military
industrial and generally the political antagonism
of France and Germany in the Balkans and
particularly Greece and Romania consists an
important chapter not only for the European
historical reality, but also for the local history of
Southeast Europe.
This antagonism besides its political and
diplomatic formation that, of course, originated
from the French-German collision of 1870-71 and
the creation of the Bismarck system in Europe
took, from the end of the XIXlh century and
particularly the beginning of the XXlh century, a
more concrete financial and also industrial
economic shape.
Apart from the fact that the foreign policy of
the two countries, France and Germany, was not
always considered identical with the policy of the
financial credit and banking cycles of these
countries, which of course pushed forward
common efforts and initiatives for mutual benefit,
soon this financial weapon was to be used directly
or indirectly for its promotion, as well as for specific
economical interests.
The value of this weapon was known to both
governments. Their capability to provide or deny
the permit for investing foreign bonds in their
național money market gave them the power to
embody this factor as a crucial element of their
foreign policy. Thus, the permit could be followed
by the deșire of obtaining economic advantages
and political exchanges.
In the case we have reported but generally also
in the matter of foreign borrowing, as much as in
the Balkans as in the Ottoman Empire, the
collaboration between the banks of the two sides
for pure technical reasons -particularly that is the
protection of the clients-investors from probable
risk of bankrupt of the borrowers - was accepted
by both governments.48
This collaboration was of course as it appeared
especially in the case of Romania, mostly desirable
from the bank foundations of both sides that were
also involved for reasons of common financial profit.
However, from the end of the XIXlh century,
the promotion of industrial orders started to play a
more significant role in the contracts of foreign
loans. The German banks, which were closely
connected with certain industrial centers of their
country, were trying to push forward and ensure
more orders for their național industry from the
countries that borrowed.
The financial weapon would be used by the
French with a particularly pressing way and mainly
with the stimulation of the French Foreign Affairs
Office and it is obvious that this tactic proved itself
quite effective in many cases. The principal
doctrine: the orders must be made to the industries
and companies of the country that covered
financially the loan.
The harsh antagonism of the two important
war industries - the German Krupp and the French
Schneider - as much as in Turkey as in the Balkans
and of course in the countries that have caught
our interest, the support of the correlating
governments and the implication of bank cycles
consists a characteristic example.
Foe several years prior to World War I, Greece
and Romania became the theater of this strong
political-military and economical antagonism.
From the beginning of the XXlh century, Greece
enrolled gradually in the French influence sphere
due to the French capital, that flooded the country
and by the principie of “coherent loan”, meaning as
mentioned previously, the obligation of the country
that borrows to order industrial products from the
lending country’s industries, a great number of
military materials purchases were made in France.
On the contrary, Romania traditionally under
the financial and economic influence of Germany
would turn to the latter for covering her military
------------■ Review of Military History ■----------
orders. The political connection between the two
countries would not withdraw significantly despite
the French efforts after 1913, to puii off the country
out of the hands of the Triple Alliance.
Finally, the cases of these two Balkan countries,
on the eve of 1914, demonstrate through this intense
antagonism the formation that the West-European
imperialism had taken this period, which linked the
investment of capitals with the promotion of political
pursuits but also industrial and military interests.
The Balkan countries were eventually obliged
in order to be able, as far as this was possible, to
improve their substructure and modernize their
societies, to adapt to the demands of the powerful
European States.
1	Bernstein-Milza, 1977, 247.
2	J. Ganiage, 1982, 46.
3	R. Cameron, 1969, 397.
4	Ibidem.
5	G. Ranki, 1986, 90-91.
6	Athens to Paris 16-4-1904, F.M.F.A., Greece, N.S.,
v.15.
7	Athens to Paris 9-3-1905, 17-4-1905 and 25-1-
1906, F.M.F.A., Greece, N.S., v.36.
81	. Antonopoulos, 2007.
9	R. Poidevin, 1969, 563.
10	Paris to Rome, 30-10-1907, F.M.F.A., Greece,
N.S., v.37.
11	Berlin to Paris, 16-2-1910, F.M.F.A., Greece, N.S.,
v.17.
12	I. Antonopoulos, 1994, 286.
13	R. Poidevin, 1969, 684.
14	Ibidem, 685.
15	Athens to Paris, F.M.F.A., Greece, 30-6-1912,
27-7-1912, N.S., v. 42.
16	F.M.F.A., Greece, 8-10-1913, N.S., v.44.
17	F.M.F.A., Greece, 16-26/1/1914, N.S., v.19.
18	F.M.F.A., Greece, 1914, General N.S., v.45.
19	R. Poidevin, 1969, 687.
20	Cameron, 1969, 393.
21	Bernstein, Milza, 160.
22	EEE, 1990, 250.
23	Kastris, 1921, i
24	Poidevin, 1969, 57.
25	Thobie, 1976, 102.
26	Poidevin, 1969, 208-309.
27	F.M.F.A., Romania, 1-3-1902, N.S., 10.
28	Poidevin, 1969, 309.
29	Ibidem.
30	F.M.FA, Romania, 7-5-1902 and 29-5-1902, N.S., 23.
31	Poidevin, 1969, 310.
32	F.M.F.A., Romania, 5-10-1905 and 11-10-1905,
N.S., 12.
33	Poidevin, 1969, 311.
34	Ibidem, 576.
35	F.M.F.A., Romania, 19-7-1910, N.S., 24.
-------■ Review of Military History ■-------------------
36	F.M.F.A., Romania, 6-1-1913, N.S., 12.
37	F.M.F.A., Romania, 16-1-1913, N.S., 12.
38	F.M.F.A., Romania, 29-1-1913, N.S., 12.
39	F.M.F.A., Romania, 14-4-1913, N.S., 12.
40	F.M.F.A., Romania, 11-9-1913, N.S., 12.
41	Poidevin, 1969, 673.
42	F.M.F.A., Romania, 6-10-1913, N.S., 12.
43	F.M.FA, Romania, 8-10-1913 and 9-10-1913, N.S., 12.
44	Poidevin, 1969, 674.
45	F.M.F.A., Romania, 3-1-1914, N.S., 25.
46	F.M.F.A., Romania, 4-5-1914, N.S., 25.
47	Poidevin, 1969, 675.
48	Ibidem, 811.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I.	Records of French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(F.M.FA.)
1.	Nouvelle Serie-Greece Volume 15, 17, 19, 36,
37, 39, 42, 44, 45, 46
2.	Nouvelle Serie-Romania Volume 12, 23, 24, 25
Antonopoulos J.: Les relations franco-helleniques
de la lin du XIXe siecle au debut du XXe siecle
(Finance et politique en Grece 1897-1914) These de
Doctorat, Paris 1994
Antonopoulos}.: 0ioiâ eâe ĂeâefiiâoBâ oâșl
ÂeeUâă oul âfi ; fn oio 20'5 ăepia, ââedâbfișd
«ÂE^IĂ», Âehiâ 2007
Bernstein S. Milza P.: EooinBâ oco Âonjiâșo, C
ÂonuââueF OdiouiBâ eâe ș Â6nb<\ oul Âeijîi 1815-
1919, ÂEÂÎÂIĂNÂEÂ, Âehlă 2000
Cameron R.: La France et le developpement
economique de 1’ Europe 1800-1914, Paris, 1971
Damianov S.: „Aspects economiques de la
politique francaise dans les Balkans au debut du XXe
siecle”, Revue d’ Etudes BalkaniquesNo 4, Sofia, 1974
Âeeșîeeb Âeââeaâooeeh ÂăeoeeiâăBaâeă-
Dâăeiioieâ EoâîfiBâ, NîSiâiBâ, Âeaioeeh ÂeșljH,
Âcbiă 1990 (EEE)
Ganiage J.: Les Relations internationales de 1890
â 1914, Centre de Documentation Universitaire, Paris,
1980
Kastris D.: Les capitaux etrangers dans la finance
roumaine, Paris, 1921
Loulos E.: Q Ââniâleeh âieeoeeh 66șl ÂeeUaâ
1898-1914, DâOâaTbqo, Âehiâ 1990
Poidevin R.: Les relations economiques et
iinanciers entre la France et l’Allemagne de 1898 ă
1914, Paris, 1969
Ranki G.: DâneoânâeăeYo ÂonuâăueYo leeifiiBâo
19T*-20’dâ6., Âniiyâieș Oynio 1989
J.	Thobie: „A propos des interets fmanciers et
economiques francais en Roumanie ă la veille de la
premier guerre mondiale”, Relations Internationales
No 6, Paris, 1976
----------------------------------------I~43~]---
TREATY OF BUCHAREST
THE ROLE OF ROMANIA
IN THE END OF BALKAN WAR II
Dr. EFPRAXIA S. PASCHALIDOU
Historian, Hellenic Commission on Military History
From the first moment of the declaration of
Balkan War I against the Ottoman Empire, Greece
sought to confer with its allies on a just partition of
the territories, which would be liberated from the
Ottoman rule. However, the allies - especially
Bulgaria, which pursued the vision of creating a
Great Bulgaria - were unwilling to discuss the
matter. She adopted the same stance towards
Serbia’s demand for a revision of the Treaty of
1912, under which they had settled territorial issues
between them. For this reason, Serbia conferred
with Greece and the two countries exchanged
relevant draft agreements. Long discussions on
the agreements followed and finally, on 22 April
1913, the Greek Minister of Foreign affairs and
the Serbian Ambassador to Athens signed a
preliminary alliance protocol, which was comple-
mented by a military agreement on 1 May 1913.
After further discussions, the preliminary protocol
led to a final treaty of alliance, which was signed
on 12 May in Thessalonica. On the same day a
revised military treaty was also signed. The treaty
and the military alliance provided for a ten-year
defensive alliance between Greece and Serbia,
which thus United, would confront Bulgaria’s
excessive territorial demands. The same treaty
specified the Serbo-Bulgarian and Greco-Bulgarian
borders that the two countries would propose; in
the event that Bulgaria refused to accept them,
they would seek arbitration. If Bulgaria were to
resort to arms, the two countries would act in
common to crush their opponent. The treaty and
the agreements were sanctioned by the Greek
government in Athens, on 8 June 1913 and were
immediately implemented.
Greece and Serbia never ceased to seek a
peaceful solution of their differences with Bulgaria,
----W--------------------------------------------
but they always met with intransigence: Bulgaria
had already decided to launch a surprise, simul-
taneous attack in Macedonia. Putting their plâns
into effect, they moved the bulk of their forces
opposite the Greek and Serbian armies, the
redeployment completed by mid-June. At the same
time however, in an attempt to counter the threat,
Greece and Serbia advanced their strategic
concentration. While carrying out their strategic
concentration, the Bulgarians adopted delaying
tactics in the ongoing negotiations with Greece
and Serbia to settle their differences. At the same
time, the Bulgarians avoided any major dispute that
could cause a war at such a criticai point in time
and endanger their strategic concentration.
On 27 June, the Ministry of the Army informed
the General Headquarters that Romania would
declare war on Bulgaria on the following day, and
that the Bulgarians were seeking ways to come to
an understanding with Serbia and Greece for the
termination of hostilities. The General Headquar-
ters reported to the Government that, according
to Information provided by the Greek liaison officer
at Serbian Headquarters, the Romanian army had
crossed the Danube 1913 and was advancing within
Bulgarian territory. Furthermore, on the same day,
the Ottoman army once again began war opera-
tions against the Bulgarians in eastern Thrace.1
Romania wanted to be present in the decisive
moments of the Balkan Peninsula, as being a
neighbor of the Balkan allies having social and
economic interests for keeping a constant balance.
At length, faced with the Romanian invasion
and the possibility of Bulgaria’s annihilation, the
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Sazonov,
-----------■ Review of Military History ■-------
supported by the French Minister of Foreign
Affairs S. Pichon, invited the Greek and Serbian
Governments to cease hostilities, to conclude an
armistice and to send delegates to St. Petersburg
to settle the dispute through Russian mediation.
This invitation was unwelcome to Prime Minister
Eleftherios Venizelos, who had always suspected
that the increased Russian influence over a
conference held in St. Petersburg would benefit
Bulgaria. On his return from Nish, where nego-
tiations were taking place, Venizelos found a messa-
ge from the Romanian Minister of Interior Take
lonescu, asking him to prolong the war by opposing
the Russo - Austria-Hungarian wish to leave Kavala
to Bulgaria. On 29 June, only two days after the
Romanian invasion from the north, Ottoman troops
had begun an advance into Thrace; they proceeded
unhindered, the Bulgarians retreating to the north-
east. Military disaster and disillusionment with
Russian support, had forced the formation of a new
Government in Bulgaria, with Genadiev as Minister
of Foreign Affairs. The new administration adopted
the Russian advice to profit from the presence of
the Greek and Serbian Premiers at Nish by sending
delegates there in order to negotiate an armistice
and to appeal to Romania for a cessation of
hostilities.
The General Headquarters was also informed
for the occupation of Vratsa by the Romanians. At
the same time, the Romanian government sent the
confidențial note to Venizelos that also advised
Greece to take a more conciliatory tone so that
Greece’s aspirations would not act against its
territorial claims. On 7 July, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs Lambros Koromilas, announced to the King
Constantine the following telegram, concerning the
confidențial announcement made by lonescu, to
Venizelos: “...It is known that England more than
any other Great Power will oppose the annexation
of Kavala by Greece and it will be of beneiit to all if
the Balkan States agree to peace in a spirit of
reconciliation, otherwise Europe will intervene
emphaticallyandimpose its own terms thatinclude
the idea of autonomy for Macedonia. Today Bulgaria
proposed to Romania to drawup a peace accord and
will concede territorial lines to Romania, but Romania
----■ Review of Military History ■------------
refused. The position of Romania has been
somewhat uncertain for days now, and it is still
undecided whether its Army will advance as was
previously announced by a Romanian Major. I
suppose thatMr. lonescu is following the same policy
as before, subject to proposals made byRussia.”2
On 8 July, Genadiev asked the Romanian Prime
Minister T. Maiorescu and Minister of Foreign
Affairs, directly for a cessation of hostilities to be
followed by peace negotiations and King Ferdinand
of Bulgaria sent a personal message to King Carol
of Romania to the same effect. The Romanians
halted their advance and sent a delegation to Nish.
Meanwhile, it was proposed that the peace
conference should be held in Bucharest. The plan
had the support of Austria-Hungary and Germany,
who wielded considerable influence in the
Romanian capital. Venizelos agreed that the peace
conference could be held in Bucharest, insisting
nevertheless that the preliminaries should first be
signed at Nish. All the belligerents, with the
exception of Greece, agreed to sign an armistice.
Venizelos, who feared that the reoccupation of
Adrianople by the Ottoman troops and rumors that
Greece and the Ottoman Empire were contriving
to proclaim the autonomy of Thrace would invite
European intervention, was eager to begin
negotiations. King Constantine’s reasons for
refusing to sign an armistice were both strategic
and political: an armistice would allow the Bulgarian
army to recuperate, whereas total victory would
enable Greece to increase her territorial claims so
as to include Alexandroupolis (Dedeagach).
Besides, King Constantine feared, an armistice
would give the Great Powers the opportunity to
intervene. Russia, Austria-Hungary and Romania
were making representations against the strangu-
lation of Bulgaria, while France was urging the
Greek Government to moderate its claims, as a
lesser evil compared to Austria-Hungary’s
intervention.3
On 10 July, Maiorescu invited the Șerb Prime
Minister Pashich and Venizelos to send their
delegates to Bucharest for the peace preliminaries,
while the armistice would be signed at Nish.
--------------------------------------1~45~|---
Pashich, who feared that Maiorescu would conclude
a separate peace, immediately accepted the
invitation, but Venizelos was prepared to accept
only on condition that the peace delegations would
sign both the armistice and the peace preliminaries
in the Romanian capital. On the same day,
Venizelos informed King Constantine that Russia
had expressed a strong deșire to end the war and
that the King of Bulgaria had contacted the King
of Romania requesting termination of hostilities.
He added that Romania accepted the truce and
that Serbia would probably bow to the pressure
exerted by Russia for a truce and recommended
that Greece should also assent to it. Romania had
agreed to the conclusion of an armistice, which
Serbia, yielding to Russian pressure, probably would
accept: “Mr. Demidov came to inform me of Mr.
Sozonov’s telegram expressing his strong deșire
for the signing of an armistice. He also informed
me of King Ferdinand’s telegram to King Carol,
requesting that the advance of the Hellenic-Serbian
troops cease, otherwise Solia will be threatened
with a crisis that Demidov interprets as a danger
of dynastic overthrow. I explained to Mr. Demidov
the reasons why we cannot agree to an armistice
without the signing of preliminary peace condi-
tions, as well as howdistrustfulIam of the sincerity
of Ferdinand’s fears. Nevertheless, Romania
accepts the armistice and I do not know whether
Serbia will withstand Russian pressure till the end.
In any case, I was thinking that, considering the
sacrilices caused by the gradual contestation of
the territory as well as the dangers from cholera,
it would be opportune perhaps to state that we
accept an armistice where Romania undertakes to
support our territorial and other claims, so thatit
is henceforth in solidaritywith the rest of the allies.
Securing this solidarity would be sullicient compen-
sation for the losses due to the armistice; besides,
before the armistice we could demand the con-
cession of severalpositions of the Bulgarian Army.
Ihe issue of armistice is deiinitely, for the time
being atleast, purelymilitaryand therefore itis up
to Your Majesty to notify me of your decisions
thereupon. ”4 Obviously, he left the final decision
in the hands of the Commander in Chief and King,
due to the purely military nature of the matter.
----I~46~|-----------------------------------
The King however, refused the arrangement of a
truce, as he wanted a more complete military
imposition against Bulgaria and the continuation
of all operations until the signing of the preliminary
accord for peace: “Iam surprised the Ambassador
of Russia should inform us of the telegram of the
King of Bulgaria to his counterpart of Romania
begging for the cessation of the advance of the
Hellenic and Serbian armies. I have no relation
either with the King of Romania or with Russia. If
KingFerdinandis threatened with a crisis because
of our advance, he can telegraph directly to the
King of Serbia and myself; whether Romania agrees
to an armistice is completely indiiferent to us; it
plays no role in the presentwar. IknowofBulgaria’s
bad faith from bitter experience and I have no
intention to give it a new oppor tuni tytollaunti tself
once more. Serbia cannot sign an armistice without
our approval and not appear unfaithful. The
sacrilices caused by our advance are not excessive;
on the contrary, they are equal to the object we
are pursuing and only one percent of our troops
fall victim to cholera. Therefore, these are not
strong reasons for the cessation of hostilities.
Finally, please teii the Ambassador of Russia that
under no circumstances do I accept armistice.
Should Bulgaria consent to sign preliminarypeace
on the battleiield, accepting my conditions, then I
shall acceptimmediate armistice.”5
Despite Russia’s failure to prevent war between
the Balkan States, St. Petersburg never ceased
pursuing a policy to put an end to it, especially
after the inițial defeats of the Bulgarian forces.
Austria-Hungary and Romania also made overtures
to end the hostilities. On 11 July 1913, Austria-
Hungary proposed an armistice and the opening
of negotiations in Bucharest for the signing of a
peace treaty. The belligerent countries accepted
the Austro-Hungarian recommendations for
negotiations without the cessation of hostilities and
dispatched delegations to Bucharest. Venizelos had
also informed the King that the Austro-Hungarian
ambassador had conveyed to him a telegram from
his government recommending that represen-
tatives of the belligerents be sent to Nish for the
conclusion of an armistice, while negotiations for
----------■ Review of Military History ■----
peace would be conducted in Bucharest. Following
this, the Prime Minister expressed the opinion that
it would be advisable for Greece to accept the
conclusion of the armistice, leaving the final
decision to Commander in Chief, King Constantine,
because of the clearly military nature of the issue:6
“7heAmbassador ofAustria-Hungaryinformed me
of the telegram sentbyCountBerchtold, who after
setting out the proposal made by Romania that
delegates be sent to Nish to conclude peace and
thatpeace negotiations be heldin Bucharest, added
to Baron Brown: - Please insist on the Romanian
proposal being accepted and make the observation
that a refusal shall not improve the position of the
two allied States. We shall be obliged to see in an
eventual refusal the proof that Greece and Serbia
seek to suffocate Bulgaria, which we shall not
permit-, ItoldMr. Brown thathisproceedingis so
serious that Icannotgive an oliicial reply before I
consult with the Ministerial Cabinet and receive
the King’s approval. However, I cannot but protest
over the perception that we seek to suffocate
Bulgaria since we aim atnothing else than securing
the equilibrium and we simplyrefuse to be deceived
by Bulgaria. The thoughts of the Ministerial
Cabinet shall be conveyed to Your Ma jesty bythe
Minister of Foreign Affairs.”7
Telegrams, sent by Koromilas and the General
High Command, regarding Greece’s represen-
tatives for the peace talks in Bucharest, followed
the same day: “A short time ago the Romanian
Ambassador informed me as to the following
telegram3 sent by the Romanian Government. It
made no mention of the meeting of the Prime
Ministers in Bucharest, but we telegraphed Mr.
Alexandropoulos to report thatMr. Venizelos would
gladly travel there if Mr. Pashich would also be
prepared to make the trip. Ireplied to Mr. Filodor
that ourrepresentatives would travel to Bucharest
to resolve all the issues that arose from the war,
both political and territorial as well as military, and
that the truce would automatically follow the
drawing up of the preliminarypeace accord. During
the timely verbal announcement made to me by
the Serbian Ambassador, Mr. Pashich, he made it
known that it would be possible for him to accept
----■ Review of Military History ■------------
the proposal by Russia and Romania on condition
that the two conferences be carried out concurren-
tly and that the ceasing of all hostilities would not
take place at the Conference at Bucharest until it
was indubitably proved that Bulgaria truly and
sincerely wantedpeace.”9 The following day, 11
July, the Minister of Foreign affairs once again
informs the King after a meeting with the
Romanian Ambassador and asks for his orders
concerning the Greek delegation to Bucharest:
“...After some time he showed me the invitation
from the Romanian government to the Prime
Ministers of Serbia, Montenegro and Greece
asking them to travel to Bucharest. Mr. Panaș will
again be the second representative. Mr. Papa-
diamantopoulos will not take part in the confe-
rence. The oilicers who will be appointed by Your
Highness will be obliged to travel there as technical
representatives. We decided to send the military
oilicers to Nish so as not to become involved in
any new issues. I await Your Highness’ decision
concerning the oliicer who will accompany and be
under the command of Captain Rangabe. I must
receive your reply as soon as possible so as to
prepare theproxies.”10
Nevertheless, the diplomatic thoughts and the
background hidden behind the above mentioned
decisions seemed to be rather complicated.
Deciding on the scope and tactics to be followed in
Bucharest proved exceedingly difficult. For King
Constantine, the Bucharest conference was an
opportunity for Greece to secure a durable peace
based on the balance of powers and on a closer
understanding between Greece and Romania, the
two non-Slav States of the peninsula. He believed
that, in a spirit of reconciliation, Pashich was likely
to renounce his claims to the zone south-east of
the rivers Struma and Nestos. If this happened,
Constantine’s claim to Alexandroupolis (Dedea-
gach) would appear even more excessive. It would
cost Greece, not only the support of Serbia, but
also the desired rapprochement with Romania. He
proposed that Greece should reduce her claim from
Alexandroupolis to that of Porto Lagos. If, however,
military operations continued and Bulgaria
sustained a crushing defeat, Greece might increase
her claims. Venizelos’ insistence on a conciliatory
attitude was founded on his fear that Serbia and
Romania would sign a separate peace. To avoid
isolation and to gain Romanian support, Greece
must accept an armistice, a policy which Constan-
tine rejected out of hand. He agreed to the Porto
Lagos line only if negotiations in Bucharest reached
a deadlock.
Finally, on 12 July, when Maiorescu expressed
the wish that he might attend the conference,
Venizelos decided to head the peace delegation,
which included N. Politis, A. Pallis and D. Panaș,
who was to join them at Belgrade. Venizelos left
for Bucharest on 13 July, dissatisfied with his
arrangement with Constantine on the question of
the armistice. He intended to communicate the
Greek peace terms to the Bulgarian delegation upon
his arrival. If the Bulgarian reply left room for
hope, he would instruct Alexandropoulos and
Rangabe, who had remained at Nish, to sign the
armistice.
After having refused for eighteen days to accept
an armistice, on 15 July, King Constantine ins-
tructed Venizelos to sign it. As soon as Venizelos
arrived in Bucharest on the 16 July, he communi-
cated to the Bulgarians his intention. He had also
informed the Commander in Chief that Maiorescu
had agreed to propose in the first session, which
was to take place that day, the signing of a five-day
suspension of hostilities, which would take effect
the following day. On 17 July, the first plenary
session of the conference accepted Venizelos’
proposal of a five-day suspension of hostilities.
On the next day, the peace delegations in
Bucharest agreed to have separate private meetin-
gs with the Bulgarians, so that only irreconcilable
differences would be brought to the conference.
The Bulgarians and Romanians had no great
difficulty in reaching an agreement. By 18 July,
most of the points of their agreement had been
settled and Bulgaria was hoping for a separate
Bulgaro-Romanian peace treaty. Maiorescu,
however, declared to the conference that the
agreement between the Romanian and Bulgarian
delegations was not a separate treaty, but only the
first step towards a general settlement.
The major obstacle of the conference was the
question of Kavala and owning to its importance as
the center of tobacco commerce, this question
aroused internațional interest. On his arrival at
Bucharest, Venizelos discovered that none of the
Great Powers would support him actively on the
question of Kavala. In order to gain use of Kaiser
Wilhelm’s influence on King Carol, Queen Sophia
of Greece, telegraphed Constantine’s request for
‘eingutes Wbrt' about Kavala to her brother Kaiser
Wilhelm and he, in turn, communicated it to King
Carol. The Romanian King offered to mediate for
a frontier beginning between Kavala and Porto
Lagos, which was acceptable to Venizelos.
The conference meeting of 22 July coincided
with the end of the five-day cease-fire. King
Constantine, although dreading the possibility of a
renewal of hostilities without Serbian and Romanian
support, was not prepared to grant Bulgarian
demands or to ask for an extension of the cease-
fire. To do this, he believed, would expose the
weakness of his position. He hoped that the other
belligerents would have failed to reach an
agreement with the Bulgarians and that one of
them would propose the extension of the cease-
fire. At the meeting, however, Maiorescu ann-
ounced that Bulgaria and Romania had reached
an agreement and that at the expiry of cease-fire
the Bulgarians hoped to continue the war against
Serbia and Greece. He hastened to explain that
Romania would not sign a separate treaty, but would
support her cobelligerents. He then communicated
the Austria-Hungarian and British Communi-
cations concerning Kavala and proposed the
extension of the cease-fire for three more days.
Maiorescu’s declaration concerning the condi-
țional character of the Romano-Bulgarian agre-
ement shattered Bulgarian hopes of isolating
Greece and Serbia. The Bulgarian delegation
accepted the renewal of the cease-fire.11
The Greek delegation to Bucharest encoun-
tered fierce resistance to its territorial demands,
48
■ Review of Military History ■
and the Prime Minister informed the King that it
was not possible to satisfy the Greek demand for a
boundary east of the river Nestos. In reply, the
King approved the line of the Nestos River as
Greece’s minimum position. Meanwhile, some of
the Great Powers, especially Austria-Hungary,
insisted that Kavala ought to be adjudged to
Bulgaria. The Greek side was unyielding on the
issue and succeeded in gaining the support of
France and Germany and, a little later, Italy.
Venizelos responded immediately to Maiorescu’s
show of solidarity in the question of Kavala. On 23
July, without prior consultation with either the King
or his government, he granted Maiorescu’s request
concerning the autonomy of Vlach12 schools and
churches and the creation of a Vlach bishopric in
the territories annexed by Greece. Romania was
given permission to subsidize these institutions.
Though the concession had been recorded in an
exchange of informai letters13 between the two
Premiers and remained inoperative, the mere
recognition of Vlach minority rights aroused strong
criticism in Greece. Venizelos was accused of
having created a non-existent question. The
recently appointed Govemor General of Macedonia,
Stefanos Dragoumis, resigned in protest.14
Venizelos, however, was in particular hurry to
obtain a favorable decision by the Balkan peace
conference of Bucharest. On 24 July, he had yet
another fruitless discussion with the Bulgarian
delegates. At the conference meeting which
followed, Maiorescu announced the conclusion of
the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement and stated that, if
Bulgaria rejected the Greek claim on Kavala,
Romania and Serbia would cancel their agreements
and would resume hostilities. Subsequently, the
Romanian prime minister proposed the suspension
of the sessions and the holding of bilateral talks
between the Greek and Bulgarian delegations. The
Bulgarians withdrew for one more private talk with
Venizelos. They told him that, if they secured a
small concession along the northern frontier, they
would give in. Venizelos rejected this offer
professing that to accept it would exceed his
instructions. At that moment, the French Minister
----■ Review of Military History ■---------------
Blondei, who arrived to ask about the progress of
the conference, supported by Maiorescu, implored
Venizelos not to prolong the war unnecessarily. As
a result of the mediation of the Romanian delegate
General Coandă, Venizelos accepted a small
rectification of the eastern frontier, in order to
facilitate Bulgaria’s railroad connection to Porto-
Lagos. In the afternoon, when the meeting was
resumed, Maiorescu announced the conclusion of
the Greek-Bulgarian agreement, which secured
Kavala for Greece.15
On 25 July, the above-mentioned agreement
was initialed and three days later, on 28 July 1913,
the peace treaty ending the state of war between
the Balkan States was signed.16 On 30 July, a mutual
assistance protocol was signed in Bucharest,
providing for military and diplomatic cooperation
between the four Balkan allies (Romania, Serbia,
Greece and Montenegro).17
Prime Minister Venizelos mainly depended on
personal connections and secret negotiations. His
presence in Bucharest and his intimacy with Take
lonescu, contributed to the success of the Greek
diplomacy. It is a tribute to the stability of Greek
politics that he was the only Balkan premier who
both prepared the 1912 agreements and remained
in power to witness their consequences through to
the Treaty of Bucharest. On 30 July the Greek
delegation departed from Bucharest and returned
to Athens.
1	Hellenic Army General Staff / Army History
Directorate, A Concise History of the Balkan IVars
1912-1913, Athens 1998, p.p. 265,269,275,297.
2	Telegram from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs: Athens 7-7-13, to His Majesty the King -
General High Command. AHD Archive, F. 1699b/
A/1420.
3	Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, Greece and the
Balkan Imbroglio, GreekForeign Policy, 1911-1913,
Athens, 1995, p.225-230.
4	Telegram from the Prime Minister Venizelos:
Athens 10-7-13, to His Majesty the King, General
Headquarters. AHD Archive, F. 1699b/A/1524.
----------------------------------RH—
5	Telegram from the King Constantine,
Commander in Chief: Livounovo 10-7-13, to the
Prime Minister Venizelos, Athens. AHD Archive,
F. 1699b/A/1525.
6	HAGS / AHD, Concise..., o.c., p. 309
7	Telegram from the Prime Minister Venizelos:
Athens 11-7-13, to His Majesty the King, General
Headquarters. AHD Archive, F. 1699b/A/1563.
8	A copy of the telegram sent from Bucharest
to the Romanian Embassy: “In the name of the
Romanian Embassy could you please invite the
Hellenic government to send its representatives
to Bucharest to discuss preliminary peace terms
and the Hnal peace accord? With respect to the
truce, itis advisable that with respect to the serious
situation in Solia we should previously discuss in
Nish all the preliminary and urgent military
measures with the other representatives of the
warring nations. Our Colonel Christesko is today
already in Nish and will be followed the day after
tomorrow by General Coandă; they are our
representatives for these measures.” Maiorescu.
9	Telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs:
Athens 11-7-13 to His Majesty the King, General
Headquarters. AHD Archive, F. 1699b/A/1623.
10	Telegram from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs: Athens 12-7-13 to His Majesty the King,
General Headquarters. AHD Archive, F. 1699b/A/
1623.
11	Gardikas, Greece..., o.c., p. 236-238.
12	More about vlach, see some of the basic
bibliography, in Greek: Katsougiannes M. T, The
Vlachsin the GreekRegions, Thessalonica, 1964;
Keramopoulos Antonios, Who are the Kout-
sovlachs, Athens, 1939; Aravantinos P., A Studyof
the Koutsovlachs, Athens, 1905; Krystalles C., On
the Vlachs of the Pindos, Averoff Evangelos, The
Political Aspect of the Koutsovlach Issue, Athens,
1948.
13	In Bucharest, 23July (5 August) 1913. T.
Maiorescu to E. Venizelos: As was agreed during
the negotiations, Ihave the honour of asking Your
Excellency to respond to my announcement and
to verifythat: Greece agrees to grant autonomy to
the Koutsovlach School and Church that are
situated in lands that will revert to Greece in the
future and to permit the establishment of an
Episcopate for the Koutsovlachs, as Romania will
cede the prescribed present and future religious
and educațional institutions under the supervision
of the Hellenic Government. As President of the
Ministerial Council, please be so kind as to accept
my esteemed regards.
E. Venizelos to T. Maiorescu: In response to
the note delivered to me today from Your
Excellency, I have the honour of contirming to
Your Excellency that: Greece agrees to grant
autonomy to the Koutsovlach School and Church
that are situated in lands that will revert to Greece
in the future and to permit the establishment of an
Episcopate for the Koutsovlachs, as Romania will
cede the pacitistic presentand future religious and
educațional institutions under the supervision of
the Hellenic Government. As President of the
Ministerial Council, please be so kind as to accept
my esteemed regards. AHD Archive, F. 1699b/A/
1926.
14	Gardikas, Greece..., o.c., p. 239.
15	HAGS /AHD, The GreekArmyin the Balkan
Wars 1912-1913, Military Operations against the
Bulgarians, voi. III, (in Greek), Athens 1992, p. 293-
297.
16	AHD Archive, F. 1699b/A/1923,1927.
17	AHD Archive, F. 1699b/A/1928a.
UNPUBLISHED SOURCES
Hellenic Army General Staff, Army History
Directorate, Archive of the Balkan Wars, 1912-
1913.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
•	Hellenic Army General Staff / Army History
Directorate, Ihe Greek Army in the Balkan Wars
1912-1913, Military Operations against the
Bulgarians, voi. 111, (in Greek), Athens, 1992.
•	Hellenic Army General Staff / Army History
Directorate, A Concise History of the Balkan Wars
1912-1913, Athens, 1998.
•	Gardikas - Katsiadakis Helen, Greece and
the Balkan Imbroglio, Greek Foreign Policy, 1911-
1913, Athens, 1995.
■[50]
■ Review of Military History ■
THE 534 HELLENIC AIR SQUADRON
IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA (1919)
KAISAROU-PANTAZOPOULOU TRIANTAFYLL1A
Historian of the Hellenic Air Force History Museum
Member of the Hellenic Commission on Military History
The 534 Reconnaissance and Light Bombing
Squadron was founded in early October 1918. The
Squadron was based in the Lebet airfield, NW of
the city of Thessaloniki and it was placed under
the Eastern French Air Command. Thus, the Squa-
dron’s first commander was French.1
The flying staffs of the Squadron were
exclusively Greek, while the technical staff included
French nationals as well. Specifically, the Greek
force consisted of twelve officers and two Non-
Commissioned aviators, a reserve medical second
lieutenant and approximately two hundred Non-
Commissioned officers and soldiers having
technical and other skills.2
The new Squadron was formed to operate in
the Eastern Thrace front. In the end, it didn’t take
part in those operations due to Turkey’s armistice.
At that time, the allies decided the Russian
campaign, aiming to aid the Tsar’s troops in
suppressing the Bolsheviks Revolution. The Allied
Expeditionary Force was composed of: the A”
Hellenic Army Corps, a French Division, units of
the French and British Fleet, two Squadrons of
the French Air Force including a “Base” and the
534 Hellenic Air Squadron.3
In early March 1919, the 534 Air Squadron,
under the command of the French Cap tain Rigon
and the Lieutenant Petro Oikonomako as comman-
der of the Greek staff was boarded on a Greek
cargo ship in the Thessaloniki port. The Squadron
had only been supplied with the stuff for settling
and accommodating itself in an air base. Aeroplanes
and in general, aviation material and automobiles
would be provided to the Squadron from the French
“Pool” in Odessa.
One day after its departure, the Air Squadron
reached Constantinople. Approximately four days
later, the Squadron disembarked in the Odessa port
from the steamship “Engineer Artandof” and
settled in the Odessa airport, in the city outskirts
(see Back Cover).
■	The Spad XIII was one of the
most successful fighter planes of
WWI. The 531 Fighter Squadron of
the Hellenic Army Flying Corps
possessed eight of these planes
and used them in operations
during WWI and in the Asia Minor
Campaign
■	Review of Military History ■
■Sergeant loannis
Meletopoulos is shown
on the left front side
of a reconnaissance
Dorand AR-1 biplane
that was extensively
used
by the HAFC Squadrons
as a trainer
(The picture is from the
archives of the Hellenic
Air Force History
Mu seu mj
The 534 Squadron stayed in the Odessa airport
for a week, waiting for the delivery of aeroplanes
from the French “Pool”. In the meantime however,
the Bolsheviks took over and the Allied Force
started to retreat towards Romania.4
On the eve of its departure, the Greek Air
Squadron was ordered by the French to pick up a
Spad XIII aircraft, due to its pilot’s illness and to
transport that plane “by flight” to Bessarabia, where
the entire Allied Expeditionary Force was soon
expected to retreat.
The task was assigned to Sergeant loannis
Meletopoulos, a competent aviator of fighter planes.
However, there was no map of the region in the airport
and despite the personnel’s efforts, it was not possible
to find even a plain school map of the region5.
It should also be noted, that the plane should
be regarded as having no chance to complete its
journey. The plane’s flying range was so limited,
that it was almost certain to run out of fuel.
Moreover, there was no time to transport the plane
by ground.
Despite the adversities, Sergeant Meletopoulos
took off on March 24,1919, the day that the allied
troops left Odessa, heading towards the Romanian
city of Brăila. His only aid in that enterprise were
the advice of peers and the directions by the
French officers of the Squadron in an area sketch
that was roughly drawn from memory.
---1~52~|----------------------------------------
After several hours of flight,
he attempted to land the plane in the border
between Bessarabia and Russia, so as to be supplied
with fuel. At the time of the landing, he was attacked
by Russian peasants that most likely were
revolutionaries. He was forced to take off again in
the midst of a snowstorm and to fly speculating on
the course and constantly looking for the Brăilei
airport.
In that aimless wandering, the Sergeant aviator
run out of fuel and he was forced to land the plane
in Romanian territory, specifically close to the
region Sulina. The plane suffered several damages
and the aviator appealed to the allied authorities,
as to have the aircraft repaired and transported to
the Brăila airport. Subsequently, Meletopoulos went
to Galatsi Romania, where his Squadron arrived
as well a few days later.6
As it has already been mentioned, the 534
Squadron had been given a single aircraft. After
the aircraft’s departure, the 534 Squadron moved
with great hardship to the Odessa port. The
squadron had seen no war action during its 20-day
stay in Odessa. It boarded on the German
transoceanic vessel “Korkovado”7, with final
destination the Constantinople port, by the way of
Sulina, where the French Air units disembarked.
The Russian expedition of the 534 Squadron lasted
approximately 27 days.
During the 534’s stay in Constantinople, the
two French officers of the Squadron were
-----------■ Review of Military History ■-------
transferred to a French unit and the command of
the 534 Squadron was assigned to the Lieutenant
Petros Oikonomakos by order of the “Middle East”
and the “Danube” Air Commands. The Squadron
was ordered to abandon its material and to depart
by steamship for Galatsi, Romania8.
There, the staff of the 534 Squadron was
accommodated in the roughly arranged stables of
a Romanian cavalry unit’s câmp, near the airport.
The squadron was supplied with money and goods
for its everyday operațional needs from the Galatsi
base. For the transfer and the transportation of
the Squadron’s officers, a personnel automobile
had been disposed (to the Squadron).
Under these circumstances, the activities of
the 534 Squadron were reduced to the submission
of the regular reports to the Air Command and the
watch of the test-flights of the planes that were
delivered from France at a very slow pace. Also
the lower rank staff went through everyday
training and the attendance of schools that, among
other things served to reinforce the discipline.9
Near the end of April 1919, the French Air
Force suffered a fatal accident. In the course of a
test-flight, a fighter plane crashed, due to the
engine fault. The plane’s pilot was killed in the
crash. That was a great casualty for the “Danube
Air Force”. After the religious ceremony in the
Galatsi Catholic Church, the Commander of the
534 Squadron, Lieutenant P. Oikonomakos decora-
ted the dead pilot with the Hellenic “War Cross”.
Following a petition by P. Oikonomakos,10 the “War
Cross” was awarded by the Army Corps I that was
stationing in the city under the command of the
Lieutenant General Nider.
That act was appreciated by the French officers
and served to improve the relations between Greek
and French officers that had been disaffected after
the appointment of the Lieutenant P. Oikonomakos
as the sole commander of the 534 Squadron.
■ The Cover page {left) and the first pages of the 534 Squadron’s «dyeeiî
Î0u££îo», or Payroll Book. The foreground page is signed by the 534 Squadron’s
commander Lieutenant Petros Oikonomakos. The background pages show the
entries in the 534 Squadron’s Payroll Book recording the monthly salary
(«xnciâoeeYo Ăâiăi+Yo») and the 'bread allowance' of each member of the 534
Squadron during its stay in Galați (The document is from the archives of the
HAFHM)
— ■ Review of Military History  ---------------------------------------1"53 I
The Greek commander of the Squadron,
taking advantage of the fact, he requested and
received by the Army Corps I four more “War
Crosses”, that he then awarded to French officers
with first among them the commander of the Air
force “Base”. Since then and until day the 534
Squadron was ordered to move to Asia Minor,
where the Greek troops were advancing, the
delivery of vehicles (motorcars and trucks) and
aeroplane spare parts, engines and automobiles
was carried out at a much faster pace.
At the end of July 1919, the 534 Squadron
departed for Smyrna. However, before disem-
barking, a new mandate was recalling the
Squadron to Thessaloniki, as to operate in the
Thrace front. The reasoning was that the 534
Squadron had no planes and the aviators needed
further training since they had no flights for a
five-month period.11
The Squadron soon departed from Thessaloniki
to Drama, except from the flying staff that reached
Drama three days later along with the aeroplanes
that they received from the Air Force “Base”. Thus
the 534 Squadron stopped from being the “534
Squadron with no planes”, since it now possessed
aeroplanes and it was renamed as the “C” Squadron,
abolishing the allied numerical prefix (534) ,12
In the mid January 1920, the “C” Squadron
departed again for Smyrna by steamship from the
Thessaloniki port; and in early February, the flying
staff with its planes departed for the Kazamir
airport, SE of Smyrna.
The spare parts that the 534 Squadron had been
supplied in Romania served not only the operațional
needs of the “C” Squadron. A new Air Force “Base”
was formed in Asia Minor that technically supported
the three Squadrons (“B”, “C” and “D”) throughout
the Asia Minor campaign.13
Since its planes arrived at the Kazamir airport,
the “C” Squadron retaining its ground personnel
and being reinforced with some new aviator officers
and Non-Commissioned officers started its war
action in Asia Minor. According to the progress of
operations, the “C” Squadron continued on its war
operations from other airfields and bases as well
until August 1922, when it departed from Asia Minor
to be based in the river Evros front.14
1	The 534 was the fourth in sequence Squadron of
the Hellenic Army Flying Corps (HAFC). The
Squadrons 531, 532 and 533 had already been formed
during the World War I and those had been operating
under the French Air Command, Hellenic Wings: An
lllustrated History of the H.A.F and its precursors, n.
1 1908-1944, published by the Hellenic Air Force
History Museum, pp. 38, 42.
2	P. Oikonomakos, Limited Action. The 534
Squadron with no Planes in Russia, p. 7.
3	Ibid, p. 8.
4	History of the Hellenic Air Force, Volume II,
published by the Hellenic Air Force History Museum,
1998, second edition, p. 9.
5	P. Oikonomakos, op.cit., p. 19.
6	History of the Hellenic Air Force, Volume II,
ed.cit., p.10.
7	The steamship “Korkovado” had been seized by
the allies soon after the declaration of the war, History
of the Hellenic Air Force (1908-1935), published by
the Ministry of the Air Force, E. Brontakis, p. 169.
----F541------------------------------------------
8	P. Oikonomakos, op.cit., p. 42.
9	Ibid, p. 45. The author remarks that in general,
the Hellenic Army was very well regarded by the
Romanian citizens of Galatsi. Besides, the commander
of the Romanian Air Force of the region was of Greek
origin, like several other officers of the Romanian
Army and Navy who spoke fluently the Greek
language, pp. 46 - 48.
10	Ibid, p. 50.
11	That reasoning is refuted by the Squadron’s
commander (the Lieutenant P. Oikonomakos)...
because by the time the Squadron settled in the
Smyrna air base, that is in a few days time, the
Squadron’s aviators would have been able to return
to Smyrna with their planes”, P. Oikonomakos,
op.cit., p. 54.
12	Register No. 94088/12-12-1919/General Staff,
History of the Hellenic Air Force, Volume II, ed.cit.,
p. 22.
13	P. Oikonomakos, The Hellenic Air Force until
1941, Athens 1970, p. 65.
14	P. Oikonomakos, Limited Action. The 534
Squadron with no planes in Russia, p. 61.
-----------■ Review of Military History ■------
ROMANIA, GREECE AND THE ISSUES
IN THE BLACK SEA
(1919-1939)
Dr. PETRE OTU
President of the Romanian Commission of Military History
During the interwar period, the relations be-
tween Romania and Greece were among the fin-
est, both countries becoming part of the same alli-
ance - the Balkan Pact, whose treaty was signed
in Athens by the foreign ministers of Romania,
Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia on February 9,1934.
The intense bilateral collaboration during the in-
terwar period was facilitated by the geographic
location, both States sharing the same Balkan
space, by the historical traditions and by the com-
munity of interests between the two States and the
two peoples.
In this framework, the Black Sea represented
a point of convergence, this area being strongly
connected to Eastern Mediterranean, a maritime
area of high interest for Greece. History even
showed the existence of several geopolitical con-
stants between the two stretches of water. The
hegemonie power in the Black Sea has usually tried
to assert its control over the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, thus dominating the entire area and gaining
access to the world ocean. The most eloquent ex-
ample is the Russian Empire in the first half of the
XIXlh century, which strongly pursued to extend
its control beyond Bosporus and Dardanelles
Straits. The Treaties of Hiinkâr Yskelesi (1833) and
of London (1841) mark the climax of the Russian
policy of controlling the Black Sea and, concomi-
tantly, the Eastern Mediterranean. Reversely, the
great powers which appeared in the Eastern Medi-
terranean and Middle East extended their domi-
nation in the Black Sea area, especially on its west-
ern and northern shores. This is how the Achae-
menid Empire, the Greek poleis, the Roman, Byz-
antine and Ottoman empires have all acted in vari-
ous historical periods.1
The First World War brought important changes
in the Black Sea and Mediterranean areas through
the disappearance of two major competitors - the
Russian and the Ottoman empires. The Russian
----■ Review of Military History ■------------
empire was the first to disappear, as a consequence
of the revolution from February-March 1917, at
the end of which the czar abdicated and, in No-
vember same year, the Bolsheviks seized power at
Retrograd. It is worth mentioning that Soviet Rus-
sia only became a littoral state at the Black Sea
later on, in 1921-1922, after the end of the civil war
and the annexation of Ukraine and Georgia.
The disappearance of the Ottoman Empire was
a similarly complicated process, which put Greece
in the position of an important actor in this geo-
graphic area. Between 1921 and 1922, the Greco-
Turkish War took place, which ended with the vic-
tory of the forces led by Mustafa Kemal and with
the armistice of Mudanya signed on October 11,
1922.2
During this conflict, the Romanian govern-
ment had a policy of non-interference, as long as it
took place outside Europe. Simultaneously, the
Romanian authorities, through Nicolae Titulescu,
rejected the suggestions made by Great Britain
and Greece, in September 1922, to send military
forces in the Straits region. At the same time, the
Romanian government shaped its position concern-
ing this issue, which basically had two major goals
- ensuring the free circulation on the Straits and
the demilitarization of the Black Sea through na-
val disarmament. It was the historical experience
from the recently ended First World War that de-
termined Romania to adopt such a stance. The
Ottoman Empire, once it entered the war along
Central Powers, blocked the Straits. This action,
together with the occupying of the entire Șerb ter-
ritory by the troops of the same coalition (1915),
isolated Romania from its western partners. The
only supplying line was from Russia, a very long
and unsafe route.
The end of the Greco-Turkish war made the
Treaty of Sevres inoperable and called for the con-
vocation of an internațional conference in order
■ Eleftherios Venizelos
to solve the complicated issues from the Eastern
Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Entente
powers decided that the conference will take place
in the Swiss city of Lausanne.
The Conference of Lausanne took place between
November 20,1922, and July 24,1923, with the par-
ticipation of 12 States, among which Romania and
Greece. The Romanian delegation, led by the Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, I.G. Duca, included
Constantin Diamandy, Constantin Conțescu and
Colonel Toma Dumitrescu. The Greek delegation
was led by Eleftherios Venizelos and included
Demetreos Caclamanos, Nicolăos Plastiras and
loannis Politis.3 The Romanian delegation did ev-
erything it could so that the free circulation in the
Straits and the demilitarization of the Black Sea to
become norm and to be accepted as internațional
law. This was not easy, taking into consideration the
diverging opinions among the great powers them-
selves and among them and the smaller countries.
In practice, all the discussions during the re-
union evolved around two fundamental theses -
the British one, which satisfied the Romanian de-
mands, and the Soviet one - enjoying Turkish sup-
port -, which demanded the closing of the Straits.
The British thesis, skillfully supported by Lord
Curzon, chief of the delegation and head of the spe-
cial Commission for territorial affairs, pursued the
demilitarization and the free circulation in the
Straits, so that the access of non-littoral States would
not be restricted. The Soviet position pursued the
maintaining of the hegemony in the Black Sea, hid-
den under Turkish neutrality, thus Moscow becom-
ing a defender of Turkey’s rights. Therefore, the
situation reached a point that seemed unconceivable
before the start of the First World War, given the
two century of old rivalry for hegemony in the Black
Sea between the two powers.
Turkey eventually accepted the British propos-
als, which also enjoyed the support of the former
Allies. Therefore, the British position triumphed
because of the changes in Turkey’s position, which,
with some reservations, agreed to the Solutions
offered by the Allies. If the Turkish delegation
proved itself open to concessions in what con-
cerned the Straits, in all the other issues it was
inflexible, making the negotiations more difficult.
On February 4,1923, the proceedings of the Con-
ference were halted; they resumed on April 23,
1923, and continued until July 24 same year, when
the peace treaty was signed.
During the talks, the Romanian and Greek
delegations had frequent consultations on various
issues, including on those related to the conse-
quences of the recently ended Greco-Turkish war.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, I.G. Duca, told
Venizelos that “we are very interested that Greece
be Consolidated and powerful and I assured him of
our support”.4 However, the situation in which both
countries found themselves at the conference was
not easy. Romania had a vital interest in the status
of the Straits and, consequently, was willing to treat
Turkey leniently, as its help was essential in reach-
ing the proposed goals. This is the reason why the
support given to Greece by the Romanian diplo-
mats could not be complete and unconditional. On
the other hand, the military defeat and the inter-
nai unrest created an unfavorable environment
for Greece at the talks in Lausanne, being there-
fore forced to moderate its claims and to seek to
minimize the losses as much as possible.5 How-
ever, in what the Straits were concerned, the Greek
delegation supported the Allies’ (British) point of
view and, implicitly, the Romanian position, which
contributed to the finalizing of the talks.
The peace treaty of Lausanne, signed on July
24,1923, contained important provisions for stabi-
lizing the situation in the Balkans and in the Near
and Middle East. The independence of the new
-----------■ Review of Military History ■-------
Turkish state was therefore recognized, while its
borders in Europe were established according to
the situation from 1913, like they were after the
end of the Second Balkan War. The public debt of
the former Ottoman Empire was divided among
the States which took over territories, the regime
of capitulations and the financial control over the
Turkish state were abolished and a population ex-
change took place between Greece and Turkey.
The free circulation in the Straits of all ships
and aircraft (civilian and military) was proclaimed,
in accordance to several cases - in peacetime, in
wartime, with Turkey as a belligerent power, with
Turkey neutral, etc. The Bosporus and Dardanelles
Straits were demilitarized on a length of 15 to 20
km, with the exception of Constantinople (Istanbul),
which could keep a garrison of 15 000 soldiers. The
Commission of the Straits was established, which
was presided by the representative of Turkey and
having one delegate from each of the littoral States.
The treaty transformed the Black Sea in a free
and open sea to navigation for all countries, re-
gardless whether the ships belonged to the littoral
or non-littoral States or whether they were trade
ships or war ships.6
The Conference of Lausanne, in spițe of all
the tensions, played an important role in stabiliz-
ing the relations among the States from South-
Eastern Europe and in diminishing the strong con-
tradictions that plagued this geographic area for a
long time. The agreement was the first act which
revised the system built on the Paris Peace Con-
ference, abolishing the Treaty of Sevres. At the
same time, it officially confirmed the disappear-
ance of the Ottoman Empire, the great power that
had dominated the region for five centuries.
The positive collaboration between the Roma-
nian and Greek delegations during the Conference
of Lausanne contributed to the development of bi-
lateral relations, which became closer. For in-
stance, on July 1925, the Romanian government
agreed to the proposal of the Greek Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Constantin Rentis, concerning the
signing of some treaties of arbitration by Greece,
Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes (Yugoslavia since 1929), as a fist step to-
wards the signing of a security pact or even the
constituting of an alliance of the three countries.
The talks that followed did not lead to the material-
ization of the project, but did soothe the tensions
in the Balkans.
----■ Review of Military History ■---------------
The inițiative of the Turkish and Greek gov-
ernments concerning the setting up of a Balkan
Pact illustrates this new atmosphere. The Roma-
nian government considered that several condi-
tions must be met in order to make this formula
successful: things should not be rushed; no men-
tioning of any state; no outside hegemony in the
Balkans; all the Balkan States should take part.
The Balkan Pact project was eventually abandoned
because of the opposition of France, which favored
a formula similar to the Little Entente, the alli-
ance created in 1920-1921 by Romania, Czecho-
slovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes.7
An important moment in the evolution of bilat-
eral relations was the signing, in March 12,1928
in Geneva, of the Pact of nonaggression and arbi-
trage. Through this document, the parties com-
mitted themselves not to attack each other, not to
invade their territories and not to declare war
against each other. The use of force was allowed
only in the cases of self-defense stipulated in the
Covenant of the League of Nations. The Covenant
also provisioned methods of solving the disputes in
the spirit of the norms established by the forum in
Geneva. The exchange of the instruments of rati-
fication took place onjuly5,1929.
In the same year, during the reunion of the
International Labor Organization in Athens, the
former Greek prime-minister, Alexandros Papanas-
tassiou, proposed the convocation of an informai
conference of the Balkan States. The latter gave
their consent, thus laying the grounds of a period
of political effervescence in the region, the first
such reunion taking place in Athens on October 5-
12,1930. The statute of the conference stipulated
that the fundamental goal of the reunion was the
rapprochement among the Balkan States from all
points of view. Three such reunions followed -
Istanbul (October 1931), Bucharest (October 1932)
and Thessaloniki (November 1933), while the fifth,
initially planned to take place in Belgrade and later
moved to Istanbul, never took place. As they were
nongovernmental bodies, they could not have pos-
sibly solved the numerous problems in the region,
some of them decades or centuries old, but the
topics of discussions and the proposed Solutions
did contribute to a significant rapprochement of
the countries from this geographic area.
Regarding naval collaboration, we must men-
tion another revealing fact. At the end of August
-----------------------------------------—
1933, ample manifestations took place in Greece
commemorating the great naval victories in the
War of Independence. The ship “Constanța” was
invited to take part to these manifestations, along-
side a British cruiser. During the three days of the
event, there took place boat races, swimming com-
petitions and other sailor games. A dinner was of-
fered in the honor of the foreign fleets. The Greek
Minister of Navy, Hadjikyriakos, visited the Roma-
nian ship, being saluted by its commandant, cmdr.
Al. Dumitrescu. The Minister of Navy declared, as
the Romanian representative in Athens reported,
that he is happy to see the representatives of the
Romanian fleet attending the Greek navy mani-
festations, thus illustrating the friendship between
the two countries, “which are united by everything
and divided by nothing”.8
Coming back to the general situation, we no-
tice that in the autumn of 1933 the political con-
tacts intensified, including those at the highest
level, the main topic of discussions being the set-
ting up of the Balkan Pact. This issue was also
discussed during the reunion of the Little Entente
in Zagreb (January 22-23, 1934), where the final
attempt to draw Bulgaria was decided, on the occa-
sion of the visit in Romania of Czar Boris (January
25-28,1934). This final attempt, however, had no
results.
On February 9,1934, the Foreign Ministers of
Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey signed
in Athens the Balkan Pact. The essence of the
pact was contained in the first two articles: “Ro-
mânia, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece mutually
guarantee the security of all their borders in the
Balkans” (art. 1). “The High Contracting Parties
commit themselves to focus on the measures of
dealing with certain situations that could aifect
their interests, as they are delined bythe present
agreement. They commit themselves not to un-
dertake anypolitical action towards any other non-
signatory Balkan country of the present agree-
ment, without prior mutual notice, and not to take
anypolitical obligation towards any other Balkan
country without the consent of the other contract-
ing parties” (art. 2). The agreement was accompa-
nied by an “annexed protocol”, which referred,
among others, to: the non-aggressive and open
nature of the alliance; the possibility of enforcing
the pact even if the aggressor was from outside
Balkans; the signing of the conventions “with simi-
lar goals to the ones pursued by the Balkan Pact”
—r^n----------------------------------------------
(military conventions); the maintaining of the ter-
ritorial statu-quo, etc. Another important feature
was the reservation formulated by Turkey and re-
corded in the secret annex of the Pact, in which it
in no way admitted to be considered as committing
itself to take part in actions directed against the
Soviet Union.9
The alliance had three periods in its develop-
ment: during the first, until mid 1936, each mem-
ber defined its positions; the second, until the end
of 1938, was the phase of actual military collabora-
tion; the third, during 1938-1940, was marked by
the weakening of the solidarity and the reduction
in the military cooperation.
A lot of energy was put in the first phase and
the negotiations proved difficultas a consequence
of the different geopolitical situation of the various
signatory States. Thus, the common denominator
had to be found for States with a Mediterranean
calling (Turkey or Greece) and for others with a
central-continental inclination (Romania). It was
also necessary to eliminate or at least to dampen
the major differences resulted from prior political
agreements. We mentioned the case of Turkey.
Greece found itself in a similar situation, the au-
thorities in Athens stating that, by fulfilling its com-
mitments from the Pact, they cannot go to war
against one of the great powers under any circum-
stance.
The Black Sea issue was the main point of in-
terest of Turkey and Romania, both littoral States,
Greece paying more attention to the situation in
the Mediterranean Sea, where it had to face Italy’s
hegemonie tendencies. That is why the tripartite
military convention (Romania, Yugoslavia and Tur-
key) was first finalized.
During the tripartite talks, certain differences
in the opinions surfaced out concerning the num-
ber of forces allocated to the Balkan theater of
war and the area of concentration of the large
Romanian units for the action against Bulgaria.
Therefore, Turkey, starting from its superior po-
tențial of mobilization and from the existence of a
single enemy on a frontier of about 100 km, was
demanding the concentration of an army of 30
divisions, each ally participating with an equal num-
ber of troops. Ankara’s option was determined by
the fear of an Italian action in the Eastern Medi-
terranean, an area where most troops would have
been deployed. Romania, having in mind its strate-
gic situation - all its borders being quasi-concentri-
-----------■ Review of Military History ■--------
cally threatened - rejected the proposal of the
Turkish General Staff, declaring that Turkey should
have the main share in an action directed against
a Balkan enemy.
The Turkish General Staff assessed the situa-
tion differently, offering, in one of the Solutions
still under development, “ the maximum number of
available forces”. There existed, therefore, a ma-
jor difference between the Romanian point of view
(shared also by Belgrade) and the Turkish one.
The Romanian view saw the Balkan Pact as the
natural extension of the alliance system in Cen-
tral Europe, offering Little Entente the safety of
the back of the disposition. For Ankara, Little En-
tente was a factor susceptible of taking over the
ensuring of the security in the Balkans, while its
forces could have been deployed, for example, in
the Eastern Mediterranean.
Political aspects also added to these different
strategic views. The internațional events from the
spring of 1936, such as the remilitarization of
Rhineland, postponed the signing of the tripartite
military convention. The firm stance of Nicolae
Titulescu in what concerned both alliances (Little
Entente and the Balkan Pact), given that not even
France had reacted to an act of force threatening
its territory, led to the apprehension of the deci-
sion makers from the other Balkan capitals of be-
ing committed, without their consent, to an extra-
Balkans or extra-Mediterranean conflict.
The new reunion of the Permanent Council of
the Balkan Pact (Belgrade, May 4-6,1936) did not
succeed to break the deadlock of the tripartite mili-
tary convention. But it was important because
Greece insisted to clarify its position concerning
the military convention, a very important fact
given its reservation from May 1934. Formally, the
Greek prime-minister loannis Metaxas gave as-
surances that “Greece is strongly determined to
follow the politics of the Balkan Pact in the most
sincere spirit of trust and in constant collabora-
tion with its Balkan allies”. Moreover: “ The royal
government considers the Balkan Pact to be an
essential foundation of the Greek foreign policy”.
From a military point of view, in the eventuality of
Italy taking part in a Balkan conflict against the
Balkan Pact, Greece would have not considered
itself automatically bound to an immediate re-
sponse. But, if the Balkan Pact would fight on the
French and British side in a conflict, Greece was
willing to have consultations with both powers and
----■ Review of Military History ■------------
with its Balkan allies in order to determine the way
it can participate. On this basis, it was decided to
begin the talks for the elaboration of the quadri-
partite military convention. From a diplomatic
point of view, it can be said that the reunion in
Belgrade recorded a change in the Greek-Italian
relations, with beneficial effects on the solidity of
the Balkan Pact. From a military point of view,
however, which was essential for such an alliance,
the situation did not differ, the written declaration
of loannis Metaxas moving Greece only a little
from where it stood in May 1934.
Although during the summer of 1936 many
important events took place in the Balkans, such
as, for instance, the Montreux Conference (June
22-July 22), which adopted a new statute of the
Straits of the Black Sea, the establishment of the
authoritarian regime in Greece (August 4) and the
dismissal of Nicolae Titulescu as the minister of
Foreign Affairs (August 29), the Balkan States suc-
ceeded to harmonize their different views and to
sign the tripartite military convention (between
Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia) on November 6
and the quadripartite convention on November 10.
The first document had 21 articles and laid
down the conditions of the military cooperation
among the three allied States (Romania, Yugosla-
via and Turkey) against an aggressor in the
Balkans, under the conditions of not being engaged
in any front, this being the least probable case. On
the grounds of the principie of equal rights, pro-
posed by Turkey, the intervention forces were fixed
to 120 infantry battalions, 150 artillery batteries,
24 squadrons and 100 planes for each party. The
necessity of establishing a high command came to
light, but this issue was transferred to the political
factors.
Turkey opposed mentioning the provision con-
cerning the transit of military materials in war-
time as being contrary to the Montreux Conven-
tion, but Ankara made a concession to Romania,
the most interested state in this issue, the access
being guaranteed through a letter given by the
Turkish government.
In the second hypothesis, the one of “restricted
liberties”, concerning the engaging in other front
of one of the contracting parties in the context of
o regional conflict, the formulation was evasive,
the action being supposed to be supported at “avail-
able maximum”. This expressed Turkey’s fear of
being engaged outside the Balkan area.
This tripartite military agreement was similar
to those signed in the framework of the Little En-
tente at the beginning of its activity, in 1920s. It
was a framework convention, under which the
projects of the operations were to be finalized. This
was the task of the chiefs of General Staffs who
met at annual conferences.
The quadripartite military convention was also
a framework convention, which established the
principles of military collaboration in case of a re-
gional conflict with the separate participation or
in cooperation with Bulgaria, Albania and Hungary.
The forces destined in such case for Romania,
Yugoslavia and Turkey consisted in 120 infantry
battalions, 120 artillery batteries, 24 squadrons and
100 planes for each of the three countries and 75
battalions, 90 artillery batteries, 16 squadrons and
65 planes for Greece. The quadripartite conven-
tion was discussed again at the session of the Per-
manent Council of the alliance of Athens (Febru-
ary 15-18,1937), where, following difficult negotia-
tions, the reservations concerning this document
formulated by Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania
were eventually abandoned. The major objections
on the nature of the document previously ex-
pressed by Greece and Turkey remained in their
place.
On February 11 and, respectively, on April 10,
1937, the tripartite and quadripartite conventions
were ratified by the signatory countries. But, mean-
—F60l--------------------------------------------
while, Yugoslavia distanced itself from the two alli-
ances, signing separate agreements with Bulgaria
and Italy. The direct consequence was the reduc-
tion of the military activity, although the chiefs of
general staffs continued to meet annually.
In the dramatic summer of 1938, the Balkan
Pact tried to adapt itself to the new realities. The
expression of these new orientations was the
Thessaloniki agreement (July 31,1938) with Bul-
garia, where the putting into practice of the mili-
tary, naval and air clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly
was given up.
The Balkan Pact survived the Czechoslovak
crisis, but the disappearance of the Little Entente
created, from a strategic point of view, a difficult
situation for Romania and Yugoslavia by leaving
uncovered the northern and western borders. The
Romanian General Staff, aware of these implica-
tions, considered that “the Balkan Pact can en-
dure the influence that Germany and Italy will
exert over some of the component members”.10
In order to remedy this shortcoming, the Ro-
manian and Yugoslav General Staffs held talks in
1938 and 1939 in order to reach a new bilateral
military agreement. The chance of success of this
attempt was ruined by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact
(August 23, 1939), which placed the entire area
from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea under the
condominium of the two totalitarian great powers
- Germany and the Soviet Union.
It is worth mentioning that the Balkans re-
mained outside this agreement between Moscow
and Berlin, something that allowed the Balkan Pact
to survive until the spring of 1940. The last session
of the Permanent Council of the alliance took place
in Belgrade (February 2-4,1940). At the request of
Greece, the four ministers of foreign affairs de-
cided to take into account the studying of some
hypotheses of defense in case of an attack from
outside the Balkans, but things did not move for-
ward. Despite the displayed optimism - the Roma-
nian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Grigore Gafencu,
was a good example - the Balkan Pact was a dying
alliance, as it could not cope with the pressures
coming from outside its region of competence.
It is also worth mentioning that the Balkans
represented one of the subjects which contributed
to the deterioration of the friendly German rela-
tions with the Soviet Union. During the visit to
Berlin in the autumn of 1940 of Vyacheslav
Molotov, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs,
-----------■ Review of Military History ■-----
Hitler turned down Stalin’s offer to reach a new
agreement to divide the Balkans, something that
precipitated the decisions taken in Berlin. In the
spring of 1941, Yugoslavia and Greece were occu-
pied by Germany, which imposed its control over
South-Eastern Europe. Both Romania, which had
also been mutilated in the summer of 1940, and
Bulgaria had been previously included in the Ger-
man sphere of dominance.
The Montreux Conference, where the deci-
sions taken in Lausanne were discussed again, rep-
resented another moment when the common in-
terest of Romania and Greece concerning the is-
sues in the Black Sea came to light. Having in
background the important changes that took place
in the internațional arena during the first half of
the fourth decade, Turkey strongly demanded the
revision of the treaty of 1923, which, in its opinion,
was harming its sovereignty. On April 10,1936, the
Turkish government sent a letter to the signato-
ries of the Treaty of Lausanne and also to the Sec-
retary General of the League of Nations, in which
it demanded the revision of the status of the Straits.
All the contracting parties accepted Ankara’s re-
quest and the place for the new conference was
chosen again in Switzerland, this time at Montreux.
The talks took place between June 20 and July 20,
1936. The Romanian delegation was led by Nicolae
Titulescu and the Greek delegation by Nicolas
Politis, who was elected vice-president of the Con-
ference, the president being W. Bruce, Australia’s
representative, the only British dominion that at-
tended at the Montreux Conference.
Just like in Lausanne, there were two points
view - one expressed by Turkey, the other by Brit-
ain. Basically, Turkey wanted to regain the control
over the Straits, something that met the griev-
ances of the Soviet Union. The British project
envisioned the maintaining of the regime estab-
lished in 1923. After hard negotiations, the Turk-
ish point of view prevailed, the right of Turkey to
rearm the zones demilitarized by the Treaty of
Lausanne being recognized. The free circulation
principie was maintained for trade ships, but was
severely restricted for war ships, especially if Tur-
key remained neutral.
Romania supported the Turkish point of view
and opposed the British project. This was a signifi-
cant change of stance compared to what had hap-
pened in Lausanne, when Bucharest and London
were on the same wavelength. In the opening ses-
----■ Review of Military History ■--------------
sion, Nicolae Titulescu stated thatTurkey’s request
to revision the status of the Straits by legal means
complied with the internațional law and, conse-
quently, did not contravene to the spirit and letter
of the peace treaties. The Romanian Minister of
Foreign Affairs stated: “I will say that the Straits
are the heart of Turkey, but they are also the lungs
of Romania. And when a region is, byits verygeo-
graphic location, the heart of one nation and the
lungs of the other, the most elementary piece of
wisdom demands that the two nations unite”.11 In
another intervention, Titulescu declared that the
main reason why Romania accepted Ankara’s
standpointwas “our unlimited trustin Turkey’s loy-
alty”.12
Titulescu’s stance can be explained by several
causes. The acceptance of the Turkish point of
view contributed to the maintaining of the unity of
action of the Balkan Pact, which was subjected, at
that time, to strong pressures from inside and es-
pecially from outside. At the same time, Titulescu’s
position also met the interests of France, who had
signed a treaty of mutual assistance with the So-
viet Union. As the Soviet help for France could
have only come by sea, the Romanian acceptance
satisfied both powers - France and the Soviet
Union.
At the same time, Nicolae Titulescu had signed
with the Soviets, also in Montreux (on July 21,1936),
a protocol which laid the foundations of a future
treaty of mutual assistance between Romania and
the Soviet Union. The support given to the Turk-
ish position, which met Moscow’s interests, could
only prepare the way to the signing of the treaty of
mutual assistance between the two countries.13
Titulescu’s position in Montreux generated
mixed reactions among the Romanian political
class, a number of leaders - Gheorghe I. Brătianu,
Octavian Goga, Mihail Manoilescu and others -
considering that Romania’s security interests were
affected by the blocking of the Straits during war-
time. Nicolae Titulescu’s attitude in Montreux was
actually one of the reasons for which he was dis-
missed from the position of Minister of Foreign
Affairs on August 29,1936.
In what concerns Greece, its position took into
account its interests at the Black Sea, which were
significantly smaller than Romania’s. The Greek
diplomacy agreed to Turkey’s request because the
Greek commercial navigation to the ports from
this region, although very active in the Straits,
-------------------- — -------------------dE—
was not harmed by the new regime. Greece unsuc-
cessfully tried, yet without putting too much effort,
to obtain in exchange the fortification of the Greek
islands that had been disarmed following the
Lausanne convention, such as Lemnos, Chios,
Mytilene, as a safety measure at the entrance in
the Straits.14
During the interwar period, closed relations of
cooperation in numerous fields developed between
Romania and Greece, both of whom were, in a
certain sense, a model for the entire region. These
relations materialized themselves in several initia-
tives, the most important being the Balkan Pact, a
defensive regional alliance whose goal was to pre-
serve the political and territorial statu-quo. As for
the issues in the Black Sea, they represented a
point of convergence in the Greco-Romanian re-
lations, both countries situating themselves on the
same position at Lausanne and Montreux. It must
be added that the significance of the Black Sea
was different at Bucharest and Athens, Romania
being a Black Sea country and Greece a Mediter-
ranean country. Consequently, the two diploma-
cies promoted mainly their interests in these mari-
time areas. But, when these interests overlapped,
Romania and Greece succeeded to find ways of
communication which amplified the bilateral co-
operation.
1	For the geopolitical aspects in the Black Sea,
see the Central National Archives of History, fund
Brătianu family, file no. 506. (The course on the Black
Sea after the Ottoman conquest taught by Gheorghe
I. Brătianu at the University of Bucharest, 1941-1942);
Georgios Prevalakis, Balcanii. Cultură și geopolitică,
foreword by the author in the Romanian edition, trans-
lation, notes and afterword by Nicolae-Șerban
Tanașoca, Publishing House Corint, Bucharest, 2001;
Charles King, Marea Neagră. O istorie, translation by
Dorin Branea and Cristina Chevereșan, Publishing
House Brumar, 2005.
2	For the events in the Balkan Peninsula and Asia
Minor in the period 1919-1922, see, among others,
Arnold J. Toynbee, The Eastern Question in Greece
and Turkey, second edition, Howartig Fertig, New
York, 1970; Misha Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999.
Naționalism, War and Great Powers, Granata Books,
London, 1999, p. 378-396; Georges Corm, Europa și
Orientul. De la balcanizare la libanizare. Istoria unei
modernități neîmplinite, Romanian translation by
Ileana Rotund, foreword by Claude Karnoouh, Pub-
lishing House Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1999, p. 105-111;
Barbara Jelavich, Istoria Balcanilor. Secolul al XX-lea, trans-
lation by Mihai Eugen Avădanei, afterword by Ion
Ciupercă, Institutul European, voi. 2, Iași, 2000, p.
120-126, etc.
3	Among the papers on the Conference of
Lausanne, there must be mentioned: Aii Fuad, La
question de Detroits. Ses origines, son evolution, sa
solution ă la Conference de Lausanne, Paris, 1928;
Nicolae Dașcovici, Marea Neagră sau regimul
Strâmtorilor, Iași, 1937; Paul Gogeanu, Strâmtorile
Mării Negre de-a lungul istoriei, Bucharest, 1966;
Nicolae Titulescu, Documente diplomatice, Bucha-
rest, 1967; Ilie Seftiuc, Iulian Cârțână, România și
problema Strâmtorilor, Publishing House Științifică,
Bucharest, 1974; Gheorghe N. Căzan, Problemele
Orientului Apropiat de la războiul mondial la Conferința
de pace de la Lausanne, in Relații internaționale în
perioada interbelică, Bucharest, 1980; Eliza Campus,
Din politica externă a României. 1913-1947, Bucharest,
1987, etc.
4	I.G. Duca, Memorii, volume IV, Războiul, partea
a Il-a (1917-1918), edition and index by Stelian Neagoe,
Publishing House Machiavelli, Bucharest, 1994,
p. 262.
5	Charles and Barbara Jelavich, Formarea statelor
naționale balcanice. 1804-1920, translation by loan
Crețiu, foreword and peer review by professor Camil
Mureșan, Publishing House Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 2002,
p. 365.
6	Nicolae Dașcovici, op. cit., p. 169.
7	Jean Baptiste Duroselle, Istoria relațiilor
internaționale, voi. I, 1919-1939, translation by Anca
Airinei, Publishing House Științelor Sociale și Politice,
Bucharest, 2006, p. 80.
8	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, fund 71/
Greece (1920-1944), volume 35, f. 16.
9	Among the papers on the establishment and
evolution of the Balkan Pact, there must be men-
tioned: Cristian Popișteanu, Antanta Balcanică.
Momente și semnilicații, second edition, Bucharest,
1971; Eliza Campus, înțelegerea Balcanică, Bucharest,
1972; Alexandru Oșca, Gheorghe Nicolescu, Tratate,
convenții și protocoale secrete (1934-1939), Publish-
ing House Vlasie, Pitești, 1994, etc.
10	Romanian Military Archives, fund 948, file no.
493, f. 113-114.
11	Nicolae Titulescu, Discursuri, Publishing House
Științifică, Bucharest, 1967, p. 530.
12	Idem, Documente diplomatice..., p. 803.
13	For the Soviet-Romanian relations, see Relațiile
româno-sovietice, voi. I, 1917-1934, Publishing House
Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 2004, p. 414-434.
62
■ Review of Military History ■
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE LEGAL REGIME
OF THE STRAITS AND ACCESS
TO THE BLACK SEA
(EUXEINOS PONTOS)
Rear Admirai Dr. STYLIANOS POLms
Vice President of the Hellenic Commission on Military History
The access to the Black Sea (Euxeinos Pontos1)
has not been safe since Antiquity. According to
the Greek myth a pair of cliffs, the Gyanean Rocks
(Symplegades) were moving on their bases to-
gether randomly, crushing whatever sought to pass
through the Straits. In order to cross them with
Argo, Jason followed the advice of seer Phineus in
order to cross them with his boat Argo. The Argo-
nauts were given a dove and they were supposed to
let it pass through the Symplegades. If the dove
managed to do so, Argo could try to cross as well.
Otherwise, the operation should be cancelled. Fi-
nally, the dove passed losing only its tail’s feathers
and thus Argo followed. After Argo’s successful
journey, the Rocks stopped moving and became
firmly rooted in the sea.2
This strânge myth resembles the formation of
the legal regime of the Straits. Many tried - like in
the Clashing Rocks - to prohibit the free transit of
ships. The flight though of the dove, which is the
peace Symbol, shows that the existing legal regime
secures the transit of the Straits without obstacles
and establishes stability in the region. Interest on
the Straits, meaning the region of Hellespont or
Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and Bosporus,3
possibly started at the era of the Trojan War which
is not simply a myth of Homer. Then, many years
later, the Persian army and that of Alexander the
Great4 passed through this area but from opposite
directions: the first in 489 BC to take over the
world for imperialistic reasons and the latter in
334 BC in order to stop Persian conquests. At the
time Greece showed all its grandeur! The victori-
ous army Commander did not spread terror and
destruction, but civilisation! That’s why he is the
only conqueror in History who was adored like a
God! There is no doubt that this was the best de-
----■ Review of Military History ■--------------
fence. Wherever he passed, he did not ruin any-
thing but on the contrary he built model cities,
majestic theatres, gyms; he opened new roads,
spread Greek education, established new currency
and developed trade. Plutarch5 in his book “On the
Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander the Great”,
correctly stated that “the countries that did not
meet Alexander did not see the light of sun”.
Arrian6 also notes that Alexander the Great actu-
ally set free the cities he had occupied and estab-
lished liberal regimes. Therefore, the Straits be-
came at the time the bridge over which the Greek
civilisation passed to Asia.7
The transfer of the capital of the vast Roman
Empire to the “New Rome” gave the Straits a great
strategic importance. During the medieval times,
they played an important role to Constantinople’s
defence until its submission to the Ottomans in
1453, when they devolved to the full control of the
Turks. The problems related to the control of the
Straits started in 1774 when the Treaty of Kyuchuk-
Kainardjy between Russia and Turkey regulated
issues of free navigation through the Straits. Then
during the 19* century, the control or the creation
of a special regime to the Straits was the main
target of the Russian Foreign Policy. In 1809 a peace
treaty was signed between England and Turkey,
forbidding the navigation of all warships of any
power. This was a great success for England, which
meanwhile had under its rule Gibraltar and Malta,
and managed to achieve the isolation of the Rus-
sian warships in Euxeinos blocking their access to
the Mediterranean. During the Greek revolution,
Turkey tried many times to deny the navigation
even by commercial ships that were of Greek in-
terests. The Ottoman defeat during the Russian-
Turkish war of 1828-29, obliged the Turks to sign
------------------------------------------1~63~|---
the Hunkiar Iskelesi Treaty on 8 July 1833 accord-
ing which Turkey would close the Dardanelles to
all warships except those coming from the Black
Sea Powers when requested by Russia. This treaty
created the conditions for the absolute Russian
domination of Euxeinos Pontos. As Western pow-
ers were afraid of the consequences of a possible
Russian expansion in the Mediterranean, Britain,
France, Austria and Prussia forced, with the Lon-
don Straits Convention of ÎS"1 July 1841, Russia to
accept that only Turkish warships could pass
through the Straits. The Treaty of Paris on 30
March 1856 closed the Straits to all warships, made
the Black Sea a neutral territory and prohibited
fortifications, naval bases and warships in its re-
gion.
World War I broke out on 28 July 1914 when
Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia and ended on 11
November 1918 when the Allies accepted
Germany’s armistice. It lasted approximately four
years and three months, while peace negotiations
went on for five years. On 28 June 1919 the Treaty
of Versailles was singed and on 10 September that
of Saint-Germain followed by the Trianon on 4
June 1920, the Peace Treaty of Sevres in 1920 and
finally on 24 July 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne which
consists of two parts, the first related to the Straits
which is annulled and the latter on peacekeeping
which is in force until today.
The regime of the Straits started actually get-
ting shape at the San Remo Conference, in Italy
in April 1920. The decisions taken were embodied
in the Treaty of Sevres and got their present form
during the Montreux Convention that replaced fully
all the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty on the
Straits.8 According to the Treaty of Sevres, the
Straits open, both in peace and war, to every ves-
sel of commerce or of war and to military and
commercial aircrafts, without distinction of flag,
were under the control of the Commission of the
Straits. This internațional Commission should have
its own military force in order to secure the
demilitarisation of the region including the Straits,
the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and
Bosporus. The existing fortifications were to be
disarmed and demolished following the Treaty
within three months.9 This treaty was a moral res-
toration for the Great Powers, as well as a political
expediency. If it was implemented, it would stop
----64--------------------------------------------
wars in the Balkans, minimize serious complica-
tions and guarantee until nowadays security in the
region.10 Unfortunately, the Treaty was not en-
forced, although the Sultan’s government signed
it and the Soviet Union recognised with the Treaty
of Moscow on 16 March 1921 the principie of free
navigation to the Straits. In an extremely diplo-
matic way, Turkey achieved its first success. The
Representative of Kemal, Bekir Sami Bey, man-
aged to sign an agreement with the French gov-
ernment in the framework of the London Summit,
which was violating many important provisions of
the Sevres Treaty. On 10 May 1921, the Straits
were pronounced neutral by the High Commis-
sioners of Britain, France and Italy. At the time,
Britain’s foreign policy was against Turkey, strongly
supporting the strengthening of the Guard of the
Straits. On the contrary, France was pro Turkey.
On 20 October 1921, Franklin-Bouillon, a diplomat
representing France, signed the Treaty of Ankara,
the crown of the Turkish efforts to subvert the
Treaty of Sevres - a Treaty described correctly by
the French President Poincare as “more fragile
than the famous porcelains of the town where it
was signed”.
International developments including the re-
treat of the Greek troops from Asia Minor which
started in August 1922, gave Turks the opportunity
to occupy the Straits. However, their plan did not
succeed and they gave up their effort when the
British opposed force. At the same time, the Allies
sent a Note to Kemal on 22 September informing
him that they were considering in a positive way
the Turkish request to get Thrace up to Evros river.
Correspondence resulted to the Armistice of
Mudanya on 11 October 1922 and the Treaty of
Lausanne headed by Lord Curson11 and signed on
21 November 1922. Negotiations lasted many
months, stopped on 4 February 1923 and reopened
on 23 April. The participants were Greece, Tur-
key, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Romania
and Serbia, while USA attended as an observer.
Bulgaria and Russia participated only in the nego-
tiations on the Straits status; Belgium and Portu-
gal settled only financial matters with Turkey.
Greece was represented by Eleftherios Venizelos,12
Turkey by its Foreign Minister, General Ismet
Inbnii, Italy by Prime Minister Benito Mussolini
and France by President Raymond Poincare. The
most important issue for the Great Forces was the
-----------■ Review of Military History ■-----
status of the Straits. Inițial views were completely
contradictory. Soviet Union wished to close the
Straits for its own security, although the Treaty of
Moscow (16 March 1921) had already recognised
the Turkish sovereignty under the condition of
free navigation of merchant ships. Britain wanted
the opposite, i.e. to remain open so as their fleet
could sail through Euxeinos. Finally, the British
proposals prevailed with certain restrictions. The
principie of freedom of transit and navigation by
sea and air, at Hellespont, Propontis and Bosporus
was recognised under certain conditions.13
To secure a satisfactory operation of the sta-
tus of the Straits, the Treaty demilitarized the re-
gions around Bosporus and Hellespont including
the islands at the entrance of the Straits - Imbros,
Tenedos, Mavries, Lemnos and Samothrace.14 An
internațional Commission was also formed under
the supervision of the League of Nations with rep-
resentatives from England, France, Italy, Japan,
Greece, Bulgaria, Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Rus-
sia and Romania headed by Turkey. Demilitariza-
tion regime didn’t really affect Greece as it re-
ferred only to two Greek islands, Lemnos and
Samothrace, as opposed to Turkey. Apart from this,
Turkey did not like the Lausanne status of the
Straits for various reasons. It tried to undermine
with all means, transit ships and created serious
problems by abusing its rights and blocking free
navigation of the Straits.15 It was anxious to find
the right moment to replace it and managed to
supersede it in 1936 with the Montreux Conven-
tion. The Turkish Government invoking rebus sic
stantibus (total change of circumstances) consid-
ered that the Treaty of Lausanne was out-of-date
and called the High Contracting Parties to review
it.16 International conjunctions assisted this suc-
cess as Turkey joined the League of Nations in
1932, Germany denounced the military provisions
of the Treaty of Versailles, Italy was absent from
the Conference of Montreux due to its attack to
Ethiopia, Soviet Union supported with its great
power Turkey and England tried to win Turkey
over so as to have it as an ally in case of war in the
Mediterranean.
According to the provisions of the Montreux
Convention of 1936 the Sea of Marmara and the
Bosporus enjoy complete freedom of transit and
navigation. The Convention has 29 articles, 4 an-
----■ Review of Military History ■---------------
nexes and one protocol,17 and represents the tri-
umph of the Turkish and Soviet interests. After
the abolishment of demilitarisation, Turkey re-
gained its sovereignty right, as well as the military
control of the Straits. The Soviet Union secured
its naval domination in the Black Sea. Greece also
profited as the demilitarisation regime for the is-
lands of Limnos and Samothrace was abolished.18
The restrictions of the new status are registered
in Articles 10,14 and from 18 to 21.19 Only the light
surface war vessels and auxiliary ones belonging
to Black Sea or non-Black Sea Powers enjoy free-
dom to transit through the Straits. The classifica-
tion of ships was based to the existing at the time
criteria, mainly in order to block the transit of
“pocket” battleships. Present ships are not so big,
machine guns have smaller calibres and other
weapons are more effective but completely un-
known when the Convention was drafted, and con-
sequently the above mentioned restriction has lost
its meaning. The rest restrictions though remain
of great importance, especially those referring to
the tonnage and the duration of stay in the Black
Sea. The forces transiting the Straits should not
comprise more than nine vessels and exceed
15,000 tons, while the total aggregate tonnage of
the vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea Pow-
ers should not exceed 30,000 tons and exception-
ally 45,000 tons. No vessels of war can remain in
the Black Sea more than 21 days.
The Montreux Convention imposes restric-
tions to the Black Sea States too, regarding their
exit the Aegean through the Straits. Battleships
and cruisers of any size can individually pass
through the Straits, escorted only by two destroy-
ers.20 Their submarines constructed or purchased
outside the Black Sea, can enter the Black Sea to
reach their bases on condition that a prompt no-
tice is submitted to Turkey. Submarines that are to
be repaired in dockyards outside the Black Sea
must follow the same procedure and give detailed
information to Turkey. In any case, these subma-
rines have to travel by day on the surface and
must pass through the Straits singly.21
The Montreux Convention was implemented
successfully until the beginning of World War II
and during the period that Turkey seemed to be
neutral. In March 1945, the Soviet Union annulled
the Moscow Treaty signed with Turkey in 1925,
65]-----------------------------------------------
and tried to revise radically the status of the
Straits. At the same time it demanded the deploy-
ment of Soviet bases in the Straits, had territorial
claims along the coasts of the Black Sea and ac-
cused Turkey - not in vain - that it was not impar-
țial as a neutral Power but supported the Nazis and
acted against Russia.22 These Soviet views were
expressed officially by a Note on August 1946 which
proposed the free at any time transit and naviga-
tion of all merchant ships and war vessels of the
Black Sea Powers and embargo for all other war
ships belonging to non-Black Sea Powers with the
exception of some cases, non-defined in the Note.
The Soviet Union intended to create a new status
exclusively run by Black-Sea Powers so as to keep
away all other States. It also wished to take over
the defence of the Straits in cooperation with Tur-
key. Turkey was not objecting to a reform of the
existing status, but denied to discuss any proposal
which could offend its sovereign rights and re-
jected Moscow’s request for bases, insisting on
the necessary involvement of Great Britain and
USA to the formation of the new regime. The Turk-
ish government was aware that the Russian in-
volvement to the defence of the Straits would down-
grade their country’s strategic position and bring
them dangerously close to a Power with a differ-
ent political theory aiming to expand its interna-
țional influence. The strong Soviet pressure
brought Turkey closer to England and the USA,
which both eagerly showed their interest to par-
ticipate in a revising conference on the Straits. At
the same time, the United States expressed their
objection to the formation of a new status with
local features, as well as to the Soviet demand to
participate to the defence of the region.
The first country to submit precise proposals,
was the USA on 2 November 1945. The first 3
points of the American Note satisfied the Soviet
requests. The Straits would remain open to the
passage of all merchant ships even in time of war,
as well as to the war vessels of the Black-Sea Pow-
ers, while the passage of all other war ships was
not permitted unless agreed otherwise by the
Black-Sea Forces or unless the ships were part of
a UN operation. These views and the lack of reac-
tions from the British side, surprises us even at
present. At the time, the interest of these two Great
Forces on restricting the Soviet exit to the Medi-
terranean was possibly low or there was an un-
----W-------------------------------------------------
known to the internațional community exchange.
How else can this attitude be explained? Two Great
Powers had no objection to lose their few rights of
access of their war ships to the Black Sea and
were abandoning this maritime region to the So-
viet sovereignty.
This diplomatic activity had no results and
nothing happened. The “cold war” also contrib-
uted to this as gradually the relations between the
East and the West were getting worse. The Truman
Doctrine which literally saved so many States in-
cluding Turkey, brought it closer to the West.23 On
4 April 1949, the signing of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation, formed a strong group of lib-
eral states faithful to the aims and principles of
the UN Chart, with strong deșire to live peacefully
with other people and their governments. On Feb-
ruary 1952 the Alliance was enlarged by the si-
multaneous accession of Turkey and Greece.24
Turkish-Soviet relations were not any more at a
satisfactory level. There was small improvement
on 30 May 1953 when the Soviet Union gave up its
claims on Turkish territories.25
The Montreux Convention had a twenty
years’ validity.26 In 1956 the twenty years expired,
but it was not revised and is still into force. It is a
fact that it operated and continues to do so in a
satisfactory way. The Soviet Union used its rights
and its war ships were Crossing very often the
Straits in their way into the Mediterranean. Many
submarines coming from Arctic and Baltic bases27
also joined the Soviet fleet. The United States of
America have not signed the Convention, but they
have fully respected it. In their efforts to keep it
alive, they have been sending their ships to the
Black Sea following carefully its provisions. Tur-
key though created many problems despite its con-
tractual obligation. It tried to regulate the naviga-
tion regime of the Straits with unilateral acts. It
issued relevant Turkish regulations in 1994 and
1998 as well as restricting navigating measures in
November 2002. Within this framework, Turkey
expressed strongly its wish to replace the names
“Straits of Dardanelles, Sea of Marmara and
Bosphorus” or “Straits”28 that appear on the terms
of the Convention by others such as Turkish Straits
or Cannakale Straits, Instanbul Straits in order to
include them gradually to their Regulations and to
overthrow the validity of the Montreux Conven-
-----------■ Review of Military History ■-------
tion as well as the internațional guarantees of free
navigation that Montreux enacts.29 Turkey has
implemented a Maritime Traffic Regulation of the
Turkish Straits since 1 July 1994, in order to con-
trol transit of the Straits. This Regulation violates
the Convention. The International Maritime Or-
ganization (IMO) urged caution on it in May 1994
to avoid further action from Turkey. The fact that
the increased traffic in the Straits causes prob-
lems and could create dangers, cannot ignored.
On the other hand, if Turkey wanted to contribute
positively to these problems, it could bring the
matter for discussion in the IMO and ask interna-
țional Community to take the necessary measures
instead of trying to annul unilaterally the Montreux
Convention. This was also the spirit of the IMO
Legal Committee during the relevant Assembly in
October 1994. Turkey though instead of modifying
its Regulation, it published instructions on its imple-
mentation and not adjustments according to the
Convention. Taking it into account during its As-
sembly, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC 65)
adopted its President’s conclusions regarding the
navigation through the Straits following the IMO
Rules and Recommendations, and pointed out the
need to conform to the internațional law and the
1936 Montreux Convention. It also advised Gov-
ernments and International Organisations to re-
fer all technical issues arising during the transit of
the Straits, to the sub-Committee of the Maritime
Safety (NAV) of the IMO, which is the competent
body for their solution. On November 1995, the
19lh Plenary Session of the IMO adopted the Regu-
lation and Recommendations for maritime traffic
through the Straits that were agreed upon previ-
ous MSCs (63 - March 1994). It confirmed that
they aim to the protection of the maritime traffic
and environment in the area of the Straits, and
don’t influence the rights of ships passing through
the Straits as these are provided by International
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 and the
Montreux Convention of 1936. Furthermore, it
mentioned that the Turkish Code of Regulation
should be in full compliance with them. Following a
Russian inițiative, the final Resolution included a
proposal for the establishment of an International
Commission to observe the Turkish Traffic Regu-
lation and the passage through the Straits. Turkey
though stated that it was not sharing its right to
speak on Straits. However, when unilateral acts by
a contracting party of the Convention, consist se-
---■ Review of Military History ■---------
rious violation of internațional law, cannot annul
or replace internațional agreements. All parties
believe that the status of the Montreux Conven-
tion should not be offended, especially regarding
the right of free navigation under no excuse.
The end of the “cold war” influenced consid-
erably the dangers arising from the non-implemen-
tation of the status secured by Montreux. Initia-
tives also on its reform by those States that had
reasons to ask for it were reduced, with the excep-
tion of Turkey which continues to insist but not as
strongly. Nowadays, the dispute between East and
West does not exist any more and the role of NATO
has been redefined after the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact. At the 5th NATO Enlargement in
2004, seven new members joined the Alliance, in-
cluding two Black-Sea Powers, Bulgaria and Ro-
mânia.30 Last year these two countries also joined
the EU. Turkey which has been a NATO member
since 1952, is hopefully going to access it soon.
The ties between the States interested in the
Straits, are continuously getting closer and make
the future look more optimistic. The basic condi-
tion though is the maintenance of the legal re-
gime of the Motreux Convention and its strict
implementation, through which peace and pros-
perity can be secured.
1	The historical name of the sea between the south-
east Europe and Minor Asia. It is connected to the
Mediterranean via Bosporus and the Sea of Marmara.
The name changed to Black Sea because of the bad
weather which usually exists. The original name
Euxeinos Pontos in the contrary means “hospitable
sea”. Countries bordering it are Bulgaria, Georgia,
Ukraina, Romania, Russia and Turkey.
2	Argonaut expedition is a mythic trip with a ship
named Argo on board of which were all the principie
heroes of ancient Greece headed by Jason. Their
destination was Colchis, the eastern point of Euxeinos
Pontos.
3	According to the introduction of the Montreux
Convention: "... the Straits of the Dardanelles, the
Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus comprised under
the general term ‘Straits’... “.
4	Alexander in ancient Greek means “he who re-
pulses fighters”. His father’s name was Philippos,
meaning “friend of horses” and his mother’s one Olym-
	[67-------------------------------------------
pias. Her name comes from the word “Olympos”, the
mountain where ancient Greek Gods lived.
5	Plutarch lived approx. from 45 to 120 AD. He
was horn in Chaeronea, Boeotia and was a priest for
Apollo at the Oracle of Delphi. He travelled a lot and
was an important historian and biographer.
6	Known as Flavius Arrianus, he was horn around
105 AD in Nicomedia, Asia Minor and was a military
commander as well as a great historian, philosopher
and geographer. He also became a priest for Demeter
and Persephone. He was holding high military and
political command in the Roman Empire. He died af-
ter 146 AD.
7	Cf. J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander
the Great, translated by K. Koliopoulos.
8	Its preface is clear and cannot be misunderstood:
“...Desiring to regulate transit and navigation in the
Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and
the Bosphorus comprised under the general term
“Straits” in such manner as to safeguard, within the
framework of Turkish security and of the security, in
the Black Sea, of the riparian States, the principie
enshrined in Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace signed
at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923; Have resolved to
replace by the present Convention the Conven-
tion signed at Lausanne on the 24,h July, 1923,
and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries ....”.
9	V. Moschopoulos, The Issue of the Straits - Con-
tribution to the Diplomatic History, p. 101; Ch.
Nikolaou, International Political and Military Treaties
- Conventions and Agreements, pp. 255-60.
10	Cf. G. Christodoulou, Diplomatic History of
Modern Europe, pp. 50-1.
11	Foreign Minister of Great Britain.
12	Greek politician horn in Mournies, Chania in
1864 and died in 1936. He was elected many times
Prime Minister and played an important role in the
country’s political life.
13	Cf. K. I. Skaltsas, The Treaty of Lausanne. Politi-
cal and Diplomatic Comments, pp. 14-7.
14	This was the only reason for demilitarisations
and not Turkey’s security. If the Turkish security
against the Greek threat, was one of the reasons,
then the restrictions would not extend so much on
Turkey’s territories. See S. Politis, Demilitarization
and the legal regime of the Aegean islands according
to internațional law, p. 247 et seq.
15	See Moschopoulos, op.cit., supra footnote 8,
pp. 100-11.
16	E. Roukounas, International Law, voi. 1. p. 165.
17	The attached Protocol refers to direct
remilitarisation only from the part of Turkey. Accord-
ing to article 3 “The present Protocol shall enter into
force as from this day’s date”, i.e. from 20 Junly 1936
and not on 9 November 1939 that the Convention
was implemented. This special provision gave Turkey
—w------------------------------------------------
the privilege to exercise its rights earlier, without
though depriving all other States of any right coming
into effect after the enforcement of the Montreux
Convention. See H. Pazarci, The Demilitarisation
Regime of the Eastern Aegean Islands, Greek transla-
tion A. Alexandris -K. Economides, The Legal Re-
gime of the Greek Islands in the Aegean - Reply to a
Turkish Study, p. 147.
18	See: Politis, op. cit. supra footnote 13. On 31
July 1936, during a debate in the Turkish National
Assembly on the ratification of the Montreux Conven-
tion, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rustu
Aras, declared full of joy: “the provisions concerning
the islands of Limnos and Samothrace which belong
to our friend and neighbour, Greece, and which had
been demilitarized by the Lausanne Convention in
1923, are abolished also by the Convention of
Montreux and we are particularly pleased about this...
By this opportunity I wish to point out one of the
features of new Turkey’s policy: to wish our friends
what we wish for ourselves and never wish for them
as well as for any other power, what we consider
unfair” See: Turkish Gazette of Great National As-
semblies, voi. 12, assembly 31 July 1936, p. 309.
19	Article 10. In time of peace, light surface ves-
sels, minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels, whether
belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, and
whatever their flag, shall enjoy freedom of transit
through the Straits without any taxes or charges what-
ever, provided that such transit is begun during day-
light and subject to the conditions laid down in Ar-
ticle 13 and the Articles following thereafter. Vessels
of war other than those which fall within the catego-
ries specified in the preceding paragraph shall only
enjoy a right of transit under the special conditions
provided by Articles 11 and 12. Article 14. The maxi-
mum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval forces
which may be in course of transit through the Straits
shall not exceed 15.000 tons, except in the cases
provided for in Article 11 and in Annex 111 to the
present Convention. The forces specified in the pre-
ceding paragraph shall not, however, comprise more
than nine vessels. Vessels, whether belonging to Black
Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, paying visits to a port in
the Straits, in accordance with the provisions of Ar-
ticle 17, shall not be included in this tonnage. Nei-
ther shall vessels of war which have suffered damage
during their passage through the Straits be included
in this tonnage; such vessels, while undergoing re-
pair, shall be subject to any special provisions relat-
ing to security laid down by Turkey. Article 18. (1)
The aggregate tonnage which non-Black Sea Powers
may have in that sea in time of peace shall be limited
as follows: (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b)
below, the aggregate tonnage of the said Powers shall
not exceed 30.000 tons; (b) If at any time the ton-
------------■ Review of Military History ■-----------
nage ot the strongest fleet in the Black Sea shall
exceed by at least 10.000 tons the tonnage of the
strongest fleet in that sea at the date of the signature
of the present Convention, the aggregate tonnage of
30.000 tons mentioned in paragraph (a) shall be in-
creased by the same amount, up to a maximum of
45,000 tons. For this purpose, each Black Sea Power
shall, in conformity with Annex IV to the present Con-
vention, inform the Turkish Government, on the 1 st
January and the Ist July of each year, of the total
tonnage of its fleet in the Black Sea; and the Turkish
Government shall transmit this information to the
other High Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-
General of the League of Nations; (c) The tonnage
which any one non-Black Sea Power may have in the
Black Sea shall be limited to two-thirds of the aggre-
gate tonnage provided for in paragraphs (a) and (b)
above; (d) In the event, however, of one or more non-
Black Sea Powers desiring to send naval forces into
the Black Sea, for a humanitarian purpose, the said
forces, which shall in no case exceed 8.000 tons alto-
gether, shall be allowed to enter the Black Sea with-
out having to give the notification provided for in
Article 13 of the present Convention, provided an
authorisation is obtained from the Turkish Govern-
ment in the following circumstances: if the figure of
the aggregate tonnage specified in paragraphs (a) and
(b) above has not been reached and will not be ex-
ceeded by the dispatch of the forces which it is de-
sired to send, the Turkish Government shall grant
the said authorisation within the shortest possible
time after receiving the request which has been ad-
dressed to it; if the said figure has already been reached
or if the dispatch of the forces which it is desired to
send will cause it to be exceeded, the Turkish Gov-
ernment will immediately inform the other Black Sea
Powers of the request for authorisation, and if the
said Powers make no objection within twenty-four
hours of having received this information, the Turkish
Government shall, within forty-eight hours at the lat-
est, inform the interested Powers of the reply which
it has decided to make to their request. Any further
entry into the Black Sea of naval forces of non-Black
Sea Powers shall only be effected within the available
limits of the aggregate tonnage provided for in para-
graphs (a) and (b) above. (2) Vessels of war belonging
to non-Black Sea Powers shall not remain in the Black
Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever be the ob-
ject of their presence there. Article 19. In time of
war, Turkey not being belligerent, warships shall en-
joy complete freedom of transit and navigation
through the Straits under the same conditions as those
laid down in Article 10 to 18. Vessels of war belonging
to belligerent Powers shall not however, pass through
the Straits except in cases arising out of the applica-
tion of Article 25 of the present Convention, and in
cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of ag-
gression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance
binding-Turkey, concluded within the framework of
the Covenant of the League of Nations, and regis-
tered and published in accordance with the provisions
of Article 18 of the Covenant. In the excepțional cases
provided for in the preceding paragraph, the limita-
tions laid down in Article 10 to 18 of the present
Convention shall not be applicable. Notwithstanding
the prohibition of passage laid down in paragraph 2
above, vessels of war belonging to belligerent Pow-
ers, whether they are Black Sea Powers or not, which
have become separated from their bases, may return
thereto. Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Pow-
ers shall not make any capture, exercise the right of
visit and search, or carry out any hostile act in the
Straits. Article 20. In time of war, Turkey being bel-
ligerent, the provisions of Articles 10 to 18 shall not
be applicable; the passage of warships shall be left
entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government.
Article 21. Should Turkey consider herself to be
threatened with imminent danger of war she shall
have the right to apply the provisions of Article 20 of
the present Convention. Vessels which have passed
through the Straits before Turkey has made use of
the powers conferred upon her by tbe preceding para-
graph, and which thus find themselves separated from
their bases, may return thereto. It is, however, under-
stood that Turkey may deny this right to vessels of
war belonging to the State whose attitude has given
rise to the application of the present Article. Should
the Turkish Government make use of the powers con-
ferred by the first paragraph of the present Article, a
notification to that effect shall be addressed to the
High Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the League of Nations. If the Council of the
League of Nations decide by a majority of two-thirds
that the measures thus taken by Turkey are not justi-
fied, and if such should also be the opinion of the
majority of the High Contracting Parties signatories
to the present Convention, the Turkish Government
undertakes to discontinue the measures in question
as also any measures which may have been taken un-
der Article 6 of the present Convention.
20	Article 11. Black Sea Powers may send through
the Straits capital ships of tonnage greater than that
laid down in the first paragraph of Article 14, on condi-
tion that these vessels pass through the Straits sin-
gly, escorted by not more than two destroyers.
21	Article 12. Black Sea Powers shall have the
right to send through the Straits, for the purpose of
rejoining their base, submarines constructed or pur-
chased outside the Black Sea, provided that adequate
notice of the laying down or purchase of such subma-
rines shall have been given to Turkey. Submarines
belonging to the said Powers shall also be entitled to
■ Review of Military History ■
pass through the Straits to be repaired in dockyards
outside the Black Sea on condition that detailed infor-
mation on the matter is given to Turkey. In either
case, the said submarines must travel by day and on
the surface, and must pass though the Straits singly.
22	See Barry Buzan, “The Status and Future of the
Montreux Convention”, p. 161; Frank G. Weber, The
Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Questfora
Turkish Alliance in the Second World War.
23	Cf. Barry Buzan, op. cit. supra footnote 21, p.
163.
24	S. Politis, NATO Establishment and Enlarge-
ment.
25	This issue was finally closed with an agreement
on the redemarcation of the Turkish-Soviet borders
on December 1973.
26	See article 28.
27	On 18 July 1976, Russia violated the Conven-
tion by sending Kiev aircraft carrier to join its fleet in
the Mediterranean. Although that ship had a 14,700
square meter flight deck, arrestor wires, a bow ski-
jump and the carrier consisted of helicopters and 30
vertical launched aircrafts, the Soviet claimed that it
was not an aircraft carrier but a large antisubmarine
cruiser because of its aircrafts. This type of ships were
not included into the ones restricted by the Conven-
tion and for this reason it was entitled to cross the
Straits. Barry Buzan, op. cit. supra footnote 21, pp.
159-60.
28	These names have a Greek origin. The word
Dardanelles comes from Dardania, Dardanos’ town,
son of Zeus and Electra, 8 km from Kephez Burnu on
the cost of Asia Minor; Marmara comes from the Greek
word for marble and Bosphorus from the ox passage
according to the Ancient Greek myth of Io, Zeus’
mistress.
29	See Y. Inan, A Turkish view on the Current Re-
gime of the Turkish Straits, pp. 87-99.
30	The other States were Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. See Politis, op. cit.
supra footnote 23.
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■ Review of Military History ■
THE PARTICIPATION OF ROMANIA
AND GREECE AT BSEC
COOPERATION THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN THE BALKANS
ȘERBAN FILIP CIOCULESCU
Researcher of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense
and Military History
During the Cold War era, the Black Sea has
been a Soviet lake with a strategic “clasp” provided
by Turkish control on the Straits. After the end of
the bipolar rivalry, the existing riparian States and
the newly independent ones felt the need to set up
an instituțional framework, in order to go beyond
the classical “neorealist” (using International
Relations theory vocabulary) zero-sum game for
power and security maximization. They wanted to
(re)invent the logic of cooperation and mutual trust,
and create a common understanding of the new
security environment characterized by globali-
zation and regionalization. More precisely, they
wanted a better mutual understanding and confi-
dence, a safe politic and economic climate and
good neighborly relations.
Therefore, the Organization of the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) has been created
June 1992 as an informai intergovernmental
framework for promoting trade and economic
cooperation in this area and was lately turned into
an internațional economic organization on 1 May
1999, following the coming into force of its Charter
signed in June 1998 in Yalta, when it received legal
identity on the internațional scene. It became a
tool for multilateral cooperation, knew the
instituțional spectacular development and quickly
specialized in “soft security” issues: economy, trade,
environment, culture, Science etc.1 Worth to
remember that the Istanbul Summit Declaration
from June 25, 1992, a kind of birth-certificate for
the new organization, stipulated that it main goal
“is to ensure that the Black Sea becomes a sea of
peace, stability and prosperity, striving to promote
friendly and good-neighborly relations” among the
region’s States.2
BSEC is important especially because it covers
a huge territory encompassing the areas of the
----■ Review of Military History ■-----------
Black Sea littoral States, the Balkans and the
Caucasus, with an area of nearly 20 million square
kilometers. The BSEC-covered region is located
on two continents: Europe and Asia.3 Demo-
graphically, BSEC represents a region of about 350
million people and a foreign trade capacity of over
USD 300 billion annually. Analysts noted that after
2000, the BSEC countries had the fastest economic
growth in the world, with 6% GDP increase and a
growing rhythm 3,5 times bigger than that of the
Euro zone.4 In 2006, the foreign direct investments
was 72 billion USD. After the Persian Gulf region,
it is the second-largest source of oii and natural
gas along with its rich proven reserves of minerals
and metals. It is becoming Europe’s major transport
and energy transfer corridor, as the Greater Black
Sea Area is a transit space for the oii and gas
coming from Central Asia and the Caspian basin.
Certainly, Greece and Romania are among the
main countries benefiting from the economic rise
of this region. Even in Romania exports more than
65% of its goods in the EU States, there are at least
20% of its exports going to the Black Sea region. At
the same time, the number of commercial
transactions between BSEC countries and Greece
almost quadrupled between 1992 and 2003, and is
continuing to increase rapidly.5 They have a
common interest in the development of a regional
wide market and regional infrastructures.
Romania has been, since the beginning, an
enthusiastic supporter of the Turkish inițiative for
setting up BSEC and the first session of the working
group which put the basis for the new organization
held its consultations in Bucharest in 1991.
The BSEC has its headquarters in Istanbul and
is made up of 13 member States: Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Republic
of Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, the Russian
----------------------------------------P73~|----
Federation, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. FYROM
is expected to clarify its status, especially by
ratifying in its Parliament the Treaty of accession.
So, through Albania, Serbia and Montenegro,
BSEC connects the Black Sea and the Balkans
areas. The observer countries are: Austria, Bela-
rus, Croația, the Czech Republic, Egypt, France,
Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Tunisia,
the US, as well as the International Black Sea Club
and the Energy Charter Secretariat Black Sea
Commission - also play an active role within BSEC.
Among the most important areas of cooperation
within BSEC one should mention the combat
against organized crime. Romania has a tradition
in this field, because at the second BSEC summit,
onjune 30,1995, in Bucharest, itpushed towards
the decision to agree with the combat against
organized crime, traffic of drugs, weapons and
radioactive stuffs as a new realm of activity for the
organization. The Hellenic Republic has been also
a strong supporter of the combat against crime
and terrorism, and on October 1998, in Korfu, the
States signed “The Agreement among the
Governments of the BSEC participating States on
cooperation in combating crime, in particular in
its organized froms”. At the Kiev summit, in March
2002, it was signed the Additional Protocol
establishing the BSEC Network of Liaison Officers
for combating crime, which entered into force in
April 2003.
A real success was the organizing in Romania
of the “Regional Conference on Strengthening of
the Criminal-Justice Response to Trafficking in
Persons in the Black Sea Region”, included in the
BSEC - UNODC Project on “Strengthening of the
Criminal-Justice Response to Trafficking in Persons
in the Black Sea Region”, under the supervision of
Romanian Ministry of Interior and Administrative
Reform in July 2008. Romania is the Country-
Coordinator for the WG on Combating Crime for
the terni May 2007-April 2009. Together with
Greece, which hosted a meeting of this WG in
December 3,2004, the member States adopted the
Additional Protocol on Combating Terrorism to the
Agreement among the Governments of the Black
Sea Economic Cooperation Participating States on
Cooperation in Combating Crime, in Particular In
Its Organized Forms.
Romania was also a coordinating-country for
the following working groups: “transportations”
and “science and technology”, the last group being
currently chaired by Bulgaria, between May 2008
and April 2010.6 The Hellenic Republic is the
Country Coordinator for the WG on Banking and
Finance for the term November 2006 - October
2008, for the WG on Culture between November
2006 and October 2008, and also for the WG on
Instituțional Renewal and Good Governance
between May 2007 and April 2009.
Romania contributed to the BSEC activities,
especially by supporting a strengthening coo-
peration between BSEC and the EU and framing a
partnership, immediately after the EU launched
its European Neighborhood Policy. It favored the
security and stability dimension in the Black Sea,
by cooperating for drafting a concept for more
involvement of the organization in this filed. Also
it launched a reflection process on the future of
BSEC, supported the economic exchanges in the
region and the States from SE Europe and
Caucasus in their democratic transition. Romania
also launched the reform and restructuring process
of BSEC for more effectiveness and visibility. The
Bucharest Statement “Towards the 15lh anniver-
sary of BSEC”, adopted by consensus, expressed
the common will for implementing key-decisions,
reform and restructuring the BSEC, enhance the
observer States’ contributions. One should mention
the additional protocol to the convention for
fighting organized crime, with a special emphasis
on terrorism, but also a memorandum of agreement
between BSEC and SECI Centre of Bucharest in
order for the centre to share its experience with
the organization, and also the fact that Romania,
as an EU and NATO member, committed itself to
support and promote the BSEC goals within these
organizations’ agendas for more visibility.
During Romania’s OSCE presidency, between
November 2005 and April 2006, the main goals has
been accomplished: developing a partnership
relation between EU and BSEC, supporting States
from eastern Europe and Caucasus, the reflection
process on the future of the organization, mobilizing
member States to implement projects for regional
development, developing trade exchanges among
BS countries, enhancing BSEC cooperation with
other internațional and regional organizations.
So, Romania is very interested in attracting
more investments in Greater Black Sea Area (by
improving the investment climate), developing
energy and communication, transport infrastruc-
tures and improving the trade environment, also
-----------■ Review of Military History ■-------
in the protection of the environment, which in a
compulsory EU requirement.
Regarding the energy corridors, Bucharest
strongly supports Nabucco gas pipeline, a big EU
project, which is said by many analysts to be the
geo-economic “rival” of the Blue Stream II and
South Stream (the Russian parallel projects), not
because it is seeing the building of energy corridors
like a zero-sum game between Russia and the EU
States, but because this pipeline coming from
Azerbaijan and Turkey to Austria would ensure the
beginning of a real energy independence for the
EU States towards Russia.7 EU imports too much
of its natural gas from a single country, Russia, or
from sources that are under Russian control - more
than 30% from the total imports and it’s foreseen
to have about 65-80% in 2020. Thus, EU needs to
diversify its suppliers.8 Unfortunately, up to now,
BSEC does not have a real decision-making power
concerning the transit corridors and the inter-
states negotiations are usually bilateral not
multilateral. It would be very useful to have a wide
and deep cooperative framework among EU, BSEC
and Russia in the realm of energy sharing and
transportation, but a prior condition would be the
signing and ratification of the European Energy
Charter by Russia and all the other interested States
and common rules for the access on energy
infrastructures markets.
In order to have good assessment of the
security situation in the Black Sea region, one
needs a conundrum of academic and practicai
experience. Consequently, Greece’s efforts to link
the academics and policy-makers in the Black Sea
area were crowned by the setting up of the
International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS),
headquartered in Athens, a project warmly
supported by Romania. In 2008, the International
Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) is celebrating
its tenth year of existence and is may be the main
academic think tank dedicated to the study of
security, politics and economy in the region, thus
serving as a very important expertise provider for
governments and for the BSEC executive structures.
The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank,
which is the organization’s main funding me-
chanism, is based in Thessaloniki and has an
important role in promoting financial stability and
investments in this region. Concerning Romania,
“the BSTDB will focus in the next four years on
providing financial support to large and medium
sized companies engaged in particular in export
generating activities, infrastructure and financial
sector” (Romania - CountryStrategy2007-2010)2
Greece has a strategy which insists on the benefits
of regional cooperation for promoting investments
and trade in neighboring States - “instead, for
operations undertaken in Greece, the Bank needs
to focus most on fulfillment of the regional
cooperation aspect of its mandate. Promoting
regional cooperation is important for Greece,
which borders on countries with which investment
and commercial ties had remained at very low
levels for decades. As a result, much remains to be
done to interconnect with neighboring countries
in order to improve relative efficiencies, realize
economies of scale, and achieve better comple-
mentarity. (Greece - CountryStrategy2007-2010,
Thessaloniki, December 200610) In June 2008, at
the lOth Annual Meeting in St. Petersburg of the
Board of Governors, the Black Sea Bank posted
some impressive results for 2007 financial year,
“with 60% growth of outstanding portfolio and 15%
increase in operating income. The amount of
approved operations exceeded USD 1,3 billion”.11
Romania was also deeply involved in the drafting
and adoption of the BSEC Economic Agenda for
the Future.
On 1 May 2006, for the first time, a Greek
representative, Ambassador, L. Chrysanthopoulos,
assumed the post of Secretary General of the
BSEC Permanent International Secretariat; he was
elected, through consensus, by the Council of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the BSEC member
States.
Greece had the chairmanship previously in
May-October 1999 and Athens tookthe necessary
actions to ensure the BSEC observer status at the
UN General Assembly. The inițiative to strengthen
relations between the BSEC and the UN was
adopted in 2000 by the UN General Assembly. In
November 2006, the BSEC signed an agreement
with the United Nations Development Programme,
for the joint implementation of the Black Sea Trade
and Investment Promotion Programme. This
pioneering programme is funded jointiy by Greece
and Turkey, with a symbolic financial contribution
from the BSEC. The BSEC completed negotiations
with the OECD Development Center on imple-
menting a programme entitled “Black Sea and
■ Review of Military History ■
75
Central Asia Outlook jointly with the OECD and
OSCE”. This programme proposed by the OECD
concerns a cooperation framework already agreed
upon with the OSCE. BSEC-OECD cooperation
under this programme was approved at the BSEC
Foreign Ministers Meeting in Moscow in January
2006. Greece’s financial contribution to this
programme comes up to 200,000 euros annually
for its three-year duration.
Within the framework of the lst meeting of
BSEC Foreign Ministers (Thessaloniki, 1999) a
Decision was adopted, on Greece’s inițiative,
regarding the Organization’s contribution toward
achieving the objectives of the Stability Pact for
Southeastern Europe, and particularly with regard
to the activities of the second and third Working
Table on economic reconstruction, development,
justice and internai affairs. Greece and Romania
are now active in the Regional Cooperation Council,
the body which replaced in February 2008 the
Stability Pact.
Greece organized during its presidency seven
ministerial meetings on transport, tourism, energy,
combat against organized crime, education,
research, technology, good governance. Between
November 2004-April 2005 and November 2005 and
April 2006, during their presidency terms,
Bucharest and Athens made substanțial efforts to
enhance the cooperative framework and ensure a
regular participation of the EU in BESC activities,
through the observer status. Bucharest and Athens
reached a common position also in September
2005, when the Ministers of countries that belong
to BSEC adopted a ‘BSEC Action Plan on coope-
ration in Science and technology’, because they
acknowledge the extreme importance of these
activities in the future development of the Black
Sea countries, in a globalized world.
Building relations between EU and BSEC
obviously had been the main goal of both Romania
and Hellenic Republic’s presidencies of the BSEC.
Thus, the central focus of Greece’s Chairmanship
of the BSEC (2004-2005) was bringing the BSEC
closer to the EU12 and this is an extremely
important common point with Romania. Worth to
mention that the Summit Declaration of the Heads
of State and Government of the BSEC Member
States from Moscow, on 25 October 1996, affirmed
their political will to cooperate with the EU in fields
of common interest and invited the EU institutions
to work out a common platform for developing
----W--------------------------------------------
closer contacts and cooperation.13 In 1997 the
European Commission submitted to the EU
Council a Communication on Regional co-
operation in the Black Sea area: State of play,
perspectives for EU action encouraging its further
development, but only on 30 April 1999 the
Platform for Cooperation between BSEC and the
EU was adopted by the BSEC CMFA in Tbilisi.
It is within the framework of this objective that
all the Ministerial Meetings and Working Group
meetings were held; that the Extraordinary
Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials took
place in Brussels in April 2005 and that the 15,h
Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the BSEC member States adopted the
Komotini Declaration. The International Center
for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) supported with a
theoretical perspective the Komotini project.14
Following this meeting and the Komotini ministerial
declaration, a special mandate was given to the
Greek presidency by the BSEC Foreign Ministers
in 2005 to proceed to the necessary consultations
with the organs of the EU and to examine the
potențial for creating a new EU regional Dimension
in the wider Black Sea area, along the lines of the
EU Nordic Dimension. Logically, Romania and
Greece openly supported the Declaration endorsed
by the BSEC Ministerial Council from Chișinău, in
October 2005, which asked for a wide partnership
between EU and BSEC in areas like trade, develo-
pment, energy and transport infrastructures,
combating terrorism and organized crime,
protection of the environment and good gover-
nance.
In September 2006, the European Commission
made a positive recommendation for strengthening
EU-BSEC relations and announced the drawing
up of a new Communique with the regard to EU
regional policy for the Black Sea region and the
future role of the BSEC in implementing this policy.
Based on the abovementioned special mandate,
our country has played an important role in
changing the climate in relations between the EU
and the BSEC.
In 2006-2007, this Black Sea regional dimension
was born, especially during the German EU
presidency, with substanțial Greek and Romanian
efforts made within EU and BSEC. 15The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic prepared
a Working Paper entitled “ Towards an EU Regional
Dimension in the Wider Black Sea Area”, which
-----------■ Review of Military History ■------
was presented at the meeting of the Working Party
on Eastern Europe and Central Asia in Brussels,
in January 2006. A second meeting of the BSEC
Committee of Senior Officials with representatives
of EU institutions and member States took place in
Brussels on 11 April 200616. The Committee of
Senior Officials endorsed in January 2007, in
Istanbul, the Working Paper on BSEC-EU interac-
tion and it became an ofiicial document named
BSEC-EU Interaction: 7he BSECApproach.17 The
documenthas been drafted byICBSS. This policy
paper underlined the common aims of both these
organizations, the fields of cooperation and the
goals to be fulfilled by the BSEC using the synergy
with the EU18.
Romania, through the voice of former minister
of foreign affairs, Mihai R. Ungureanu, took part on
22 January 2007 at the CAGRE meeting in Brussels,
and asked for a Black Sea regional dimension of the
CFSP. He mentioned the need for a balanced
relation between the Eastern and Southern
dimension of the ENP and proposed an extension
of the Barcelona Process and the setting up of a
Bucharest process, to be included in the ENP.19
Eventually, the European Commission’s
communique entitled Black Sea Synergy A New
Regional Cooperation Inițiative was issued on 11
April 2007 and may form the basis for future BSEC
cooperation, because it is building on the ideas from
“BSEC-EU Interaction” document. The EU’s Black
Sea Synergy stated that “the EU, however, should
be ready to strengthen contacts with regional
organizations. The EU’s Black Sea regional
inițiative aims at a comprehensive approach
including all countries in the region; therefore the
wide membership of the Organization of the Black
Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the fact
that Russia and Turkey are its founding members
is a decisive advantage and could substantially
contribute to the success of Black Sea Synergy.
EU-BSEC links would serve primarily for dialogue
at the regional level. This might include meetings
between senior officials with a view to better
coordinate concrete projects”.20 BSEC welcomed
this document and prepared its reception using its
own mechanisms. The BSEC Approach and the
Black Sea Synergy are the two main documents
which ensures a common instituțional ground for
dealing with this region.
Romania and Greece, together with Bulgaria,
are the only EU members which are also BSEC
----■ Review of Military History ■-------------
members; therefore they had a common interest
in linking, as strongly as possible, these orga-
nizations. If Turkey will also join, then the EU will
have a stronger presence within BSEC. The Czech
Republic, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Poland
and Slovakia have an observer status within BSEC.
Because some of the BSEC States are participating
is the European Neighborhood Policy (Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine), the
cooperative framework becomes more and more
important and it’s absolutely necessary for the EU,
in order to build a Black Sea regional dimension, to
have deep and positive relations with BSEC.
Eventually, the European Commission applied for
and was granted the observer status of the BSEC
on 25 June 2007 at the organization’s 15lh Anni-
versary Summit which was held in Istanbul.
The Greek proposals contained within the
Komotini declaration were partially implemented
during the Serbian Chairmanship of BSEC. These
proposals included the construction of a ring-road
around the Black Sea named “The Argonauts
Road”, to begin at Alexandropolis, Crossing Turkey
through the new bridge over the river Evros,
skirting the Black Sea and returning to Alexan-
dropolis, the construction of some parts of the Pan-
European Corridor X (86 km in Serbia, 33 km in
FYROM and roads in Albania) and also the Greek
proposal for sea corridors, i.e., connections bet-
ween the ports of the Black Sea and the ports of
the Aegean Sea. Therefore, Greece, supported by
Romania and other BSEC States, managed to create
connections between the markets of the Black Sea
and Balkan countries.
It seems that the key-element for deeper
partnership between BSEC and EU would be a
closer relation between Brussels and Moscow, thus
meaning also that Russia should give up its
tendency to divide EU and establish preferențial
relations with some member countries.
Romania played a significant role in other two
initiatives within the Black Sea region: the
establishment of the Black Sea Universities
Network (BSUN) and the setting up in 2007 of the
Black Sea Euro-region, under the aegis of the
Council of Europe. All BSEC States are members
in the Council of Europe, this is an important factor
for improving stability through cooperation. In June
2006, Romania launched the Black Sea Forum for
Dialogue and Partnership, a cooperation inițiative
aimed at strengthening the dialogue and mutual
77
confidence among the region’s countries. Together
with the Community of Democratic Choice and
other regional initiatives like GUAM, all of them
contributed to the enhancement of regional coo-
peration and exchanges, fostering a better security
environment.
Romania and Greece are both generally satis-
fied regarding the huge achievements fulfilled
under BSEC umbrella, but they also acknowledge
some problems which need Solutions, like the lack
of effectiveness in sensitive realms such as energy
infrastructures, proliferation of weapons, frozen
conflicts, also the slow mechanism of implementing
decisions and the lack of sufficient financial funds.
Together will the other members, they will try to
improve its activity and expand its cooperation
areas, for the well-being of the region’s peoples.
We are, now, at the beginning of a new century,
which we hope will bring much more cooperation
and a more stable environment than the previous
one. There is a need for more cooperation in the
Black Sea Area and even in the Balkans, of
identifying common interests and common visions.
Following the end of the Cold War, the internațional
community found new perspectives and new
mechanisms for ensuring regional cooperation and
stability.
As we all know, the Western Balkans had been
an area of confrontation, turmoil and instability
for a very long time. Now, the situation seems more
stable and predictable, as most of the countries in
Western Balkans are on their way to EU and NATO
integration. What the community of experts and
the policy makers had the opportunity to see, during
these long years, is that the logic of cooperation is
much more profitable and useful than the logic of
confrontation. Those States and also ethnic-
religious communities that tries to play a zero-sum
game against their neighbors and ‘rivals’ usually
failed in their strategies, had a difficult and inco-
nomy went bad. All of them eventually understood
that the security through cooperation is the best
answer to an internațional environment affected
by globalization and by the new risks and challen-
ges. A win-win strategy is the only reasonable
solution for a peaceful coexistence of the demo-
cratic States. Of course, the strong States, those
which had a socio-political cohesion and a workable
economy, are in a much better position to enter
effective forms of cooperation than the weak or
----P78~|------------------------------------------
failing States. The strong ones can rely on the
consent of their populations when they decide to
cooperate. The democratic consent is the best
guarantee for the popular support for inter-state
cooperation.
So, the Balkan countries were generally
speaking, successful in their efforts to modernize,
to transform and improve, and they did it by
accepting to play the game of the cooperation,
either in an institutionalized form, or in a informai
one. But we should remember that the most
effective organizations of cooperation have been
promoted from abroad. The Stability Pact for South
East Europe, the SECI and Royaumont initiatives
were all brought by the EU, US and other States
and organizations.
Today, the Greater Black Sea Region is in a
position that suggests some resemblance with the
Balkans ten years ago. There are very different
countries, with specific visions and interests, each
has its own history and foreign policy, and
therefore one cannot speak about a common Black
Sea identity.
In contrast with the Euro-Atlantic space,
security is not conceived, imagined as indivisible
and unique. Usually, each country wanted to
enhance its own security by itself or by a limited
form of cooperation. Like the Western Balkans,
the Greater Black Sea region is a regional security
complex. There are patterns of interaction ranging
from hostility and mistrust to partnership and even
friendship. This reflects historic preferences,
happy and unhappy events for each nation. But
history should not become an insurmountable
obstacle if States really want to forge cooperative
ties. Nobody is so radical to stand that the nations
should rewrite their history only to improve
relations with the other ones, by forgetting sensitive
issues, remembrances of discord and hostility.
History doesn’t have to be neglected because it is
a bench-mark, a vital element for a people’s identity.
Only it should be interpreted in a constructive way.
For those States which had a glorious history
of regional hegemony in areas like the Black Sea
and the Balkans, it must be clear that the ‘animus
dominandi’ spirit (quoting famous IR theorist Hans
Morgenthau21) is not well suited for the contem-
porary world. Hegemony, be it a hard military one
or a softer one, usually creates mistrust, rivalry
and even hatred. In a globalized world when
everybody can see closely what the others are
-----------■ Review of Military History ■------
doing, when the risks of convențional war are
diminishing while the asymmetric transnațional
threats are more and more important, the
community of democratic States should always
strive for a multilateralist solution to all the regional
and global issues of security. Even if there is no
Black Sea-Caspian identity, even if the Balkans
contain EU and NATO members plus non-
members, it must be a common will to assert the
‘ownership’ principie in a multilateral framework
that doesn’t exclude other States outside the regions
themselves.
As all the IR theorists and practitioners
perfectly know, the inter-state cooperation in the
“hard” security field, that is military one, is much
more difficult to realize than the economic,
environmental and cultural one. Military security
is still a very sensitive topic in the GBSR. But even
in the Balkans the situation is not perfect, as long
as not all the region’s countries belong to NATO
and the EU. Anyway, we have Bosnia Herzegovina,
Serbia and Montenegro which eventually became
PfP countries and are on their way for a possible
future enlargement. More than that, Albania and
Croația has been included in a new NATO enlar-
gement wave, their Adriatic Charter proving to be
an effective and credible cooperative framework,
worth to be replicated by the other States who want
to integrate the Euro-Atlantic security space.
FYROM also has its chances to be a NATO member
and Romania warmly encourages Greece and
FYROM to find a amiable solution for their cultural
and political dispute.
In my opinion, the lessons of stabilizing the
Balkans through institutionalized cooperation are
useful also for the Black Sea Area. The existence
of BLACKSEAFOR and the SEEBRIG could be a
first step in the long way of building an inclusive
multilateral cooperative security framework,
focused on the military area. It is time for institu-
tionalizing a mechanism of multilateral cooperation
much more effective and with a potențial of
confidence-building.
Therefore, the economic cooperation has been
the easiest way to set up closer ties between these
States who had the rațional interest to create
domestic welfare and to be recognized as valuable
partners of dialogue by the Western States and
organizations. Above all, most of them, especially
the new ones, realized that it was vital for their
regained independence and sovereignty to avoid
----■ Review of Military History ■-----------------
the Black Sea region domination by one single
power. Multilateralism has been an effective
strategy for the Balkans in the second half of the
ninth decade, after the Dayton agreement. For
the Black Sea region’s States there is a choice
between effective and wide multilateralism on one
side, and bilateral cooperation with preferred
neighbors or with a dominant regional power. In
my opinion, multilateralism is more adequate as it
brings a sense of common vision and common
interests and also it avoids the zero-sum game
perception from the excluded States.
The liberal logic of internațional relations
stipulates that cooperation is a rațional behavior
for those States which does not consider each other
as enemies. It’s about absolute gains, not relative
ones. Sometimes it’s better to work collectively if
the final output is bigger than that one can achieve
by itself. But setting up a long-term and effective
cooperation is not easy, because States often
mistrusted each other. In an anarchic and dan-
gerous internațional order, based on the fight for
power and security, it was thought that cooperating
could be a dangerous game because States were
ultimate rivals and only occasionally allies. Being
a ‘realist’, a pragmatic foreign policy decision-
maker meant to behave as an egoistic actor,
avoiding to put too much trust in a relation with
others. That is avoiding cooperation or keeping it
atalowlevel.
Obviously, the new security environment after
the Cold War proved that such strategies are of
limited utility. As more and more States in the world
are democratic and with market economies, they
understood that only through cooperation they can
increase security and promote welfare for their
citizens. So, it is important to find areas of common
interests and expected common gains.
One of the most powerful incentives to coo-
peration in the Black Sea Region was offered by
the large oii and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea
basin and Central-Asia. To transport these huge
quantities to the EU States, one needs security and
cooperation in the Black Sea area, and avoiding
the facto monopolies instituted by a country.
If the Caspian and Central Asia are one of the
main regions were natural energy is extracted, the
Black Sea and the Balkans are essential areas for
the transportation of gas and oii. Therefore, there
is a rațional need for cooperation between Black
Sea, Caucasus and the Balkan States.
------------------------------------ph—
Greece and Romania has a privileged position
towards the non-EU Balkan and Black Sea States
and their tradition of cooperation and supporting
the modernization and democratization of neigh-
boring countries will help them improving the
regional stability and also support EU and NATO
further enlargements, if this will be the case. Both
of them see the Balkans and Black Sea as strate-
gically very important areas and refer to their
history and cultural heritage. So, together they
can shape EU regional dimensions in these areas
and enhance the chances for the European
Neighborhood Policy’s success.
1	Nicolae Ecobescu, Nicolae Micu, “Black Sea
Multilateral Cooperation: New Stage, Wider
Opportunities”, in Romanian Journal of International
Alfairs, voi. IX, 2-3, 2003, pp. 246-256.
2	Ibidem, p. 248.
3	http://www.bsec-organization.org/main.
aspx?ID=About_BSEC.
4	Vasile Popa, “Noi Inițiative ale Organizației de
Cooperare Economica la Marea Neagra”, in Impact
Strategic, nr. 3 (24)/ 2007, UNAP-CSSAS, p. 79.
5	http://www.acci.gr/trade/No33/TRADE_52_
53.pdf.
6	BSEC, www.mae.ro.
7	Nick Butler, “Energy Security. A New Agenda
For Europe”, Oct-Nov 2004, CER Bulletin, Issue 38,
www.cer.org.uk.
8	Olexander Pavliuk, Ivanna Klimpush-Tsintadze
(eds), The Black Sea Region. Cooperation and Security
Building, East West Institute, 2004, pp. 139-141.
9	http://www.bstdb.org/pdf/Country_Strategy_
20072010_Romania.pdf, accessed in July 4, 2008.
10	http://www.bstdb.org/pdf/Country_ Strategy_
20072010_Greece.pdf, accessed in Juky 4, 2008.
“Moreover, it applies to all neighbors whether they
are potențial EU candidates (Albania), accession
candidates (Turkey) or new EU entrants (Bulgaria as
of 1 January 2007). There has been impressive growth
in commercial and investment ties between Greece
and new EU members Bulgaria and Romania, spurred
by the prospect of the EU accession process of the
latter, but even so there exist many further
possibilities, particularly if levels of integration among
neighboring EU member countries in western Europe
are taken as standards of comparison”
11	http://www.bstdb.org/press_releases/2008/
20080608_16am.htm.
12	Panagiota Manoli, “Greece’s Engagement With
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation”, in Xenophon
Paper, no. 2, July 2007, ICBSS, Athens, p. 79, http://
icbss.org. This author considers that Greece, Romania
and possibly also Bulgaria will try to create a Black
Sea Synergy Working Group within the BSEC.
13	The Organization of the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation (BSEC), June 25, 2007, http://
www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/
Article.aspx?office=l&folder=904&article=21032.
14	We should also mention that at the Komotini
Council, in 2005, Greece managed to include a new
issue, good governance, on the BSEC agenda and a
new Working Group on Instituțional Renewal and Good
Governance has been created. See especially
Panagiota Manoli, “Greece’s Engagement With the
Black Sea Economic Cooperation”, in Xenophon Paper,
no. 2, July 2007, ICBSS, Athens, p. 77, http://icbss.org.
15	Nicolae Micu, “The Policy of Romania Towards
The BSEC And The Black Sea Region”, in Xenophon
Paper, no. 2, July 2007, ICBSS, Athens, p. 105, http:/
/icbss.org.
16	http://icbss.org/index.php?option= content
&task=view&id=189, accessed in July 2008.
17	International centre for Black Sea Studies, http:/
/icbss.org/index.php? option= content&task=
view&id=189.
18	N. Micu, “The Policy of Romania Towards The
BSEC And The Black Sea Region”, op. cit, p. 105.
19	Romania Officially asks for a EU policy for the
Black Sea, January 24, 2007, http://www. euractiv. ro/
uniunea-europeana.
20	“Black Sea Synergy A New Regional Cooperation
Inițiative”, (COM [2007] 160 final, April 11, 2007, http:/
/europa.eu.int.
21	http://www.kentuckypress.com/0813123216
excerpt.cfm, accessed on July 6, 2008.
Coordinator Editors: Commander (Ret) GHEORGHE VARTIC
Editors: Dr. MIRCEA SOREANU, MONA ELENA SIMINIUC
Layout: ELENA LEMNARU
Cover: ADRIAN PANDEA
Tiparul executat la Tipografia Filaret
B 77/13.08.2008
80
■ Review of Military History ■